JEAN ZIEGLER

ìLes nouveaux maîtres du mondeî
Après les mafias internationales et les banques suisses, le sociologue et agitateur genevois revient à líattaque. Dans son dernier essai, il síen prend au ìprédateurî, le capitalisme mondialisé, et à ses ìmercenairesî, les institutions financières et commerciales internationales. (13Ýnovembre 2002)
 
 

Votre dernier livre síintitule Les Nouveaux Maîtres du monde et ceux qui leur résistent*. Qui sont ces ìnouveaux maîtresîÝ?
Ce sont les minces oligarchies qui détiennent le capital financier spéculatif mondialisé et que, dans mon livre, jíappelle les prédateurs. Ce sont les héritiers de cette classe de dominateurs blancs traditionnels qui gèrent líéconomie depuis cinq cents ans. Près de 90Ý% des 1Ý000Ýmilliards de dollars échangés chaque jour passent par les mains de ces sociétés. Des sociétés multinationales, comme Microsoft, líUnion de banques suisses, la Société Générale, General FoodÖ Aujourdíhui, 200 de ces entreprises contrôlent près de 28Ý% de la production de richesse mondiale.
 
 

Où se trouvent les ìmaîtres du mondeî et comment exercent-ils leur pouvoirÝ?
 
 

Leurs sièges se trouvent, ainsi que líavait prédit il y a quelques années Max Gallo, dans un étroit triangle qui relie Tokyo, New York et Stockholm. Ils exercent leur pouvoir à travers la médiation des organisations mondialistes mercenairesÝ: le Fond monétaire international (FMI), la Banque mondiale et líOrganisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), qui mettent en úuvre le consensus de Washington. Il síagit díun ensemble díaccords informels conclus tout au long des annéesÝ80-90 entre les principales sociétés transcontinentales, les banques de Wall Street, la Réserve fédérale américaine et les organismes financiers internationaux (FMI, Banque mondiale). Ces accords informels visent à obtenir, le plus rapidement possible, la liquidation de toute instance régulatrice ­ÝEtat ou organisation internationaleÝ­ la libéralisation la plus totale et rapide de tous les marchés et líinstauration à terme díune stateless global governance, un marché mondial unifié et totalement autorégulé.
 
 

Que reprochez-vous à ces institutionsÝ?
 
 

De mettre en úuvre ce consensus, car il est contraire à la vision de líHistoire et aux valeurs fondatrices de notre société. Le but de líHistoire est de créer une société humaine, dominée par la raison et où líhomme prime sur le capital. Or, ce que les ìmaîtres du mondeî nous offrent, cíest un modèle de société dont la figure centrale est le gladiateur, dont le but principal est la maximisation du profit en un minimum de temps. Ils mettent radicalement en question tout líhéritage des LumièresÝ: les valeurs de solidarité, de réciprocité et de complémentarité entre les êtres, les nations, etc.Ý; le contrat socialÝ; líidée de capacité normative de líEtatÝ; líidée que tout pouvoir sur les hommes ne peut síexercer quíavec leur consentement par délégationÝ; la souveraineté populaire. Tout ça, le capitalisme de la jungle le nie. Son postulat, cíest líautorégulation du marché.
Mais, à bien y voir, níimporte quel énoncé de líidéologie libérale bute sur un mensonge. On nous parle de libre circulation, mais les riches sont davantage protégés que les châtelains du Moyen Âge. Les 3/4 de líhumanité vivent dans le sud du monde et níont pas accès à la richesse du Nord, qui se protège derrière des barrières de quotas et autres brevets infranchissables. Je reviens du BangladeshÝ: là-bas, la seule exportation possible, en dehors des crevettes et de la jute, est le textile. Le pays doit respecter des quotas díexportation qui se réduisent chaque année. Pendant les dix jours où jíy étais, cela a provoqué la mise au chômage de 82Ý000Ýfemmes. Et les privatisationsÝ? Quel sens cela a-t-il de privatiser líeau dans un pays dont la plupart des habitants sont trop pauvres pour la payerÝ? Ou de privatiser des services, comme les contrôles vétérinaires au NigerÝ? Avec le résultat que ces services ne sont plus fournis, car considérés comme non rentables et que les têtes de bétail meurent par dizaines de milliers. Et la disparition des barrières douanièresÝ? Pour le moment, la principale conséquence est que les produits des pays riches déferlent sur les marchés des pays du Sud, dont les produits ne sont pas compétitifs. Et quand bien même ils le seraient ­Ýcomme cíest le cas avec les produits textiles ou agricolesÝ­ ils sont soumis à des quotas ou doivent affronter la concurrence des produits subventionnés du Nord. Pour justifier leur attitude, les ìmaîtres du mondeî síen réfèrent à une vieille croyance libéraleÝ: líeffet de ruissellement. Lorsque líon pose la question à un des grands patronsÝ: ìComment est-ce possible, où va ce monde, comment acceptez-vous que tant de gens meurent, etc.Ý?î, eh bien il répondÝ: ìQuand le marché sera suffisamment libre, il y aura une redistribution automatique des richesses.î Or, il níen est rienÝ: la société du capital mondialisé et líobsession de pouvoir qui habite ses acteurs níont plus rien à voir avec la valeur díusage quelconque des biens. Cíest la cupidité et la volonté de pouvoir qui priment et qui níont pas de limites.
 
 

Quelle est la conséquence de ce comportementÝ?
 
 

Les inégalités se sont creusées. Les riches sont devenus de plus en plus riches et les pauvres de plus en plus pauvresÝ: aujourdíhui, 826Ýmillions de personnes ­Ýdont 95Ý% vivent dans les pays en voie de développement sont chroniquement et gravement sous-alimentées. Toutes les sept secondes un enfant de moins de dix ans meurt de faim. Chaque jour, 100Ý000Ýpersonnes meurent de la faim ou de ses suites immédiates. En décidant en quelques minutes où placer leurs capitaux en fonction de la maximisation des profits, les ìmaîtres du mondeî décident chaque jour de la vie et de la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes. Cíest pour ça que je dis que, aujourdíhui, quiconque meurt de faim est assassiné, parce que ce níest plus une fatalité.
 
 

Mais ces problèmes ont toujours existéÖ
 
 

Oui, mais ce qui est radicalement nouveau, cíest le nombre des victimesÝ: aujourdíhui, on connaît les chiffres et on a les moyens de combattre la faim. Aujourdíhui, la planète croule sous la richesse. Le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) estime quíen líétat actuel des techniques de production, líagriculture pourrait nourrir 12,5Ýmilliards de personnes, cíest-à-dire donner à chaque individu chaque jour 2Ý700Ýcalories. Or, il níen est rien. Au contraire. Díailleurs, líONU se rend bien compte que la Déclaration universelle des droits de líhomme, qui dans la conscience collective représente les valeurs minimales pour quíune société puisse exister, est insuffisante dans sa formulation actuelle. Comme disait Bertold Brecht, le bulletin de vote ne nourrit pas líaffamé. LíONU a donc décidé de fixer de nouveaux droits de la personne, et le premier de ces droits est le droit à líalimentation. Il y a deux ans, le secrétaire général Kofi Annan mía confié la mission de rédiger un rapport sur la possibilité de mettre sur place une convention internationale sur le droit à líalimentation.

Quíen est-il des instances nationales et internationales susceptibles de réglementer le commerce mondialiséÝ?

Au niveau national, les privatisations à tour de bras ont mis sous tutelle les Parlements et les gouvernements et privé de leur pouvoir régulateur les institutions publiques. Les gouvernements appliquent ce que le capital financier international leur dit, dans les domaines de la fiscalité, de la politique salariale, de la politique de sécurité sociale etc. Les Bourses sanctionnent immédiatement toute décision qui níirait pas dans ce sens.
Quant aux instances financières et commerciales internationales, elles représentent essentiellement les intérêts des pays riches et excluent totalement les pays pauvres des processus décisionnels. Face à elles, líONU est presque totalement impuissanteÝ: les institutions de Bretton Woods [Banque mondiale et FMI] annulent dans leur pratique quotidienne ce que les agences spécialisées des Nations unies peuvent faire dans leur activité quotidienne. LíONU est devenue totalement schizophrèneÝ: alors que líOrganisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement (PNUD) ou líOrganisation pour líalimentation et líagriculture (FAO) essaient de soutenir des structures de développement dans le tiers-monde, le FMI intervient et réduit à néant ces efforts en imposant des programmes díajustement structurels et des privatisations.
 
 

Comment les pays riches influencent-ils líOMCÝ?
 
 

Par líarrogance la plus totale. Le FMI fonctionne selon le principe ìun dollar une voixîÝ: les Etats membres y ont donc un poids proportionnel au produit intérieur brut. Les Etats-Unis par exemple ont 17Ý% des voix. Dans un souci de démocratie, on a voulu appliquer à líOMC le principe du consensus, de líunanimité entre les 146Ýmembres du Conseil général. Mais líOMC est complètement dominée par líUnion européenne, les Etats-Unis et le Japon, qui -ÝensembleÝ-, sont à líorigine de 81Ý% des échanges dans le monde. Comment voulez-vous quíun pays comme le Niger ou le Bangladesh fasse le poidsÝ? Par ailleurs, pour être présent aux négociations, il faut quíun pays entretienne un représentant permanent à líOMC, à Genève, ce que la plupart des pays du tiers-monde ne peuvent se permettre. Ils sont donc exclus des processus de décision. Enfin, líOMC agit en dehors de toute transparenceÝ: ses traités constitutifs comportent plus de 26Ý000Ýpages. Cela pose des problèmes díinterprétation énormes. Et lorsquíil y a des divergences de vues entre Etats membres, ils passent devant líorgane de règlement des différends, qui décide de líinterprétation et inflige des sanctions immédiates et sévères. Cela mobilise des cohortes díavocatsÝ: à Genève, il síest créé un nouveau barreau díavocats spécialisés qui ne traitent que ces procédures. Seule une poignée díEtats peuvent síoffrir leurs services. Les autres sont condamnés à renoncer à toute initiative pour défendre leurs intérêts.
 
 

Díoù peut alors venir le salut díaprès vousÝ?
 
 

De ce que jíappelle ìla nouvelle société civile planétaireî. Ce sont par exemple les organisations ouvrières et syndicales, les ONG, les mouvements paysans, comme Via Campesina, qui représente surtout les paysans du tiers-monde ­Ý75Ý% des 1,2Ýmilliard díêtres humains les plus pauvres sont des paysansÖ Cíest une mystérieuse ìfraternité de la nuitî, qui apparaît de temps en temps pour répondre aux maîtres du monde, comme à Porto Alegre, líanti-Davos, ou tout récemment à Florence.
 
 

On reproche à ce mouvement díêtre divisé, de ne représenter que des intérêts partiels et de níexprimer que des refus, sans avoir une vision constructive. Comment pensez-vous quíil puisse faire face à un adversaire organisé, structuré et doté díune ìforce de frappeî redoutableÝ?
 
 

Marx a ditÝ: ìLe révolutionnaire doit être capable díentendre pousser líherbe.î Il níest pas question aujourdíhui de négocier une coalition hâtive entre quelques restes de gauchisme et des ruines du trotskisme. Il faut changer de perspectiveÝ: on est aujourdíhui dans un moment de ìrupture des tempsî. Ce qui apparaît comme une faiblesse de notre mouvement planétaire, ce que líadversaire qualifie de ìrevendications négativesî ­Ýabolition du FMI, de la Banque mondiale, de líOMC, interdiction des OGMÝ­ est en fait une force. Lorsque ces institutions nous demandent ce que nous voulons et nous reprochent de ne pas avoir de projet et donc de ne pouvoir dialoguer avec nous, je donne líexemple des révolutionnaires deÝ1789Ý: ils savaient ce quíils ne voulaient pas, mais níavaient pas de projet précis. Demander aux altermondialistes quel est leur projet, cíest comme demander, au soir du 14Ýjuillet, à ceux qui avaient pris la Bastille de réciter le premier article de la Constitution de la IèreÝRépublique ou de la Déclaration des droits de líhomme et du citoyenÝ! Le programme du mouvement se fait en marchant.
 
 

Propos recueillis par Gian Paolo Accardo,
© Courrierinternational.com*ÝJean Ziegler, Les Nouveaux Maîtres du monde et ceux qui leur résistent, Fayard, Paris, 2002, 364Ýp., 20Ýeuros.

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Rebonds

Penser le 11 septembre (fin). Il est raisonnable de penser que les convulsions de la mondialisation sont plutôt devant nous que derrière nous.
Un ordre mondial relâché 
 

Par Zaki LAIDI
mardi 10 septembre 2002 

Zaki Laïdi, chercheur au Ceri, est l'auteur 
d'«Un monde privé de sens», Hachette Pluriel, 2002.

Le Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (Ceri, Sciences-Po) organise aujourd'hui, en collaboration avec Libération, le colloque «Penser le 11 septembre». Il sera intégralement retransmis sur France Culture dans la nuit du 11 au 12 septembre. On lira ci-dessous la contribution d'un des participants, dernière d'une série publiée dans ces pages depuis une semaine.

En dépit de son caractère spectaculaire, violent et professionnel, le 11 septembre n'a pas véritablement introduit de rupture dans l'ordre du monde. Parce que celui-ci est devenu excessivement fluide, il paraît, tel un torrent déferlant, pouvoir poursuivre son parcours erratique en emportant dans sa crue attaques terroristes, chocs financiers, manipulations comptables et guerres civiles, guerres de la terre - comme au Proche-Orient - en attendant celles de l'eau et de l'air.

Mais dire que le 11 septembre n'est pas un événement fondateur au sens d'un avant et d'un après (comparable à l'après-prise de la Bastille, l'après-guerre ou l'après-guerre froide), ne saurait nous conduire à en minorer l'importance. Le 11 septembre est à la fois le «cinquième élément» de la mondialisation en même temps que le révélateur de son incapacité à faire système. Celle-ci reste fondamentalement dépourvue de grammaire politique ou si l'on préfère de principe d'ordre. Au mieux amalgame-t-elle plusieurs syntaxes : la marchande, la cosmopolitique et la nationale qui ne font pas résonance entre elles. Le 11 septembre complète le tableau d'un espace mondialisé tout en le déconstruisant encore un peu plus.

Cette nouvelle mondialisation - car on en a aussi connu une au XIXe siècle - s'est véritablement nouée à la fin des années 80 autour de quatre grandes mutations. La première a été l'ouverture des marchés financiers et d'investissement favorisée par les mutations technologiques, idéologiques et anthropologiques. Technologiques en raison de la révolution du temps réel, idéologiques par suite du recul du keynésianisme au profit du néolibéralisme, anthropologiques enfin en raison de l'accélération des processus d'individualisation qui ne sont pas, quoi qu'en pensent certains, la seule résultante de la déferlante néolibérale.

Sur cette première ligne de force est venue se superposer peu de temps après la chute du mur de Berlin, au point qu'on en vint à imaginer naïvement l'avènement planétaire d'une «démocratie de marché» dès lors que l'échec communiste résultait bien de cette double absence : démocratie et marché. Entre ces deux événements s'est inséré Tchernobyl qui, rétrospectivement, a bien marqué la naissance d'une conscience environnementale planétaire, conscience dont Johannesburg a révélé à la fois la vitalité et les ambiguïtés. Enfin, peu de temps après, est arrivé Internet qui est venu nourrir l'imaginaire d'un espace mondial déterritorialisé, dématérialisé, où le pouvoir et la ségrégation n'obéissaient plus à la logique de l'espace mais à celle du temps compressé. 

Bien que dissociés et très contradictoires, ces quatre éléments pouvaient nourrir l'illusion de faire système. Et de ce point de vue, on ne dira jamais assez que les mouvements antimondialisation, comme avant eux le marxisme, ont puissamment contribué à faire de la mondialisation un système, un avatar du capitalisme mondialisé dont l'épicentre serait l'Amérique et le moteur exclusif le marché. Le 11 septembre est venu perturber cet agencement. Il a définitivement ruiné la fable d'une mondialisation tranquille, rationnelle, déterritorialisée et a-historique. Aux commandes des Boeing de la mort, les kamikazes nous ont ramenés sur terre. Ils nous ont rappelé que les ressorts de l'homme étaient intacts et que les technologies nouvelles n'étaient au fond que des technologies : elles étaient et restaient disponibles pour toutes les aventures humaines, les plus belles comme les plus viles. 

Le 11 septembre nous renvoie ainsi au primordialisme de l'homme et de son histoire. Mais ce retour ne doit pas être mal compris. Il n'exprime pas une sorte de revanche contre la mondialisation. Tout au contraire, il élargit le spectre de ses réappropriations multiples et incontrôlables. C'est probablement la clarification - et peut-être la seule - introduite par le 11 septembre. Du coup, elle a passablement ruiné cette idée martelée avec constance par les militants antimondialisation pour lesquels mondialisation = américanisation.

Certes, l'Amérique de l'après-11 septembre est plus que jamais forte et arrogante. Parce que vulnérable, elle exprime dans un même élan suffisance et autosuffisance. Mais au travers de l'acharnement qu'elle met à se soustraire aux disciplines mondiales, dont la plus symbolique est celle de la Cour pénale internationale, elle montre que la dynamique de la mondialisation peut lui échapper. Le fait d'ailleurs que le réseau d'Al-Qaeda n'ait pas été réellement démantelé, malgré le succès de l'intervention afghane, en porte témoignage. Après le 11 septembre, l'Amérique de Bush nous dit qu'elle est déterminée à américaniser le monde sans mondialiser l'Amérique.

Dans l'immédiat après-11 septembre, certains esprits ont cru péremptoirement voir dans cette tragédie la faillite du néolibéralisme. Dans les faits, les choses se révèlent bien plus complexes. Les Etats-Unis n'ont jamais pensé que la sécurité nationale incarnée par l'Etat devait être mise en balance avec la dérégulation. Le grand dérégulateur que fut Ronald Reagan fut également le plus grand adepte du keynésianisme militaire, celui qui permit aux Etats-Unis de gagner la guerre des étoiles. Et lors des négociations avortées sur l'AMI, les Etats-Unis furent l'Etat qui exprima le plus grand nombre de réserves à l'accord, précisément pour des raisons de sécurité nationale. Ce qui est vrai, c'est que les Etats-Unis s'efforcent toujours de dissuader les autres de faire ce qu'ils font. On l'a vu au moment de l'affaire de l'anthrax : ils ont invoqué des clauses d'urgence nationale pour faciliter le recours aux génériques alors que jusqu'à la conférence de Doha, ils refusaient cette possibilité aux pays du Sud. 

Pour le reste rien n'a changé. L'administration Bush continue à voir dans la baisse des impôts - qui profite massivement aux revenus les plus élevés - la meilleure source de reprise, et la privatisation de la Sécurité sociale est plus que jamais à l'ordre du jour. De ce point de vue, l'affaire Enron apparaît bien plus révélatrice des défaillances du capitalisme financier et de ses règles comptables que le 11 septembre. Le Tchernobyl du néolibéralisme maladroitement prédit par Ulrich Beck (1) n'a pas eu lieu. La puissance des forces du marché est plus que jamais là, comme l'a montré le sommet de Johannesburg, même s'il faut arrêter de voir dans celle-ci une force malfaisante.

Symétriquement, l'idée d'une contestation antimondialisation délégitimée par la violence du 11 septembre ne paraît pas davantage crédible. Même si les mouvements antimondialisation surpolitisés comme Attac semblent confirmer leur infirmité politique à proposer des alternatives concrètes - à la différence de ce que font Oxfam ou Greenpeace -, il serait naïf de croire que le débat sur la mondialisation est clos. C'est même tout le contraire. Quinze ans après son lancement, la mondialisation néolibérale se heurte à une formidable inertie. La mobilité sociale des nations s'est révélée très faible, alors que les inégalités sociales ont bel et bien crû, quelle que soit la méthode de calcul retenue. Les grands bénéficiaires restent, pour l'essentiel, les pays riches, même si une intégration au marché mondial intériorisée et non pas simplement imposée de l'extérieur, reste la meilleure voie possible pour les pays en développement. 

Historiquement, la mondialisation n'a véritablement réussi que parce que la mobilité du travail avait accompagné celle du capital. On ne voit ni comment les pays riches pourraient accepter ce scénario, ni comment ils pourront l'éviter. C'est pourquoi il est raisonnable de penser que les convulsions de la mondialisation sont devant nous.

Si le 11 septembre n'a donc pas mis fin le moins du monde à la mondialisation, l'après-11 septembre a révélé l'importance du jeu des Etats et la persistance des logiques de souveraineté. Si des Etats comme la Russie, la Chine ou l'Inde ont trouvé leur compte dans l'après-11 septembre, c'est bien sûr parce qu'ils ont eu aussi à gérer leurs terroristes locaux qui se trouvent - par chance, pourrait-on dire - eux aussi musulmans. Mais il y a plus : ces Etats, inquiétés par la mondialisation - pour de multiples raisons d'ailleurs -, ont vu dans le 11 septembre l'occasion inespérée de rentabiliser à leur profit la syntaxe politique qu'ils maîtrisent le mieux : celle de la souveraineté. La souveraineté, comme la dissuasion nucléaire, confère aux Etats un pouvoir égalisateur. Elle permet ou nourrit l'illusion de traiter d'égal à égal avec l'Amérique, de pouvoir lui arracher des concessions, bref de jouer sur des registres autres que celui de la compétition économique. 

Dans cette affaire, les petits Etats ne sont pas en reste. Dès lors que le terrorisme se mondialise, chaque Etat croit avoir quelque chose à vendre et donc à échanger avec l'Amérique. Les Etats arabes notamment l'ont bien compris. Ils ont beau être révulsés par la politique moyen-orientale de Washington, ils se font une raison. L'Amérique a suspendu sine die la publication de la liste mondiale d'aptitude à la démocratie. De ce point de vue, c'est moins l'Etat cosmopolitique qui sort renforcé par le 11 septembre, que l'Etat national malveillant.

Dans ce système de plus en plus baroque, où des logiques étatiques se plaquent sur des logiques transnationales, c'est l'Europe qui apparaît comme l'acteur politique le plus affaibli, voire le plus déboussolé.

La philosophie politique de l'Europe repose, depuis Maastricht, sur un double pari : faire reculer les logiques classiques de souveraineté nationale au profit des logiques de souveraineté partagée, promouvoir une dynamique de gouvernance mondiale, à la fois pour tenir compte de la pluralité des acteurs du jeu social mondial (Etats, marchés, société civile) mais aussi pour réguler la mondialisation. D'où l'insistance de l'Europe à se battre pour Kyoto, pour les énergies renouvelables, pour la prise en compte des normes environnementales dans le commerce mondial, pour la reconnaissance des normes sociales fondamentales dans ce même commerce.

Ces deux processus sont en péril. Les grands Etats européens, dont la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Espagne et l'Italie, sont probablement tentés, après le 11 septembre, de réactiver plus ou moins subtilement les logiques spécifiquement nationales en se disant ceci : pourquoi l'Europe serait-elle la seule région du monde où la souveraineté nationale classique devrait reculer ? A cette aune, l'intergouvernementalité apparaît comme la perspective la plus optimiste.

Quant au volet gouvernance mondiale, il est au point mort. Le seul fragment qui tienne est l'OMC. Celle-ci vient par deux fois de mettre en porte-à-faux Washington avec les règles commerciales mondiales, ce qui montre combien est absurde la critique des antimondialisation qui combattent l'OMC.

Rien, naturellement, n'est jamais joué. Mais pour l'Europe, deux échéances se profilent à l'horizon : l'affaire irakienne et celle de la Cour pénale. La position dominante des Européens est de conditionner toute intervention en Irak à l'accord des Nations unies. Parviendra-t-elle à tenir le cap ? La seconde porte sur la capacité à demander aux pays candidats à l'élargissement de signer des accords bilatéraux avec Washington exemptant par avance des soldats américains de tout déferrement devant la Cour pénale internationale. Sur fond de convention européenne, l'Europe joue une partie extrêmement difficile.

De tout ce que nous venons de dire, on pourrait déduire que le 11 septembre nous confronte à une dynamique du chaos. Mais cette interprétation un peu paresseuse du monde ne rend pas compte de la complexité de celui-ci. Le système mondial n'est pas chaotique car il est doté quoiqu'on en dise de coupe-feu considérables. Ce qui le caractérise en fait le mieux, c'est son caractère baroque. A en croire le Robert, baroque est synonyme de biscornu, choquant, étrange, bizarre et irrégulier. C'est précisément l'image que donnait, le 11 septembre, l'espace dévasté des tours de Manhattan. 

Ý

© Libération 

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Les conservateurs au pouvoir ne représentent pas l'Amérique 
Michael Lind, chercheur et essayiste, a rompu, en 1995, avec les républicains, en dénonçant la montée en puissance de la droite chrétienne. 

Par Pascal RICHE
samedi 03 mai 2003 
Ari Fleischer, porte-parole de la Maison Blanche, affirme que Bush prend ses décisions «comme un dirigeant laïque», mettant de côté sa religion. Le croyez-vous ?

Non, car George W. Bush croit sincèrement que Dieu le guide. Il est imprégné d'une culture religieuse fondamentaliste, qu'il a adoptée quand il approchait de la quarantaine. Je suis texan et je connais très bien cette culture. Je vous assure qu'au Texas, les hommes politiques ne simulent pas quand ils affichent leur foi en Jésus. Les conservateurs religieux, qui sont aujourd'hui au pouvoir à Washington, évitent d'ailleurs de faire trop de publicité autour de leurs pratiques : ils n'insistent pas, par exemple, sur les réunions de prières qu'ils organisent à la Maison Blanche ou au département de la Justice.

L'Amérique n'est-elle pas de plus en plus religieuse ?

C'est l'impression - fausse - qu'elle donne, à cause de l'importance qu'a prise le Sud dans la vie politique américaine depuis une trentaine d'années. Les démocrates ont cherché à retenir les électeurs blancs du Sud, les républicains ont cherché à les attirer. Or les Blancs du Sud sont profondément religieux et très pratiquants. Pour les séduire, les candidats - notamment à la présidentielle - font de la surenchère : c'est à qui parlera le plus de Dieu. Mais cette période est en train de s'achever. Ceux qui, parmi les Blancs du Sud, sont profondément religieux, ont tous basculé chez les républicains. L'enjeu disparaît, et on devrait de moins en moins entendre parler de religion dans les discours. D'autant que la surenchère religieuse commence à nuire aux démocrates. En 2000, à force de dire Jésus par-ci, Jésus par-là, Al Gore a laissé filer des tas d'électeurs vers Ralph Nader.

Certains analystes évoquent un retour de la religion, surtout après le 11 septembre 2001...

C'est un mythe. Regardez les sondages de Barna (1). Depuis les années 60, l'Amérique est de moins en moins religieuse et de plus en plus sécularisée. Les gens vont moins à l'église, et le nombre d'athées est passé de 0 à plus de 15 %. Ils forment maintenant le deuxième groupe après les catholiques ! Le 11 septembre n'a pas interrompu cette évolution, qui nous rapproche peu à peu de l'Europe. Les Eglises protestantes libérales - méthodiste, épiscopalienne, presbytérienne - perdent des membres. Pour justifier ce phénomène, les conservateurs expliquent que ces croyants reviennent vers les Eglises plus traditionnelles, catholique, baptiste ou autres. C'est faux : les gens qui quittent les Eglises protestantes libérales perdent tout simplement la foi. Quant à la croissance des Eglises catholique et baptiste, elle est mécanique : les pratiquants de ces dernières ont plus d'enfants et l'immigration en provenance d'Amérique latine grossit les rangs des catholiques. Il est faux de croire que toute l'Amérique est à l'image de l'administration Bush. Celle-ci ne représente que 30 % de l'Amérique, et si elle a pu prendre le pouvoir, c'est uniquement à cause du système électoral.

Si le conservatisme du Sud domine le pouvoir politique américain, c'est seulement un accident ?

Ce phénomène était en gestation pendant les trente dernières années. Entre la guerre de Sécession et jusqu'en 1932, les Américains du Sud étaient écartés du gouvernement. Ils formaient les bataillons du parti démocrate, qui était alors conservateur et raciste. Pour gagner le pouvoir, Roosevelt, un New-Yorkais, s'est allié avec des libéraux protestants du Nord, des conservateurs du Sud, des catholiques d'origine irlandaise présents dans les syndicats, etc. Le gouvernement du New Deal, soit dit en passant, n'était pas si à gauche qu'on le croit : il l'était sur des questions comme la sécurité sociale, la redistribution des richesses, mais pas sur les questions raciales ou morales. Cette coalition a par la suite explosé lorsque les démocrates du Nord ont exigé que soient reconnus les droits civiques des Noirs.

Les démocrates du Sud ont alors commencé à passer dans les rangs du parti républicain. Ce dernier avait pourtant été celui de la défense des droits civiques des Noirs, mais, dans les années 60, les années Goldwater-Nixon, les républicains ont commencé à flatter le racisme du Sud. Depuis les années 90, la majorité des Blancs du Sud votent républicain. C'est une situation très nouvelle dans notre paysage politique. Jusque-là, conservateurs et progressistes se répartissaient entre les deux partis. Après ce grand reclassement, les conservateurs sont aujourd'hui tous regroupés au sein du parti républicain. Et comme les Américains du Sud sont majoritairement conservateurs, ce sont eux qui dominent ce camp. Les deux partis sont maintenant polarisés à la fois sur des lignes géographiques et sur des lignes idéologiques, ce qui n'avait jamais eu lieu.

Jusque-là, les conservateurs du Sud ne pouvaient pas émerger comme force politique ?

Non, parce que leur influence était diluée au sein du parti démocrate, qui regroupait toutes sortes de gens, des personnes proches des syndicats, des défenseurs des droits civiques, etc. Maintenant, ils sont dans le même parti que tous les autres conservateurs du pays. Et ces conservateurs sont au pouvoir alors qu'ils ne représentent pas la majorité des Américains. Ils sont surreprésentés à cause du mode d'élection du Sénat et du Président. Au Sénat, chaque Etat a droit à deux sénateurs, quel que soit le nombre d'habitants, du Wyoming (500 000 habitants, ndlr) à la Californie (33 millions d'habitants, ndlr). Les Etats ruraux de l'Ouest - conservateurs - sont donc surreprésentés. Environ 10 % du public américain élit 50 % du Sénat ! Quant au Président, du fait du système du collège électoral, il a été élu comme vous le savez alors qu'il avait une minorité des voix exprimées.

Quelles sont les conséquences de cette nouvelle situation ?

On a des radicaux au pouvoir. George W. Bush est bien plus à droite que Ronald Reagan, par exemple. La façon dont Bush creuse le déficit est délibérée : il s'agit d'aller si loin qu'on sera obligé par la suite, pour rééquilibrer les comptes, de tailler dans les dépenses publiques... Cela correspond à l'idéologie des conservateurs du Sud, républicains comme démocrates, qui n'ont jamais accepté le legs de Roosevelt et du New Deal : ils veulent revenir à ce qu'étaient les Etats-Unis dans les années 20, lorsque le gouvernement fédéral était beaucoup plus réduit. Ils rêvent d'une sorte de contre-révolution. Ils veulent également revenir sur la politique étrangère définie à l'issue de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et basée sur les Nations unies, le droit international, la décolonisation... Même s'ils parlent d'exporter la démocratie, ces conservateurs s'inscrivent dans cette tradition raciste du Sud confédéré, qui ne jurait que par la supériorité anglo-saxonne face au reste du monde.

Rien n'indique pourtant que George W. Bush soit raciste...

Il n'est pas raciste, mais il est entouré des fantômes de cette tradition. Ce n'est pas un hasard si les conservateurs d'aujourd'hui affichent ainsi leur anglophilie, vouent un culte à Churchill et tentent depuis deux ans de promouvoir l'idée d'une «anglosphère» réunissant Angleterre, Etats-Unis, Australie, Canada, et Nouvelle-Zélande... L'idée est que ces pays auraient des valeurs communes et seraient les seuls à contribuer à la civilisation humaine... Pourtant, la tradition politique américaine est beaucoup plus proche de celle des républicains français que de celle des Britanniques ! Si l'on exclut une dimension raciste, quel est en effet le lien qui nous unit aux Néo-Zélandais ?

Quelles sont les racines de cette culture ?

Politiquement, ce pays est divisé, depuis le XIXe siècle, en deux cultures, qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec une division entre conservatisme et progressisme. Les élites du Nord-Est et celles du Sud viennent des deux camps qui s'opposaient pendant la guerre civile anglaise du XVIIe siècle. Quand les puritains ont pris le pouvoir en Angleterre, les aristocrates ont fui vers la Virginie. Quand la monarchie a été restaurée, les puritains se sont enfuis à leur tour vers le Massachusetts et en Nouvelle-Angleterre. Les élites du Nord, aux racines puritaines et calvinistes, ont cette vision d'une communauté intégrante, d'une société basée sur des idéaux moraux. Ils ont conduit la plupart des batailles morales de ce pays : la lutte contre l'esclavage, le féminisme, mais aussi la prohibition. Cette culture a gagné la région des Grands Lacs et la côte pacifique et s'est mêlée à celle des descendants d'Irlandais ou d'Allemands. La tradition issue des aristocrates du Sud, des «cavaliers», s'é tend, elle, de la Virginie au Texas, et a con nu peu de mélanges : la plupart des Blancs sont des descendants de colons anglais.

Quelles sont les principales valeurs des conservateurs du Sud ?

C'est une culture prémoderne, un peu comme en Amérique latine, marquée par l'honneur (et donc la violence), la religion et une forte différenciation entre ce qui est masculin et féminin (d'où cette hostilité extrême à l'homosexualité). Cela ne correspond pas à l'image que le monde a de l'Amérique, celle de bourgeois capitalistes du Nord-Est ou du Middle West.

Ces conservateurs du Sud ne sont pas majoritaires au sein des électeurs républicains, pourquoi les dominent-ils ?

Dans le système américain, ce sont les militants de base, à travers les élections «primaires», qui désignent les candidats. Personne ne vote à ces élections, à part une petite minorité de fanatiques. Le parti démocrate est ainsi bien plus à gauche que ses électeurs. De même, la droite religieuse est disproportionnellement représentée aux primaires du parti républicain. De plus, les républicains les plus libéraux, depuis les années 60, quittent peu à peu le parti pour rejoindre les démocrates. Aujourd'hui, la droite religieuse verrouille donc le parti. Un candidat à la Maison Blanche ne peut plus être favorable à l'avortement. Vous ne pouvez même pas avoir un ticket équilibré, avec un président «pro-vie» et un vice-président «pro-choix» !

Pensez-vous que ces conservateurs du Sud seront longtemps au pouvoir ?

Je pense au contraire qu'il s'agit de la dernière administration de la sorte. Bush a certes 70 % d'opinion favorable, mais seulement 40 % des sondés disent qu'ils voteront pour lui. Si les démocrates gagnent les mêmes Etats que ceux qu'avait remportés Al Gore, plus un tout petit Etat, ils auront la Maison Blanche. Sans Ralph Nader, c'est faisable. En revanche, Bush, lui, pour être élu, doit réussir à convaincre de très nombreux électeurs qui avaient voté pour Gore et pour Nader. A plus long terme, l'immigration et la démographie lamineront l'importance des conservateurs blancs dans le Sud. Les Latinos ont beau être catholiques antiavortement, ils font partie de la classe ouvrière et votent majoritairement démocrate. Et Bush a jeté aux orties le «conservatisme de coeur» qu'il avait promis, préférant imposer des réductions d'impôts orientées vers les riches. Sa contre-révolution économique va, à mon avis, échouer, car les électeurs des classes moyennes tiennent à leur sécurité sociale, leurs retraites... De même, la nouvelle politique étrangère va échouer elle aussi : les Américains ne veulent pas bâtir un empire. L'administration a engagé deux guer res, jusque-là, à un coût minimum pour les Américains. Et après ? Elle a fait un chèque sans provision, mais le chèque est en train de revenir à la banque.

Ne pensez-vous pas que les Américains sont culturellement plus bellicistes que les Européens, ou, pour reprendre la formule de Robert Kagan, que les premiers viennent de Mars, les seconds de Vénus ?

Les Etats-Unis, pays le plus puissant du monde, ont écrasé un régime issu de l'âge de pierre, celui de l'Afghanistan, puis un régime en faillite, celui de l'Irak, pays dont le PNB n'atteint même pas celui d'Alexandria (banlieue de Washington sur l'autre rive du Potomac, ndlr). Mais les Américains ne sont pas plus prêts que d'autres à une vraie guerre : ils sont de Mars s'ils ne perdent pas plus d'une centaine d'hom mes. Mais s'il y avait des milliers de soldats tués, ils repartiraient illico pour Vénus.

(1) George Barna est un sondeur chrétien, spécialisé dans l'étude des pratiques religieuses (www.barna.org). 

  DEBATE
EE.UU.: los militares ganan terreno
Es de esperar que la democracia estadounidense resista a las tentaciones antidemocráticas de los sectores militares y civiles más recalcitrantes.
Juan Gabriel TokatlianÝ

PROFESOR DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRES

Recientemente, un reputado estudioso de los temas militares hizo, en una prestigiosa publicación castrense, las siguientes afirmaciones: "En los últimos años el control civil de los militares se ha debilitado... y hoy (las relaciones cívico-militares) están en peligro. No he detectado una conspiración pero sí los reiterados esfuerzos por parte de las fuerzas armadas para frustrar o evadir la autoridad civil... (Por lo tanto) estoy convencido de que el control civil ha disminuido al punto que se puede alterar el carácter del gobierno y socavar la defensa nacional."
El autor es el profesor Ricardo Kohn, la publicación el Naval War College Review (verano de 2002) y el caso analizado, el de Estados Unidos.
Con mucho respeto, bastante preocupación, sustentado en una bibliografía vasta y con un conocimiento de primera mano, Kohn explica la creciente erosión del poder civil sobre la estructura militar en Es tados Unidos. Según el autor, el momento culminante de un mayor descontrol civil y de más autonomía militar se produjo durante el mandato de Bill Clinton. Las dificultades afloraron desde la campaña electoral para la presidencia. No sólo Clinton había evitado el servicio militar, sino que había escrito una carta indicando su aversión (loathing) a las fuerzas armadas y se había movilizado contra la guerra en Vietnam.
Una vez llegado a la Casa Blanca, Clinton anunció su intención de abolir la prohibición de homosexuales en las fuerzas armadas. Así, el presidente recibió insultos, en persona, por escrito y en alocuciones, de parte de personal militar en servicio; algo inédito en la historia militar estadounidense.
Los incidentes y las controversias marcaron toda su administración; lo cual afectó la toma de decisiones en materia de seguridad, incidió negativamente sobre la capacidad de despliegue militar en el exterior y vulneró la confianza de los uniformados hacia sus propios líderes militares.
De acuerdo a Kohn, las tensiones cívico-militares en el gobierno de Clinton reflejaban el ascenso e incidencia de los militares en el proceso político desde los sesenta. El enorme poderío del Joint Chief of Staff en la estructura del Pentágono, en términos de las relaciones internas con el legislativo y en cuanto a la proyección de la influencia de los comandos regionales (en especial, en el Pacífico, Oriente Medio y Asia Central) en la política externa, es hoy elocuente.
Como consecuencia de esa expansión corporativa por más de cuatro décadas, los militares están cada vez más unificados en su evasión u oposición al control civil, inciden en más ámbitos (no militares) de la política interna y externa, son más visibles y vocales en sus opiniones y se han convertido, de hecho, en un verdadero grupo de interés, "el más considerable, más activo burocráticamente, más político, más partidista (a favor de los republicanos), más propositivo y más influyente en la historia de Estados Unidos".
Kohn concluye que la mayor gravitación militar se produce en el marco de un franco deterioro de la cultura cívica y del respeto de la ley, de una alarmante trivialización de los asuntos públicos por parte de los medios de comunicación, de un prestigioso abandono del principio de control civil de la seguridad nacional, y de un inquietante sentimiento entre muchos militares acerca de que deben resistir la autoridad civil.
A mi entender la nueva estrategia de primacía (reemplazante de la estrategia de la contención de la Guerra Fría), así como la nueva doctrina de guerra preventiva (reemplazante de la doctrina de la disuasión vigente hasta los atentados del 11 de setiembre de 2001), que implican el recurso a la fuerza bélica de modo habitual y furibundo y que se apoyan en una política exterior provocativa y pendenciera, puede llevar a un mayor desequilibrio en las relaciones cívico-militares en Estados Unidos. En ese sentido, la anunciada guerra contra Irak, en solitario o con algunos aliados, bien puede convertirse en el ejemplo más emblemático de un incontrolable desbalance institucional a favor de los militares y de los civiles más "militaristas" en Estados Unidos. Es de esperar que las fuertes energías de la democracia norteamericana resistan a las circunstanciales tentaciones antidemocráticas de los sectores militares y civiles más recalcitrantes.
 

Ý

THE EROSION OF CIVILIAN CONTROLÝ
OF THE MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY

Richard H. Kohn
© 2002 by Richard H. Kohn

In over thirty-five years as a military historian, I have come to have great respect for and trust in American military officers. The United States is truly blessed to have men and women of the highest character leading its youth and safeguarding its security. That fact makes the present subject all the more troubling and unpleasant, whether to write or read about it. However, the subject is crucial to the nationís security and to its survival as a republic. I am speaking of a tear in the nationís civil and political fabric; my hope is that by bringing it to the attention of a wide military and defense readership I can prompt a frank, open discussion that could, by raising the awareness of the American public and alerting the armed forces, set in motion a process of healing. 

My subject is the civil-military relationship at the pinnacle of the government, and my fear, baldly stated, is that in recent years civilian control of the military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today. The issue is not the nightmare of a coup díétat but rather the evidence that the American military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions. What I have detected is no conspiracy but repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces to frustrate or evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to preclude outcomes the military dislikes. 

While I do not see any crisis, I am convinced that civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the character of American government and undermine national defense. My views result from nearly four decades of reading and reflection about civilian control in this country; from personal observation from inside the Pentagon during the 1980s; and since then, from watching the Clinton and two Bush administrations struggle to balance national security with domestic political realities. 
 

Understanding the problem begins with a review of the state of civil-military relations during the last nine years, a state of affairs that in my judgment has been extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American peacetime history. No president was ever as reviled by the professional militaryótreated with such disrespect, or viewed with such contemptóas Bill Clinton. Conversely, no administration ever treated the military with more fear and deference on the one hand, and indifference and neglect on the other, as the Clinton administration. 

The relationship began on a sour note during the 1992 campaign. As a youth, Clinton had avoided the draft, written a letter expressing ìloathingî for the military, and demonstrated against the Vietnam War while in Britain on a Rhodes scholarship. Relations turned venomous with the awful controversy over gays in the military, when the administrationóin ignorance and arroganceóannounced its intention to abolish the ban on open homosexual service immediately, without study or consultation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by resisting, floating rumors of their own and dozens of other resignations, encouraging their retired brethren to arouse congressional and public opposition, and then more or less openly negotiating a compromise with their commander in chief.1 

The newly elected president was publicly insulted by service people (including a two-star general) in person, in print, and in speeches. So ugly was the behavior that commanders had to remind their subordinates of their constitutional and legal obligations not to speak derogatorily of the civilian leadership; the Air Force chief of staff felt obliged to remind his senior commanders ìabout core values, including the principle of a chain of command that runs from the president right down to our newest airman.î2 

Nothing like this had ever occurred in American history. This was the most open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American military since the publication of the Newburgh addresses over two centuries earlier, at the close of the American war for independence. Then the officers of the Army openly contemplated revolt or resignation en masse over the failure of Congress to pay them or to fund the pensions they had been promised during a long and debilitating war. All of this led me, as a student of American civil-military relations, to ask why so loyal, subordinate, and successful a military, as professional as any in the world, suddenly violated one of its most sacred traditions. 

While open conflict soon dropped from public sight, bitterness hardened into a visceral hatred that became part of the culture of many parts of the military establishment, kept alive by a continuous stream of incidents and controversies.3 These included, to cite but a few: the undermining and driving from office of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993, followed by the humiliating withdrawal of his nominated replacement; controversies over the retirements of at least six four-star flag officers, including the early retirement of an Air Force chief of staff (an unprecedented occurrence); and the tragic suicide of a Chief of Naval Operations (also unprecedented). There were ceaseless arguments over gender, the most continuous source of conflict between the Clinton administration and its national security critics.4 The specific episodes ranged from the botched investigations of the 1991 Tailhook scandal to the 1997 uproar over Air Force first lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the first female B-52 line pilot, who (despite admitting to adultery, lying to an investigating officer, and disobeying orders) was allowed to leave the service without court-martial. Other related incidents included the outrages at Aberdeen Proving Ground, where Army sergeants had sex with recruits under their command, and the 1999 retirement of the highest-ranking female Army general in history amid accusations that she had been sexually harassed by a fellow general officer some years previously. In addition, there were bitter arguments over readiness; over budgets; over whether and how to intervene with American forces abroad, from Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo; and over national strategy generally.5 
So poisonous became the relationship that two Marine officers in 1998 had to be reprimanded for violating article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the provision about contemptuous words against the highest civilian officials. The assistant commandant of the Marine Corps felt constrained to warn all Marine generals about officers publicly criticizing or disparaging the commander in chief.6 The next year, at a military ball at the Plaza Hotel in New York City, a local television news anchor, playing on the eveningís theme, ìA Return to Integrity,î remarked that he ìdidnít recognize any dearth of integrity hereî until he ìrealized that President Clinton was in townîóand the crowd, ìwhich included 20 generalsî and was made up largely of officers, went wild.7 During the election of 2000, the chief legal officers of two of the largest commands in the Army and Air Force issued warnings lest resentment over Gore campaign challenges to absentee ballots in Florida boil over into open contempt.8 

These illustrations emphasize the negatives. In contrast, by all accounts people in uniform respected and worked well with Secretary of Defense William Perry. Certainly GeneralsÝ
William J. Clinton
(White House)

John Shalikashvili and Hugh Shelton, successive chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after 1993, appeared to have been liked and respected by civilians in the Clinton administration. But these men, and other senior officers and officials who bridged the two cultures at the top levels of government, seemed to understand that theirs was a delicate roleóto mediate between two hostile relatives who feared and distrusted each other but realized that they had to work together if both were to survive. 
 

Now, to discount the Clinton difficulties as atmospherics and thus essentially insignificant would be mistaken, for the toxicity of the civil-military relationship damaged national security in at least three ways: first, by paralyzing national security policy; second, by obstructing and in some cases sabotaging American ability to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise leadership internationally; and third, by undermining the confidence of the armed forces in their own uniformed leadership. 

In response to that first, searing controversy over open homosexual service, the administration concluded that this presidentówith his Democratic affiliation, liberal leanings, history of draft evasion and opposition to the Vietnam War, and admitted marital infidelity and experimentation with marijuanaówould never be acceptable to the military.9 One knowledgeable insider characterized the White House of those years as reflecting the demography of the post-Vietnam Democratic Partyópeople who had never served in uniform and who had a ìtin earî for things military. Knowing little or nothing about military affairs or national security and not caring to develop a deep or sympathetic understanding of either, the administration decided that for this president, military matters constituted a ìthird rail.î10 No issue with the military was worth exposing this vulnerability; nothing was worth the cost. All controversy with the military was therefore to be avoided. In fact, the Clintonites from the beginning tried to ìgive awayî the military establishment: first to the congressional Democrats, by making Les Aspin secretary of defense; then, when Aspin was driven from office, to the military itself, by nominating Admiral Bobby Inman; then, when he withdrew, to the military-industrial complex (with William Perry as secretary and John Deutsch and John White as deputies), an arrangement that lasted until 1997; and finally to the Republicans, in the person of Senator William Cohen of Maine. From the outset, the focus of the administration in foreign affairs was almost wholly economic in nature, and while that may have been genius, one result of the Clintonitesí inattention and inconstancy was the disgust and disrespect of the national security community, particularly those in uniform.11 By the time Clinton left office, some officials were admitting that he had been ìunwilling to exercise full authority over military commanders.î12 ìThose who monitored Clinton closely during his eight years as president believed . . . that he was intimidated more by the military than by any other political force he dealt with,î reported David Halberstam. Said ìa former senior N[ational] S[ecurity] C[ouncil] official who studied [Clinton] closely, . . . ëhe was out-and-out afraid of them.íî13 

Forging a reasonable and economical national security policy was crucial to the health and well-being of the country, particularly at a time of epochal transition brought on by the end of the Cold War. But both the first Bush and then Clintonís administration studiously avoided any public discussion of what role the United States should play in the world, unless asserting the existence of a ìnew world orderî or labeling the United States ìthe indispensable nationî constitutes discussion.14 As for the Clinton administration, indifference to military affairs and the decision to take no risks and expend no political capital in that area produced paralysis. Any rethinking of strategy, force structure, roles and missions of the armed services, organization, personnel, weapons, or other choices indispensable for the near and long term was rendered futile. As a result, today, over a decade after the end of the Cold War, there is still no common understanding about the fundamental purposes of the American military establishment or the principles by which the United States will decide whether to use military power in pursuit of the national interest. 

The Clinton administration held itself hostage to the organization and force structure of the Cold War.15 At the beginning of Clintonís first term, Secretary Aspin attempted to modify the basis of American strategyóan ability to fight two ìmajorÝ 

 regional contingenciesî (changed later to ìmajor theater warsî) almost simultaneously. But Aspin caved in to charges that such a change would embolden Americaís adversaries and weaken security arrangements with allies in the Middle East and Asia.16 The result was a defense budget known to be inadequate for the size and configuration of the military establishment even without the need to fund peacetime intervention contingencies, which constantly threw military accounts into deficit.17 Budgets became prisoners of readiness. Forces could not be reduced, because of the many military commitments around the world, but if readiness to wage high-intensity combat fell or seemed to diminish, Republican critics would rise up in outrage. Thus the uniformed leadershipóeach service chief, regional or functional commander, sometimes even division, task force, or wing commandersópossessed the political weight to veto any significant change in the nationís fundamental security structure.

Colin Powell (IRI)

As a result, the Clinton administration never could match resources with commitments, balance readiness with modernization, or consider organizational changes that would relieve the stresses on personnel and equipment.18 All of this occurred when the services were on the brink of, or were actually undergoing, what many believed to be changes in weaponry and tactics so major as to constitute a ìrevolution in military affairs.î19 One consequence of the insufficiency of resources in people and money to meet frequent operational commitments and growing maintenance costs was the loss of many of the best officers and noncommissioned officers, just as economic prosperity and other factors were reducing the numbers of men and women willing to sign up for military service in the first place. 

The paralysis in military policy in the 1990s provoked the Congress to attempt by legislation at least four different times to force the Pentagon to reevaluate national security policy, strategy, and force structure, with as yet no significant result.20 Perhaps the last of these efforts, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (also called the Hart-Rudman Commission), which undertook a comprehensive review of national security and the military establishment, will have some effect. If so, it will be because the Bush administration possessed the political courage to brave the civil-military friction required to reorganize an essentially Cold War military establishment into a force capable of meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century.21 But the prospects are not encouraging when one considers Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeldís secrecy and lack of consultation with the uniformed military and Congress; the forces gathering to resist change; the priority of the Bush tax cut and national missile defense, which threaten to limit severely the money available and to force excruciating choices; and Rumsfeldís fudging of the very concept of ìtransformation.î Even the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have not broken the logjam, except perhaps monetarily. The administration has committed itself to slow, incremental change so as not to confront the inherent conservatism of the armed services or imperil the weapons purchases pushed so powerfully by defense contractors and their congressional champions.22 The White House has done so despite its belief that the failure to exert civilian control in the 1990s left a military establishment declining in quality and effectiveness. 
Second, the Clinton administrationódespite far more frequent occasions for foreign armed intervention (which was ironic, considering its aversion to military matters)ówas often immobilized over when, where, how, and under what circumstances to use military force in the world. The long, agonizing debates and vacillation over intervention in Africa, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia reflected in part the weakness of the administration compared to the political power of the uniformed military.23 The lack of trust between the two sides distorted decision making to an extreme. Sometimes the military exercised a veto over the use of American force, or at least an ability so to shape the character of American intervention that means determined endsóa roundabout way of exercising a veto. At other times, civilians ignored or even avoided receiving advice from the military. By the 1999 Kosovo air campaign, the consultative relationship had so broken down that the president was virtually divorced from his theater commander, and that commanderís communications with the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs were corrupted by misunderstanding and distrust. The result was a campaign misconceived at the outset andÝ badly coordinated not only betweenÝ
Donald Rumsfled (Defenselink)

civilian and military but between the various levels of command. The consequences could have undone the Nato alliance, and they certainly stiffened Serbian will, exacerbated divisions within Nato councils, increased criticism in the United States, and prolonged the campaign beyond what almost everyone involved had predicted.24 

Last, the incessant acrimonyóthe venomous atmosphere in Washingtonóshook the confidence of the armed forces in their own leadership. Different groups accused the generals and admirals, at one extreme, of caving in to political correctness, and at the other, of being rigid and hidebound with respect to gender integration, war-fighting strategy, and organizational change. The impact on morale contributed to the hemorrhage from the profession of arms of able young and middle-rank officers. The loss of so many fine officers, combined with declines in recruiting (which probably brought, in turn, a diminution in the quality of new officers and enlisted recruits), may weaken the nationís military leadership in the next generation and beyond, posing greater danger to national security than would any policy blunder. Certainly many complex factors have driven people out of uniform and impaired recruiting, but the loss of confidence in the senior uniformed leadership has been cited by many as a reason to leave the service.25 
 

Now, to attribute all of these difficulties to the idiosyncrasies of the Clinton administration alone would be a mistake. In fact, the recent friction in civil-military relations and unwillingness to exert civilian control have roots all the way back to World War II. Unquestionably Mr. Clinton and his appointees bungled civil-military relations badly, from the beginning. But other administrations have done so also, and others will in the future. 

If one measures civilian control not by the superficial standard of who signs the papers and passes the laws but by the relative influence of the uniformed military and civilian policy makers in the two great areas of concern in military affairsónational security policy, and the use of force to protect the country and project power abroadóthen civilian control has deteriorated significantly in the last generation. In theory, civilians have the authority to issue virtually any order and organize the military in any fashion they choose. But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions, or carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. The reality is that civilian control is not a fact but a process, measured across a spectrumósomething situational, dependent on the people, issues, and the political and military forces involved. We are not talking about a coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the tune in military affairs in the United States today.26 

Contrast the weakness of the civilian side with the strength of the military, not only in the policy process but in clarity of definition of American purpose, consistency of voice, and willingness to exert influence both in public and behind the scenes. 

The power of the military within the policy process has been growing steadily since a low point under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s. Under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has influence that surpasses that of everyone else within the Pentagon except the secretary of defense, and the chairman possesses a more competent, focused, and effective staff than the secretary does, as well as, often, a clearer set of goals, fewer political constraints, and under some circumstances greater credibility with the public.27 In the glow of success in the Gulf War, efforts to exorcise Vietnam, the high public esteem now enjoyed by the armed forces, and the disgust Americans have felt for politics in general and for partisanship in particular, the stature of the chairman has grown to a magnitude out of proportion to his legal or institutional position. 

The Joint Staff is the most powerful organization in the Department of Defense; frequently, by dint of its speed, agility, knowledge, and expertise, the Joint Staff frames the choices.28 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (the vice chiefs, convening under the vice chairman to prioritize joint programs in terms of need and cost) has gathered influence and authority over the most basic issues of weapons and force structure.29 Within the bureaucracy, JCS has a representative in the interagency decision process, giving the uniformed military a voice separate from that of the Department of Defense. Similarly, the armed services maintain their own congressional liaison and public affairs offices, bureaucracies so large that they are impossible to monitor fully. (One officer admitted to me privately that his duty on Capitol Hill was to encourage Congress to restore a billion dollars that the Pentagonís civilian leadership had cut out of his serviceís budget request.)30 Moreover, the regional commanders have come to assume such importance in their areasóparticularly in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Central Asiaóthat they have effectively displaced American ambassadors and the State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign policy.31 In recent reorganizations, these commanders have so increased in stature and influence within the defense establishment that their testimony can sway Congress and embarrass or impede the administration, especially when the civilians in the executive branch are weak and the Congress is dominated by an aggressively led opposition political party. 

One knowledgeable commentator put it this way in early 1999: ìThe dirty little secret of American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [the Clinton] administration, is that the commander in chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.î32 A high Pentagon civilian privately substantiates the interpretation: what ìweighs heavily . . . every dayî is ìthe reluctance, indeed refusal, of the political appointees to disagree with the military on any matter, not just operational matters.î In fact, so powerful have such institutional forces become, and so intractable the problem of altering the military establishment, that the new Rumsfeld regime in the Pentagon decided to conduct its comprehensive review of national defense in strict secrecy, effectively cutting the regional commanders, the service chiefs, and the Congress out of the process so that resistance could not organize in advance of the intended effort at transformation.33 

Furthermore, senior military leaders have been able to use their personal leverage for a variety of purposes, sometimes because of civilian indifference, or deference, or ignorance, sometimes because they have felt it necessary to fill voids of policy and decision making. But sometimes the influence is exercised intentionally and purposefully, even aggressively. After fifty years of cold war, the ìleak,î the bureaucratic maneuver, the alliance with partisans in Congressóthe ménage à trois between the administration, Congress, and the militaryóhave become a way of life, in which services and groups employ their knowledge, contacts, and positions to promote personal or institutional agendas.34 In the 1970s, responding to the view widely held among military officers that a reserve callup would have galvanized public support for Vietnam, allowed intensified prosecution of the war, and prevented divorce between the Army and the American people, the Army chief of staff deliberately redesigned divisions to contain ìround-outî units of reserve or National Guard troops, making it impossible for the president to commit the Army to battle on a large scale without mobilizing the reserves and Guard.35 In the 1980s, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral William J. Crowe, worked ìbehind the scenesî to encourage Congress to strengthen his own office even though the secretary of defense opposed such a move. During the Iran-Iraq War Crowe pushed for American escort of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf, because he believed it important for American foreign policy. He and the chiefs strove to slow the Reagan administrationís strategic missile defense program. Crowe even went so far as to create a personal communications channel with his Soviet military counterpart, apparently unknown to his civilian superiors, to avert any possibility of a misunderstanding leading to war. ìIt was in the nature of the Chairmanís job,î Crowe remembered, ìthat I occasionally found myself fighting against Defense Department positions as well as for them.î36 

In the 1990s, press leaks from military sources led directly to the weakening and ultimate dismissal of the Clinton administrationís first secretary of defense.37 In 1994 the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) openly discussed with senior commanders his plans to manipulate the Navy budget and operations tempo to force his preferred priorities on the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress. When a memo recounting the conversation surfaced in the press, no civilian in authority called the CNO to account.38 The 1995 Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recommended consolidating the staffs of the service chiefs and the service secretaries; no one mentioned the diminution of civilian control that would have taken place as a result.39 
Even during the 1990s, a period when the administration appeared to be forceful, insisting upon the use of American forces over military objections or resistance, the uniformed leadership often arbitrated events. The 1995 Bosnia intervention was something of a paradigm. American priorities seem to have been, first, deploying in overwhelming strength, in order to suffer few if any casualties; second, establishing a deadline for exit; third, issuing ìrobustî rules of engagement, again to forestall casualties; fourth, narrowing the definition of the mission to ensure that it was incontrovertibly ìdoableî; and fifthófifthóreconstructing Bosnia as a viable independent country.40 

In recent years senior uniformed leaders have spoken out on issues of policyó undoubtedly often with the encouragement or at least the acquiescence of civilian officials, but not always so. Sometimes these pronouncements endeavor to sell policies and decisions to the public orÝ 
William J. Crowe
(Naval Institute, Annapolis,
Maryland)

within the government before a presidential decision, even though such advocacy politicizes the chairman, a chief, or a regional commander and inflates their influence in discussions of policy. A four-star general, a scant ten days after retiring, publishes a long article in our most respected foreign affairs journal, preceded by a New York Times op-ed piece. In them, he criticizes the administrationís most sensitive (and vulnerable) policyóand virtually no one in the press or elsewhere questions whether his action was professionally appropriate.41 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives ìan impassioned interviewî to the New York Times ìon the folly of interventionî in Bosnia as ìthe first Bush administrationî is pondering ìthe question of whether to intervene.î42 Another chairman coins the ìDover Principle,î cautioning the civilian leadership about the human and political costs of casualties when American forces are sent into some crisis or conflict (and service membersí bodies return through the joint mortuary at Dover Air Force Base). This lecture clearly aimed to establish boundaries in the publicís mind and to constrain civilian freedom of action in intervening overseas. 

Certainly Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton have been fairly circumspect about speaking out on issues of policy, and the current chairman, Air Force general Richard B. Myers, even more. However, their predecessor, Colin Powell, possessed and used extraordinary power throughout his tenure as chairman of the JCS. He conceived and then sold to a skeptical secretary of defense and a divided Congress the ìBase Forceî reorganization and reduction in 1990­91. He shaped the U.S. prosecution of the Gulf War to ensure limited objectives, the use of overwhelming force, a speedy end to combat, and the immediate exit of American forces. He spoke frequently on matters of policy during and after the election of 1992óan op-ed in the New York Times and a more comprehensive statement of foreign policy in the quarterly Foreign Affairs. Powell essentially vetoed intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, ignored or circumvented the chiefs on a regular basis, and managed the advisory process so as to present only single alternatives to civilian policy makers. All of this antedated his forcing President Clinton in 1993 to back down on allowing homosexuals to serve openly.43 In fact, General Powell became so powerful and so adept in the bureaucratic manipulations that often decide crucial questions before the final decision maker affixes a signature that in 2001 the Bush administration installed an experienced, powerful, highly respected figure at the Defense Department specifically lest Powell control the entire foreign and national security apparatus in the new administration.44 

All of these are examplesóand only public manifestationsóof a policy and decision-making process that has tilted far more toward the military than ever before in American history in peacetime. 
 

Now an essential question arises: do these developments differ from previous practice or experience in American history? At first glance, the answer might seem to be no. Military and civilian have often differed, and the military has for many years acted on occasion beyond what might be thought proper in a republican system of government, a system that defines civilian control, or military subordination to civil authority, as obligatory. 

Historical examples abound. Leading generals and chiefs of staff of the Army from James Wilkinson in the 1790s through Maxwell Taylor in the 1950s have fought with presidents and secretaries of war or defense in the open and in private over all sorts of issuesóincluding key military policies in times of crisis. Officers openly disparaged Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War; that presidentís problems with his generals became legendary.45 Two commanding generals of the Army were so antagonistic toward the War Department that they moved their headquarters out of Washington: Winfield Scott to New York in the 1850s, and William Tecumseh Sherman to St. Louis in the 1870s.46 In the 1880s, reformminded naval officers connived to modernize the Navy from wood and sail to steel and steam. To do so they drew the civilian leadership into the process, forged an alliance with the steel industry, and (for the first time in American history, and in coordination with political and economic elites) sold naval reform and a peacetime buildup of standing forces to the public through publications, presentations, displays, reviews, and other precursors of the promotional public relations that would be used so frequentlyóand effectivelyóin the twentieth century.47 In the 1920s and 1930s, the youthful Army Air Corps became so adept at public relations and at generating controversy over airpower that three different presidential administrations were forced to appoint high-level boards of outsiders to study how the Army could (or could not) properly incorporate aviation.48 

Both Presidents Roosevelt complained bitterly about the resistance of the armed services to change. ìYou should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking . . . and action of the career diplomats and then youíd know what a real problem was,î FDR complained in 1940. ìBut the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . . To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.î49 

The interservice battles of the 1940s and 1950s were so fierce that neither Congress nor the president could contain them. Internecine warfare blocked President Harry Trumanís effort to unify the armed forces in the 1940s (ìunificationî finally produced only loose confederation) and angered President Dwight D. Eisenhower through the 1950s. Neither administration fully controlled strategy, force structure, or weapons procurement; both had to fight service parochialism and interests; and both ruled largely by imposing top-line budget limits and forcing the services to struggle over a limited funding ìpie.î Eisenhower replaced or threatened to fire several of his chiefs. Only through Byzantine maneuvers, managerial wizardry, and draconian measures did Robert McNamara bring a modicum of coherence and integration to the overall administration of the Defense Department in the 1960s. The price, however, was a ruthless, relentless bureaucratic struggle that not only contributed to the disaster of Vietnam but left a legacy of suspicion and deceit that infects American civil-military relations to this day.50 (Even today, embittered officers identify their nemesis by his full nameóRobert Strange McNamaraóto express their loathing.) The point of this history is that civil-military relations are messy and frequently antagonistic; military people do on occasion defy civilians; civilian control is situational.51 
But the present differs from the past in four crucial ways. 

First, the military has now largely united to shape, oppose, evade, or thwart civilian choices, whereas in the past the armed services were usually divided internally or among themselves. Indeed, most civil-military conflict during the Cold War arose from rivalry between the services, and over roles, missions, budgets, or new weapons systemsónot whether and how to use American armed forces, or general military policy. 

Second, many of the issues in play today reach far beyond the narrowly military, not only to the wider realm of national security but often to foreign relations more broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the character and values of American society itself. 

Third, the role of military leaders has drifted over the last generation from that primarily of advisers and advocates within the private confines of the executive branch to a much more public function. As we have noted, they champion not just their services but policies and decisions in and beyond the military realm, and sometimes they mobilize public or congressional opinion either directly or indirectly (whether in Congress or the executive branch) prior to decision by civilian officials. To give but three examples:Ý
Robert S. McNamara
(LBJ Library and Museum)

senior officers spoke out publicly on whether the United States should sign a treaty banning the use of land mines; on whether American forces should be put into the Balkans to stop ethnic cleansing; and on whether the nation should support the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Again, such actions are not unprecedented, but they have occurred recently with increasing frequency, and collectively they represent a significant encroachment on civilian control of the military.52 

Fourth, senior officers now lead a permanent peacetime military establishment that differs fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Unlike the large citizen forces raised in wartime and during the Cold War, todayís armed services are professional and increasingly disconnected, even in some ways estranged, from civilian society. Yet in comparison to previous peacetime professional forces, which were also isolated from civilian culture, todayís are far larger, far more involved worldwide, far more capable, and often indispensable (even on a daily basis) to American foreign policy and world politics. Five decades of warfare and struggle against communism, moreover, have created something entirely new in American historyóa separate military community, led by the regular forces but including also the National Guard and reserves, veterans organizations, and the communities, labor sectors, industries, and pressure groups active in military affairs. More diverse than the ìmilitary-industrial complexî of President Eisenhowerís farewell address forty years ago, this ìmilitaryî has become a recognizable interest group. Also, it is larger, more bureaucratically active, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than anything similar in American history.53 
 

One might argue that this is all temporary, the unique residue of sixty years of world and cold war, and that it will dissipate and balance will return now that the Clinton administration is history. Perhapsóbut civil-military conflict is not very likely to diminish. In ìRumsfeldís Rules,î Donald Rumsfeld states that his primary function is ìto exercise civilian control over the Department for the Commander-in-Chief and the country.î He understands that he possesses ìthe right to get into anything and exercise it [i.e., civilian control].î He recognizes as a rule, ìWhen cutting staff at the Pentagon, donít eliminate the thin layer that assures civilian control.î54 Nonetheless, his effort to recast the military establishment for the post­Cold War eraóas promised during the 2000 presidential campaignóprovoked such immediate and powerful resistance (and not just by the armed forces) that he abandoned any plans to force reorganization or cut ìlegacyî weapons systems.55 In the Afghanistan campaign, Rumsfeld and other civilian leaders have reportedly been frustrated by an apparent lack of imagination on the part of the military; in return, at least one four-star has accused Rumsfeld of ìmicromanagement.î56 There is also other evidence of conflict to come; traditional conceptions of military professionalismóparticularly the ethical and professional norms of the officer corpsóhave been evolving away from concepts and behaviors that facilitate civil-military cooperation. 

If the manifestations of diminished civilian control were simply a sine curveóthat is, a low period in a recurring patternóor the coincidence of a strong Joint Chiefs and a weak president during a critical transitional period in American history and national defense (the end of the Cold War), there would be little cause for concern. Civilian control, as we have seen, is situational and indeed to a degree cyclical. But the present decline extends back before the Clinton administration. There are indications that the current trend began before the Vietnam War and has since been aggravated by a weakening of the nationís social, political, and institutional structures that had, over the course of American history, assured civilian control. 

For more than two centuries, civilian control has rested on four foundations that individually and in combination not only prevented any direct military threat to civilian government but kept military influence, even in wartime, largely contained within the boundaries of professional expertise and concerns. First has been the rule of law, and with it reverence for a constitution that provided explicitly for civilian control of the military. Any violation of the Constitution or its process has been sure to bring retribution from one or all three of the branches of government, with public support. Second, Americans once kept their regular forces small. The United States relied in peacetime on ocean boundaries to provide sufficient warning of attack and depended on a policy of mobilization to repel invasion or to wage war. Thus the regular military could never endanger civilian governmentóin peacetime because of its size, and in wartime because the ranks were filled with citizens unlikely to cooperate or acquiesce in anything illegal or unconstitutional. The very reliance on citizen soldiersómilitia, volunteers, and conscripts pressed temporarily into service to meet an emergencyówas a third safeguard of civilian control. Finally, the armed forces themselves internalized military subordination to civil authority. They accepted it willingly as an axiom of American government and the foundation of military professionalism. ìYou must remember that when we enter the army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the government, entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances,î Major General John J. Pershing instructed First Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., in 1916. ìWe are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.î57 As Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it, ìThirty-two years in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and keep my name out of the papers.î58 

Much has changed. More than sixty years of hot and cold war, a large military establishment, world responsibilities, a searing failure in Vietnam, and changes in American society, among other factors, have weakened these four foundations upon which civilian control has rested in the United States. 

The first, and most troubling, development is the skepticism, even cynicism, now expressed about government, lawyers, and justice, part of a broad and generation-long diminution of respect for people and institutions that has eroded American civic culture and faith in law. Polling data show that Americans today have the most confidence in their least democratic institutions: the military, small business, the police, and the Supreme Court. Americans express the least confidence in the most democratic: Congress.59 So dangerous is this trend that Harvardís Kennedy School of Government established a ìVisions of Governance for the Twenty-first Centuryî project to explore the phenomenon, study its implications, and attempt to counteract some of its more deleterious effects.60 Americans cannot continue to vilify government, the U.S. government in particular, and expect patriotism to prosper or even survive as a fundamental civic value. 

ÝSecond, the media, traditionally the herald of liberty in this society, has become less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused on profit, less professional, and more trivial. About the only liberty the media seems to champion vocally is the freedom of the press. Issues of civilian control seem to escape the press; time after time, events or issues that in past years would have been framed or interpreted as touching upon civilian control now go unnoticed and unreported, at least in those terms.61 

Third, the nationís core civic culture has deteriorated. Such basic social institutions as marriage and the family, and such indicators of societyís health as crime rates and out-of-wedlock births, while stabilizing or improving in the 1990s, clearly have weakened over time. Our communities, neighborhoods, civic organizations, fraternal groups, and social gatherings have diminished in favor of individual entertainment; people are staying at home with cable television, the videocassette recorder, and the Internet, thereby avoiding crime, crowds, traffic, and the crumbling physical and social infrastructure of our society. American society has become more splintered and people more isolated into small groups, ìclusteredî geographically and demographically around similar values, culture, and lifestyles. With this deterioration of civic cohesionógated communities being perhaps emblematicóhas come a weakening of shared values: less truthfulness, less generosity, less sacrifice, less social consciousness, less faith, less common agreement on ethical behavior, and more advocacy, acrimony, individualism, relativism, materialism, cynicism, and self-gratification. The 11 September attacks and the war on terrorism are unlikely to reverse these trends as long as the national leadership exhorts the American people to go back to ìnormal.î62 

Civilian control is one common understanding that seems to have faded in American civic consciousness. The American peopleówhose study and understanding of civics and government generally have declinedóhave lost their traditional skepticism about the professional military that made civilian control a core political assumption, one that was widely understood and periodically voiced. Simply put, the public no longer thinks about civilian controlódoes not understand it, does not discuss it, and does not grasp how it can and should operate.63 An occasional popular movie like The Siege and Thirteen Days raises the issue, but most recent films caricature the military or, like GI Jane and Rules of Engagement, lionize an honest, brave, faithful military and demonize lying, avaricious politicians.64 

Fourth, in the last generation the United States has abandoned the first principle of civilian control, the bedrock practice extending back into premodern Englandóreliance on the citizen soldier for national defense.65 National security policy no longer seriously envisions mobilizing industry and the population for large-scale war. Americans in uniform, whether they serve for one hitch or an entire career, are taught to (and do) view themselves as professionals. In the National Guard and reserves, whose members are thought to be the apotheosis of citizen soldiers, some hold civilian government jobs in their units or elsewhere in the government national security community, and others serve on active duty considerably more than the traditional one weekend a month and two weeks a year.66 

Furthermore, while Guardsmen and reservists both voice and believe the traditional rhetoric about citizen-soldiering, the views of their up-and-coming officers mirror almost exactly those of their regular counterparts.67 Reserve forces are spending more and more time on active duty, not simply for temporary duty for the present crisis of homeland defense. Increasingly, the National Guard and reserves are being used interchangeably with the regulars, even in overseas deployments on constabulary missions, something wholly unprecedented.68 Even if they call themselves citizen soldiers, the fundamental distinction between citizens and soldiers has so blurred that in 1998, at two of the most respected U.S. institutions of professional military education, Marine majors who had spent their adult lives in uniform and National Guard adjutant generals who had done the same could both insist that they were ìcitizen soldiers.î69 Americans have lost the high regard they once possessed for temporary military service as an obligation of citizenship, along with their former understanding of its underlying contribution to civic cohesion and civilian control of the military.70 

Today, fewer Americans serve or know people who do, and the numbers will decline as smaller percentages of the population serve in uniform.71 Their sense of ownership of or interest in the military, and their understanding of the distinctiveness of military cultureóits ethos and needsóhave declined. In recent years the number of veterans serving in the U.S. Congress has fallen 50 percent, and the remaining veterans constitute a smaller percentage of the members of Congress than veterans do of the population as a whole, reversing (in 1995) a pattern that had endured since the turn of the century.72 The effect is dramatic; less than ten years ago, 62 percent of the Senate and 41 percent of the House were veterans. Today in the 107th Congress, the figure for the Senate is 38 percent, and for the House, 29 percent.73 

Finally, at the same time that civilian control has weakened in the awareness of the public, so too has the principle declined in the consciousness and professional understanding of the American armed forces. Historically, one of the chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their political neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military relationshipóall had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was and situational as it must always be. In the last half-century, however, while everyone in the armed forces has continued to support the concept, the ethos and mentalité of the officer corps have changed in ways that damage civil-military cooperation and undermine civilian control. 

Reversing a century and a half of practice, the American officer corps has become partisan in political affiliation, and overwhelmingly Republican. Beginning with President Richard Nixonís politics of polarizationóthe ìsouthern strategyî and reaching out to the ìhard-hatsîóRepublicans embraced traditional patriotism and strong national defense as central parts of their national agenda. During the late 1970sóyears of lean defense budgets and the ìhollow forceîóand in the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan made rebuilding the armed forces and taking the offensive in the Cold War centerpieces of his presidency, Republicans reached out to the military as a core constituency. They succeeded in part because, in the wake of Vietnam, the Democratic Party virtually abandoned the military, offering antimilitary rhetoric and espousing reduced defense spending. During the same period, voting in elections began to become a habit in the officer corps. In the 1950s, the Federal Voting Assistance Program came into existence in order to help enlisted men, most of whom were draftees or draft-induced volunteers, to vote. In every unit an officer was designated to connect the program to the men, and undoubtedly the task began to break down slowly what had been something of a taboo against officers exercising their franchise. How (the logic must have been) could officers encourage their soldiers to vote if they themselves abstained?74 

Today the vast majority of officers not only vote but identify with a political philosophy and party. Comparison of a sample by the Triangle Institute of Security Studies of active-duty officers (see endnote 25) with earlier data shows a shift from over 54 percent independent, ìno preference,î or ìotherî in a 1976 survey to 28 percent in 1998­99, and from 33 percent to 64 percent Republican today.75 In the presidential election of 2000, Republicans targeted military voters by organizing endorsements from retired flag officers, advertising in military publications, using Gulf War heroes Colin Powell and H. Norman Schwarzkopf on the campaign trail, urging service members to register and vote, and focusing special effort on absentee military votersóa group that proved critical, perhaps the margin of victory, in Florida, where thousands of armed forces personnel maintain their legal residency.76 

Before the present generation, American military officers (since before the Civil War) had abstained as a group from party politics, studiously avoiding any partisanship of word or deed, activity, or affiliation. By George C. Marshallís time, the practice was not even to vote.77A handful of the most senior officers pursued political ambitions, usually trying to parlay wartime success into the presidency. A very few even ran for office while on active duty. But these were exceptions. The belief was that the military, as the neutral servant of the state, stood above the dirty business of politics. Professional norms dictated faith and loyalty not just in deed but in spirit to whoever held the reins of power under the constitutional system. For Marshallís generation, partisan affiliation and voting conflicted with military professionalism.78 
Marshall and his fellow officers must have sensed that the habit of voting leads to partisan thinking, inclining officers to become invested in particular policy choices or decisions that relate directly to their professional responsibilities.79 Officers at every level have to bring difficult and sometimes unpopular duties to their troops and motivate the latter to carry them out. Likewise, senior officers must represent the needs and perspectives of the troops to political leaders even when they are unsolicited or unwanted. How effective can that advice be if the civilians know the officers are opposed to a policy in question? What are the effects on morale when the troops know their officers dislike, disrespect, or disagree with the politicians, or think a mission is unwise, ill conceived, or unnecessary? 

The consequences of partisanship can also be more subtle and indirect but equally far-reaching, even to the point of contempt for civilian policy and politicians or of unprofessional, disruptive behavior, as in 1993. The belief is current today among officers that the core of the Democratic Party is ìhostile to military cultureî and engaged in a ìculture warî against the armed forces, mostly because of pressure for further gender integration and open homosexual service.80 During the 2000 election campaign, when Al Gore stumbled briefly by supporting a ìlitmus testî on gays in the military for selecting members of the Joint Chiefs, he confirmed for many in uniform the idea that DemocratsÝ 

George C. Marshall
(G. C. Marshall Foundation)

do not understand the military profession or care about its effectiveness. His campaignís effort to minimize the effect of absentee votes in Florida and elsewhere through technical challenges outraged the armed forces, raising worries that a Gore victory might spark an exodus from the ranks or that a Gore administration would have relations with the military even more troubled than Clintonís.81 

Partisan politicization loosens the connection of the military to the American people. If the public begins to perceive the military as an interest group driven by its own needs and agenda, supportóand trustówill diminish. Already there are hints. When a random survey asked a thousand Americans in the fall of 1998 how often military leaders would try to avoid carrying out orders they opposed, over two-thirds answered at least ìsome of the time.î82 

Partisanship also poisons the relationship between the president and the uniformed leadership. When a group of retired flag officers, including former regional commanders and members of the Joint Chiefs, endorsed presidential candidates in 1992 and again in 2000, they broadcast their politicization to the public and further legitimated partisanship in the ranksófor everyone knows that four-stars never really retire. Like princes of the church, they represent the culture and the profession just as authoritatively as their counterparts on active duty. If senior retired officers make a practice of endorsing presidential contenders, will the politicians trust the generals and admirals on active duty, in particular those who serve at the top, to have the loyalty and discretion not to retire and use their inside knowledge to try to overturn policies or elect opponents? Will not presidents begin to vet candidates for the top jobs for their pliability or (equally deleteriously) their party or political views, rather than for excellence, achievement, character, and candor? Over time, the result will be weak military advice, declining military effectiveness, and accelerating politicization. 

The investment of officers in one policy or another will lead civilians to question whether military recommendations are the best professional advice of the nationís military experts. Perhaps one reason Bill Clinton and his people dealt with the military at armís length was that he and they knew that officers were the most solidly Republican group in the government.83 One need only read Richard Holbrookeís memoir about negotiating the Dayton accords in 1995 to plumb the depth of suspicion between military and civilian at the highest levels. Convinced that the military opposed the limited bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, Holbrooke and Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed that the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs was lying to them when he asserted that the Air Force was running out of targets.84 

Certainly officers have the right to vote and to participate privately in the nationís political life. No one questions the legal entitlement of retired officers to run for office or endorse candidates. But these officers must recognize the corrosive effects on military professionalism and the threat to the military establishmentís relationship with Congress, the executive branch, and the American people that such partisan behavior has. Possessing a right and exercising it are two very different things. 

A second example of changing military professionalism has been the widespread attitude among officers that civilian society has become corrupt, even degenerate, while the military has remained a repository for virtue, perhaps its one remaining bastion, in an increasingly unraveling social fabric, of the traditional values that make the country strong. Historically, officers have often decried the selfishness, commercialism, and disorder that seems to characterize much of American society.85 But that opinion today has taken on a harder, more critical, more moralistic edge; it is less leavened by that sense of acceptance that enabled officers in the past to tolerate the clash between their values and those of a democratic, individualistic civilian culture and to reconcile the conflict with their own continued service. 

Nearly 90 percent of the elite military officers (regular and reserves) surveyed in 1998­99 by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies agreed that ìthe decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society.î Some 70 percent thought that ìthrough leading by example, the military could help American society become more moral,î and 75 percent believed that ìcivilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the militaryís values and customs.î86 Is it healthy for civilian control when the members of the American armed forces believe that they are morally, organizationally, institutionally, and personally superior to the rest of societyóand are contemptuous of that society? Do we wish civic society in a democratic country to adopt military norms, values, outlooks, and behaviors? In my judgment that is an utter misreading of the role and function of our armed forces. Their purpose is to defend society, not to define it. The latter is militarism, in the classic definitionóthe same thinking that in part inclined the French and German armies to intervene in the politics of their nations in the twentieth century. 

A third, and most disturbing, change in military sentiment is the belief that officers should confront and resist civilians whose policies or decisions they believe threaten to weaken national defense or lead the country into disaster. Many hold that officers should speak out publicly, or work behind the scenes, to stop or modify a policy, or resign in protest. Some senior leaders have been willing to speak publicly on issues of national security, foreign relations, and military policy before it is formulated, and afterward as spokespersons for what are often highly controversial and partisan initiatives or programs. In 1998 and 1999, the respected retired Army colonel and political scientist Sam Sarkesian, and the much-decorated Marine veteran, novelist, and former secretary of the Navy James Webb, called publicly for military leaders to participate in national security policy debates, not merely as advisers to the civilian leadership but as public advocates, an idea that seems to resonate with many in the armed forces today.87 ìMilitary subservience to political control applies to existing policy, not to policy debates,î admonished Webbóas if officers can subscribe to policy and debate it honestly at the same time.88 Such behavior politicizes military issues and professional officers directly, for rare is the military issue that remains insulated from politics and broader national life. 

This willingnessóindeed, in some cases eagernessóto strive to shape public opinion and thereby affect decisions and policy outcomes is a dangerous development for the U.S. military and is extraordinarily corrosive of civilian control. Is it proper for military officers to leak information to the press ìto discredit specific policiesóprocurement decisions, prioritization plans, operations that the leaker opposes,î as Admiral Crowe in his memoirs admits happens ìsometimes,î even ìcopiouslyî?89 Is it proper for the four services, the regional commanders, or the Joint Chiefs every year to advocate to the public directly their needs for ships, airplanes, divisions, troops, and other resources, or their views on what percentage of the nationís economy should go to defense as opposed to other priorities?90 This advocacy reached such a cacophony in the fall of 2000 that the secretary of defensewarned the military leadership not ìto beat the drum with a tin cupî for their budgets during the presidential campaign and the transition to a new administration.91 

Do we wish the military leadership to argue the merits of intervention in the Balkans or elsewhere, of whether to sign treaties on land-mine use or war crimes, in order to mobilize public opinion one way or the other, before the president decides? Imagine that we are back in 1941. Should the Army and the Navy pronounce publicly on the merits or demerits of Lend-Lease, or convoy escort, or the occupation of Iceland, or the Europe-first strategy? Or imagine it is 1861óshould the nationís military leaders publicly discuss whether to reinforce Fort Sumter? Would it be advisable for senior officers to proclaim openly their varied opinions of whether the Southís secession ought to (or can) be opposed by plunging the country into civil war? Should senior military officers question the presidentís strategy in the midst of a military operation, as was done in 1999 through media leaks in the first week of the bombing campaign over Kosovo?92 In such instances, what happens to the presidentís, and Congressís, authority and credibility with the public, and to their ability to lead the nation? How does such advocacy affect the trust and confidence between the president, his cabinet officers, and the most senior generals and admirals, trust and confidence that is so necessary for effective national defense?93 

The way in which military officers have interpreted a study of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the decision on intervention and in the formulation of strategy for Southeast Asia in 1963­65 exemplifies the erosion of professional norms and values. H. R. McMasterís Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam is by all accounts the history book most widely read and discussed in the military in the last several years.94 Officers believe that McMaster validates long-standing military convictions about Vietnamóthat the Joint Chiefs, lacking a proper understanding of their role and not having the courage to oppose the Johnson administrationís strategy of gradualism that they knew would fail, should have voiced their opposition, publicly if necessary, and resigned rather than carry out that strategy. Had they done so, goes this credo, they would have saved the country a tragic, costly, humiliating, and above all, unnecessary, defeat.95 

McMasterís book neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have obstructed U.S. policy in Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to the Congress when asked for their views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs should have opposed President Lyndon Johnsonís orders and policies by leaks, public statements, or by resignations, unless an officer personally and professionally could not stand, morally 
and ethically, to carry out the chosen policy. There is in fact no tradition of resignation in the American military. In 1783, at Newburgh, New York, as the war for independence was ending, the American officer corps rejected individual or mass resignationówhich can be indistinguishable from mutiny. George Washington persuaded them not to march on Congress or refuse orders in response to congressional unwillingness to pay them or guarantee their hard-earned pensions. The precedent has survived for more than two centuries. No American army ever again considered open insubordination. 

Proper professional behavior cannot include simply walking away from a policy, an operation, or a war an officer believes is wrong or will fail. That is what the Left advocated during the Vietnam War, and the American military rightly rejected it. Imagine the consequences if the Union army had decided in late 1862 that it had signed on to save the Union but not to free the slaves and had resigned en masse because of disagreement (which was extensive) with the Emancipation Proclamation. More recently, Air Force chief of staff Ronald Fogleman did not resign in protest in 1997, as many officers wish to believe; he requested early retirement and left in such a manneróquietly, without a full explanationóprecisely so as not to confront his 

Lyndon Baines Johnson
(LBJ Library and Museum)

civilian superior over a decision with which he deeply disagreed.96 All McMaster says (and believes), and all that is proper in the American system, is that military officers should advise honestly and forthrightly, or advocate in a confidential capacity, a course of action. Whether their advice is heeded or not, if the policy or decision is legal, they are to carry it out. 

Resignation in protest directly assails civilian control. Issuing a public explanation for resignation, however diplomatically couched, amounts to marshaling all of an officerís military knowledge, expertise, and experienceóas well as the professionís standing with the public and reputation for disinterested patriotismóto undercut some undertaking or concept that the officer opposes. The fact that officers today either ignore or are oblivious to this basic aspect of their professional ethics and would countenance, even admire, such truculent behavior illustrates both a fundamental misunderstanding of civilian control and its weakening as a primary professional value.97 

Our military leaders have already traveled far in the direction of self-interested bureaucratic behavior in the last half-century, to become advocates for policy outcomes as opposed to advisersópresenting not only the military perspective on a problem, or the needs of the military establishment and national defense, or the interests of their services or branches, but their own views of foreign and military policyóeven, as we have seen, pressing these efforts outside the normal advisory channels. Some of this is unthinking, some the product of civilian abrogation of responsibility, and some is the unintended consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which so strengthened the chairman and the regional commanders. But let us be clear: some is quite conscious. In his memoirs, Colin Powell, the most celebrated soldier of the era, wrote that he learned as a White House Fellow, from his most important mentor, that in the government ìyou never know what you can get away with until you try.î98 Is that a proper standard of professional behavior for a uniformed officer? He also declared that his generation of officers ìvowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support.î99 Is that a proper view of military subordination to civilian authority? 

Unfortunately, General Powellís views mirror attitudes that have become widespread over the last generation. The survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions undertaken by the Triangle Institute in 1998­99 discovered that many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American forces abroad. When ìasked whether . . . military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way in . . . the decision processî to use military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming active-duty officers answered ìinsist,î on the following issues: ìsetting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political and military goals exist . . . , developing an ëexit strategy,íî and ìdeciding what kinds of military units . . . will be used to accomplish all tasks.î100 In the context of the questionnaire, ìinsistî definitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance of the militaryís recommendations. 

In 2000, a three-star general casually referred to a uniformed culture in the Pentagon that labels the Office of the Secretary of Defense as ìthe enemyîóbecause it exercises civilian control.101 In 1999, staff officers of the National Security Council deliberately attempted to promulgate a new version of the national security strategy quickly enough to prevent the president from enunciating his own principles first.102 In 1997 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs urged the chiefs to block Congressís effort to reform the military establishment through the Quadrennial Defense Review.103 In the early 1990s, senior officers presented alternatives for the use of American forces abroad specifically designed to discourage the civilian leadership from intervening in the first place.104 Twice in the past five years members of the Joint Chiefs have threatened to resign as a means of blocking a policy or decision.105 

Thus, in the last generation, the American military has slipped from conceiving of its primary role as advice to civilians followed by execution of their orders, to tryingóas something proper, even essential in some situationsóto impose its viewpoint on policies or decisions. In other words, American officers have, over the course of the Cold War and in reaction to certain aspects of it, forgotten or abandoned their historical stewardship of civilian control, their awareness of the requirement to maintain it, and their understanding of the proper boundaries and behaviors that made it work properly and effectively. That so many voices applaud this behavior or sanction it by their silence suggests that a new definition of military professionalism may be forming, at least in civil-military relations. If so, the consequences are not likely to benefit national security; they could alter the character of American government itself. 
 

Even military readers who accept my presentation of facts may find my concerns overblown. Certainly, there is no crisis. The American military conceives of itself as loyal and patriotic; it universally expresses support for civilian control as a fundamental principle of government and of military professionalism. Yet at the same time, the evidence is overwhelming that civil-military relationships have deteriorated in the U.S. government. The underlying structures of civilian society and the military profession that traditionally supported the system of civilian control have weakened. Over the course of the last generation, much influence and actual power has migrated to the military, which has either been allowed to define, or has itself claimed, an expanded role in foreign policy and national security decision making.106 The reasons are complexópartly circumstance, partly civilian inattention or politically motivated timidity. But a further reason is that military leaders have either forgotten or chosen to ignore the basic behaviors by which civil-military relations support military effectiveness and civilian control at the same time. Whatever the causes, the consequences are dangerous. Increased military influence, combined with the American peopleís ignorance of or indifference to civilian control and the misreading of the bounds of professional behavior on the part of senior military officers, could in the future produce a civil-military clash that damages American government or compromises the nationís defense. 

That civilians in the executive and legislative branches of government over the last generation bear ultimate responsibility for these developments is beyond doubt. Some on both sides seem to sense it. Secretaries of defense came into office in 1989, 1993, and 2001 concerned about military subordination and determined to exert their authority. Civilian officials have the obligation to make the system work, not to abdicate for any reason. But to rely on the politicians to restore the proper balance 
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ìThe dirty little secret of American civil-military relations . . . is that the commander in chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.î 
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is to ignore the conditions and processes that can frustrate civilian control. The historical record is not encouraging. Over two centuries, the officials elected and appointed to rule the military have varied enormously in knowledge, experience, understanding, and motivation. Their propensity to exercise civilian control and to provide sound, forceful leadership has been variable, largely situational, and unpredictable.107 

Nor can the changes in American society and political understanding that have weakened civilian control be easily reversed. National defense will capture at best superficial public attention even during a war on terrorism, unless military operations are ongoing or the government asks for special sacrifice. In wartime, Americans want to rely more on military advice and authority, not less. Over time, a smaller and smaller percentage of Americans are likely to perform military service; without a conscious effort by the media to avoid caricaturing military culture, and by colleges and universities to expand programs in military history and security studies, future generations of civilian leaders will lack not only the experience of military affairs but the comprehension of the subject needed to make civilian control work effectively. 

A better way to alter the equation is for officers to recall the attitudes and rejuvenate the behaviors that civilian control requires. Certainly every officer supports the concept; every officer swears at commissioning ìto support and defend the Constitution of the United Statesî and to ìbear true faith and allegianceî to the same.108 Because civilian control pervades the Constitution, the oath is a personal promise to preserve, protect, defend, and support civilian control, in actual practice as well as in words. The requirement for such an oath was written into the Constitution for precisely that purpose.109 Officers do not swear to strive to maximize their servicesí budgets, or to try to achieve certain policy outcomes, or to attempt to reshape civilian life toward a military vision of the good society. 

Individual officers at every level would do well to examine their personal views of civilians, particularly of their clients: the American people, elected officials, and those appointed to exercise responsibility in national security affairs. A certain amount of caution, skepticism, and perhaps even mistrust is healthy. But contempt for clients destroys the professional relationship. Lawyers cannot provide sound counsel, doctors effective treatment, ministers worthwhile support, teachers significant educationówhen they do not understand and respect their clients. Military officers who feel contempt for their elected or appointed supervisors, or the voters who placed them in office, are unlikely to advise them wisely or carry outtheir policies effectively. 
 

Officers should investigate their own professional views of civilian control. On what do you base your thinking? Much of the problem I have discussed may stem from the Cold War, or from one particular campaign of it, Vietnam, which continues to cast a long, if sometimes unnoticed, shadow. Are you positive that your thinking about civil-military relations does not rest on the mistaken beliefsóand they are mistakenóthat the war was lost because of too much civilian control, or that we succeeded so magnificently in the Persian Gulf in 1991 because the civilians ì[got] out of the way and let the military fight and win the warî?110 Neither of those interpretations fit the facts of what happened in either war.111 

Ponder whether you are prepared to accept, as a principle of civilian control, that it includes the right of civilians to be wrong, to make mistakesóindeed, to insist on making mistakes.112 This may be very hard to accept, given that peopleís lives, or the security of the nation, hang in the balance. But remember that the military can be wrong, dead wrong, about military affairsófor after all, you are not politicians, and as Carl von Clausewitz wrote long ago, war is an extension of politics.113 Were you prepared to work for and with, and to accept, a Gore administration had the Democratic candidate won the 2000 election? If there is doubt on your part, ponder the implications for civil-military relations and civilian control. It is likely that within the next dozen years, there will be another Democratic administration. If the trend toward increasing friction and hostility in civil-military relations during the last threeóthose of Johnson, Carter, and Clintonócontinues into the future, the national security of the United States will not be well served. 

Last of all, consider that if civilian control is to function effectively, the uniformed military will have not only to forswear or abstain from certain behavior but actively encourage civilians to exercise their authority and perform their legal and constitutional duty to make policy and decisions. You cannot and will not solve those problems yourselves, nor is it your responsibility alone. Civilian behavior and historical circumstances are just as much the causes of the present problems in civil-military relations as any diminution of military professionalism. But you can help educate and develop civilian leaders in their roles and on the processes of policy making, just as your predecessors did, by working with them and helping themówithout taking advantage of them, even when the opportunity arises. Proper professional behavior calls for a certain amount of abstinence. What is being asked of you is no more or less than is asked of other professionals who must subordinate their self-interest when serving their clients and customers: lawyers to act against their self-interest and advise clients not to press frivolous claims; doctors not to prescribe treatments that are unnecessary; accountants to audit their clientsí financial statements fully and honestly; clergymen to refrain from exploiting the trust of parishioners or congregants.114 It will be up to you to shape the relationship with your particular client, just as others do. At its heart, the relationship involves civilian control in fact as well as form. 
 

Civilian control ultimately must be considered in broad context. In the long history of human civilization, there have been military establishments that have focused on external defenseóon protecting their societiesóand those that have preyed upon their own populations.115 The American military has never preyed on this society. Yet democracy, as a widespread form of governance, is rather a recent phenomenon, and our country has been fortunate to be perhaps the leading example for the rest of the world. For us, civilian control has been more a matter of making certain the civilians control military affairs than of keeping the military out of civilian politics. But if the United States is to teach civilian controlóprofessional military behavioróto countries overseas, its officers must look hard at their own system and their own behavior at the same time.116 Our government must champion civilian control in all circumstances, without hesitation. In April 2002 the United States acted with stupefying and self-defeating hypocrisy when the White House initially expressed pleasure at the apparent overthrow of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela by that countryís military, condoning an attempted coup while other nations in the hemisphere shunned the violation of democratic and constitutional process.117 ìNo one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise,î Winston Churchill shrewdly observed in 1947. ìIndeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried.î118 Churchill certainly knew the tensions involved in civil-military relations as well as any democratic head of government in modern history. Both sidesócivilian and militaryóneed to be conscious of these problems and to work to ameliorate them. 
Ý 
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NOTES 

Ý1. Defenders of the chiefsí behavior in the 1992­93 firestorm over gays in the military often assert that the Clinton administrationís intention to lift the ban on homosexual service was blocked not by the military but by Congress. However, military leaders very clearly encouraged their retired predecessors to lobby the Congress against Clintonís intentions. ìThe word went out to the senior retirees,î recalls a knowledgeable, well-connected retired Army brigadier general; ìëWeíve lost unless you can generate enough pressure on Congress to block this.íî Theodore Metaxis to the author, 24 October 1999. See also Theo. C. Metaxis, ìDiscipline, Morale Require Ban on Homosexuals,î Fayetteville (North Carolina) Observer-Times, 28 January 1993,
p. 15A, especially the closing two paragraphs, in which Metaxis calls on the public to ìlet the president and Congress know how you feelî and on the military to ìput on your ëcivilian hat,í the one you wear when you vote. Write your friends and relatives and let them know how you feel, and ask them to write to Washington. Then sit down and write to the president and Congressólet them know how you personally feel. For the officers and NCOs, tell them how your responsibility to command will be eroded. For the soldiers living in barracks, since the Clinton administration just doesnít ëget it,í call or write to them, explaining what the effect would be on you. If you donít take action, the torrent of PR publicity from the homosexual lobby may carry the day.î See also Eric Schmitt, ìThe Top Soldier Is Torn between 2 Loyalties,î New York Times, 6 February 1993, p. 1; ìAspin Seeks a Deal on Gays That the Brass Will Bless,î Congressional Quarterly, 26 June 1993, p. 1670; Eric Schmitt and Thomas L. Friedman, ìClinton and Powell Forge Bond for Mutual Survival,î New York Times, 4 June 1993, p. 1; Richard Lacayo, ìThe Rebellious Soldier,î Time, 15 February 1993, p. 32; Janet E. Halley, Donít: A Readerís Guide to the Militaryís Anti-Gay Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 20­5. The extent of the presidentís defeat is revealed in George Stephanopoulos, All Too Human: A Political Education (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999), 
pp. 155­63; Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 42­8, 248­51. 

Ý2. Quoted in John Lancaster, ìAir Force General Demands Tight Formation for Commander in Chief,î Washington Post, 22 April 1993, 
p. 1, and ìAccused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe,î Washington Post, 8 June 1993, p. 21. See also ìThe President and the General,î 11 June 1993, p. 20, and ìTranscript of President Clintonís News Conference,î 16 June 1993, p. 14, both Washington Post; ìA Military Breach?î Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 11 June 1993, p. 10; David H. Hackworth, ìRancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the President,î Newsweek, 28 June 1993, p. 24; and Associated Press, ìGeneralís Lampoon of Clinton Not His First,î Washington Times, 8 July 1993, p. 5. 

Ý3. The events described below were covered extensively in the daily press, journals of opinion, and other local and national media, 1993­2001. 

Ý4. The vitriol on gender and sexual orientation is revealed by Stephanie Gutman, The Kinder, Gentler Military: Can Americaís Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars? (New York: Scribnerís, 2000). 

Ý5. The arguments over readiness became so ugly by 1998 that the Joint Chiefs and U.S. senators engaged in public accusations of dishonest testimony and lack of support. See Eric Schmitt, ìJoint Chiefs Accuse Congress of Weakening U.S. Defense,î New York Times, 30 September 1998, p. 1. The military opposition to Clintonís interventions was almost immediate; see Richard A. Serrano and Art Pine, ìMany in Military Angry over Clintonís Policies,î Los Angeles Times (Washington ed.), 19 October 1993, p. 1. The arguments over readiness continued. See Elaine M. Grossman, ìCongressional Aide Finds Spending on ëCore Readinessí in Decline,î Inside the Pentagon, 28 June 2001, p. 1. 

Ý6. Rowan Scarborough, ìMarine Officer Probed for Blasting Clinton,î Washington Times, 11 November 1998, p. 1, and ìMajor Gets Punished for Criticizing President,î Washington Times, 7 December 1998, p. 1; C. J. Chivers, ìTroops Obey Clinton despite Disdain,î USA Today, 18 November 1998, p. 27A; Pat Towell, ìKeeping a Civil Tongue,î CQ Weekly, 2 January 1999, p. 26. Article 88, ìContempt toward officials,î reads: ìAny commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or the legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on active duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.î U.S. Defense Dept., Manual for Courts-Martial United States (1995 Edition) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 1995), pp. A2­A23. The history of this provision and its enforcement is covered in John G. Kester, ìSoldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,î Harvard Law Review, vol. 81, 1967­68, pp. 1697­769; Daniel Blumenthal, ìA Brief Overview of Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,î Strategy and Policy Seminar, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1998. 

Ý7. ìWicked Wit,î New York Post, 11 October 1999, p. 6. 

Ý8. Thomas E. Ricks, ìMilitary Personnel Warned on Politics,î Washington Post, 30 November 2000, p. 35. An Army officer, receiving the reminder by mass distribution in his command, recalled that ìthis was perhaps the fourth or fifth time in the past 8 years [i.e., the Clinton administration] that I have received some official reminder of Article 88.î E-mail to the author, 27 November 2000. See also Robert G. Bracknell [Capt., USMC], ìThe Marine Officerís Moral and Legal Imperative of Political Abstinence,î Marine Corps Gazette, September 2000, pp. 102­7. 

Ý9. Another major embarrassment singed the new administration when a female civilian staffer insulted Army lieutenant general Barry McCaffrey, a much-decorated and thrice-wounded veteran of Vietnam and commander of the 24th Infantry Division in the Gulf War. McCaffrey was then serving as assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In response to a casual ìgood morningî in the White House, the staffer replied something to the effect of ìWe [or I] donít talk to people in uniform.î Within hours the incident ricocheted all over Washington and into the press, to the mortification of the administration. The impact of this insult was felt most acutely inside the Washington Beltway, and especially in the officer corps. Kenneth T. Walsh, Bruce B. Auster, and Tim Zimmermann, ìClintonís Warrior Woes,î U.S. News and World Report, 15 March 1993, pp. 22ff.; Carl M. Cannon, ìMilitary Feeling Resentful toward the White House,î Buffalo (New York) News, 23 March 1993, p. 5. McCaffrey was one of the officers featured in James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995); see also Jay Nordlinger, ìClintonís Good Soldier,î 
National Review, 3 May 1999, pp. 20­3. 

10. Conversation with a senior official, Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1993. 

11. President Clinton undertook from the beginning to woo the military, in an attempt to overcome the hostility. Walsh et al., ìClintonís Warrior Woes,î p. 22; Carl M. Cannon, ìClinton Reaches for Military Trust,î Baltimore Sun, 30 May 1992, p. 22. But five years later, the relationship was hardly better than ìa wary truce.î ìI canít think of any one thing the president has put more personal attention and caring into than his relationship with the military at all levels,î White House press secretary Michael McCurry was quoted as saying. ìHe did it because he understood that he began with a significant deficit. He has tried to make a personal and human connection with his commanders and all the way down the chain.î Brian McGrory, ìU.S. Military, Clinton Achieve a Wary Truce,î Boston Globe, 22 February 1998, p. 1. Indeed, two four-star officers having professional relationships with Clinton praised his discharge of his duties as commander in chief. See Richard H. Kohn, ed., ìThe Early Retirement of General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,î Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001, p. 16; Wesley K. Clark [Gen., USA], Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), p. 290. However, the ìpersonal and human connectionî apparently never altered the Clinton-hating in the officer corps generally, which lasted for both his terms. See David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribnerís, 2001), pp. 415­9; Joseph Curl, ìMilitary Finds Refreshing Change with New Commander in Chief,î Washington Times, 13 February 2001, p. 1. For the economic trade emphasis of the administrationís foreign policy, see Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, p. 242; David E. Sanger, ìEconomic Engine for Foreign Policy,î New York Times, 28 December 2000, p. A1. Scholarly analyses of the Clinton foreign policy are William C. Berman, From the Center to the Edge: The Politics and Policies of the Clinton Presidency (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 35­8; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, in press [due fall 2002]). 

12. Jane Perlez, ìFor 8 Years, a Strained Relationship with the Military,î New York Times, 28 December 2000, p. A13. 

13. ìClinton and the Generals,î Vanity Fair, September 2001, p. 230. 

14. In 1996, former congressman and secretary of defense (and now vice president) Dick Cheney observed: ìIf you look at the í92 election, the í94 congressional election, and I think even the 1996 presidential election, there has been almost no discussionóthis will be the third election cycle without itóof the U.S. role in the world from a security standpoint, or strategic requirements, what our military ought to be doing, or how big the defense budget ought to be.î Quoted in Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors: Americaís National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997), p. 225. 

15. The most insightful brief analysis of the overall character of the military establishment is Eliot A. Cohen, ìDefending America in the Twenty-first Century,î Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2000, pp. 40­56. For another persuasive argument for continuity with the Cold War establishment, see William Greider, Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998). 

16. Michael R. Gordon, ìCuts Force Review of War Strategies,î New York Times, 30 May 1993, p. 16. Barton Gellman, ìRumblings of Discord Heard in Pentagon; Aspinís Civilian Leadership, Management Style and Agenda Irk Some Officers,î Washington Post, 20 June 1993, p. 1; John Lancaster, ìAspin Opts for Winning 2 WarsóNot 11/2óat Once; Practical Effect of Notion Is Uncertain amid Huge Military Budget Cuts,î Washington Post, 25 June 1993, p. A6. For a broad analysis of the Bottom-Up Review, see Donald Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan, While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today (New York: St. Martinís, 2000), chap. 14. 

17. The disjunction between resources and requirements, which became the subject of much debate and recrimination in the late 1990s, was clear by 1995. See Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 1; Don M. Snider, ìThe Coming Defense Train Wreck,î Washington Quarterly, Winter 1996, 89­101, with commentary on ìwhat to do about it,î 
pp. 103­24. Wesley Clark recalls that when he was a lieutenant general and head of plans (J-5) on the Joint Staff, beginning in 1994, ìWe had constructed a closed cycle bureaucratic instrument that would focus the U.S. Armed Forcesí thinking on only two primary conflicts and then drive marginal investments of scarce resources to enhance these capabilities at the expense of other possible employments.î This ìwasnít intended to be a strategy for employing the forcesóit was meant to defend the size of the military.î Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 47, 36. 

18. A brief analysis of these dilemmas is John F. Lehman and Harvey Sicherman, ìDemilitarizing the Military,î Foreign Policy Research Institute Wire, July 1997. More extended analyses are Gouré and Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck, chaps. 1­2; and Greider, Fortress America, esp. pp. 28­9, 36­9, 42­5. 

19. For recent indications of how electronics and miniaturization, leading to greater accuracy of weapons, faster acquisition of targets, and more comprehensive networking of computer systems, and the like, might be affecting warfare and the armed services, see James Kitfield, ìThe Permanent Frontier,î National Journal, 17 March 2001, p. 780; Joseph Fitchett, ìSpying from Space: U.S. to Sharpen the Focus,î International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2001, p. 1; Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., ìFuturistic Army Vision: The Serviceís Future Combat System Is a True Leap-Ahead Program,î Armed Forces Journal International, May 2001, p. 26; James Ware, ìVirtual Defense,î Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001, 
pp. 98­112; Nicholas Lemann, ìDreaming about War,î The New Yorker, 16 July 2001, pp. 32­8; Bill Owens [Adm., USN, Ret.] with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2000). An argument for continuity, at least for ground warfare, is Stephen Biddle, ìAssessing Theories of Future Warfare,î in The Use of Force after the Cold War, ed. H. W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 217­88. For an overview, see Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 318 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998). 

20. Congress began pressing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense to consider the problem of overlapping roles and missions among the armed services as early as 1992. Congress formed a commission to address those issues in 1995, pressed for a broader Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997 (with a National Defense Panel to review and critique the effort immediately after), another QDR in 2001, and in 1998 urged the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, to take an ìend to end,î or more comprehensive, look at national security and report in 2001. See Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), on the World Wide Web at http:// www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html 
(5 October 2000); Directions for Defense, Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces: Report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 May 1995, executive summary, on the World Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/ man/docs/corm95/di1062.html (26 November 2000); William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/qdr/index.html (26 November 2000); Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, on the World Wide Web at http://www.fas.org/man/ docs/ndp/toc.htm (links from this table of contents) (2 August 2001); Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, March 15, 2001 (n.p. [Washington]: n.p. [U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century], 2001); Background on the Quadrennial Defense Review May 1997, H.R. 3230, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title IX, Subtitle B, Sec. 923, Quadrennial Defense ReviewóForce Structure Review, on the World Wide Web at http://www.comw.org/ qdr/backgrd.html (26 November 2000). For background, see Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1993); National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, August 1991); Colin Powell, Les Aspin, ìDOD Bottom-Up Review, September 1, 1993,î Defense Department briefing, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, accessed through Academic Universe, s.v. ìBottom Up Reviewî (13 December 2000). For an insiderís admission of paralysis on change within the Pentagon and the failure of outside reform efforts, see Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, pp. 32­42, 166­77, 207­19. Revealing reportage about the 1997 QDR is in George Wilson, This War Really Matters: Inside the Fight for Defense Dollars (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000), chaps. 1­3. 

21. As of 26 June 2001, some two-thirds of the fifty major recommendations of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century ìwere being acted upon in some fashion by the Administration or Congress.î Memorandum, ìRecommendationsí Status,î 26 June 2001, enclosed in Charles G. Boyd to the author, 27 June 2001. The author was a member of the national security study group supporting the commission. The G. W. Bush administration is at least rhetorically committed to change; see James Gerstenzang, ìBush Offers New Vision of Military,î Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2001, p. 1. 

22. The battle over transforming defense policy during the first months of the Bush administration in 2001 was covered extensively in the press. See, for example, reports by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 20, 25 May; 22 June; 14, 19, 25 July; 3, 7, 18, 31 August; 9 December 2001; by Al Kamen, Washington Post, 16 May 2001. Also reports by Elaine Grossman, Inside the Pentagon, 31 May; 14 June; 5, 19, 26 July; 17 August 2001; Stan Crock, Business Week, 2 July, 6 August 2001; James Dao, Thom Shanker, Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 3 June; 11, 13, 14, 19, 26, 30 July; 18 August; 2 September 2001; James Kitfield, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., and George C. Wilson, National Journal, 3 March, 9 June, 14 July, 3 November 2001; Bill Gertz, Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, 24 April; 25 May; 11, 29 June; 13 July; 30 August 2001; Robert Holzer, Defense News, 4­10 June, 23­29 July 2001; Morton M. Kondracke, Roll Call, 26 July 2001; Andrea Stone, USA Today, 27 July 2001; by William M. Arkin, washingtonpost.com, 4 June, 16 July 2001; by Pat Towell, Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 12 May, 21 July 2001; by Eun-Kyung Kim, Lisa Burgess, European Stars and Stripes, 24 May, 2 June 2001; by Vago Muradian, Hunter Keeter, Defense Daily International, 4 May 2001, and Defense Daily, 11, 25 May 2001; and by Michael Duffy, Time, 27 August 2001. Also, editorials and opinion pieces in the Washington Post, 7 February, 27 August 2001; Weekly Standard, 14 May, 23 July 2001; Los Angeles Times, 24 May 2001; New York Times, 25 May, 13 July, 20 August 2001; Washington Times, 25 May, 10 June 2001; London Financial Times, 27 June, 31 July 2001; Wall Street Journal, 13 July; 1, 27 August 2001; USA Today, 18 July 2001; Boston Globe, 22 July 2001; U.S. News and World Report, 13 August 2001; Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 27, 28 August 2001; and Newsweek, 3 September 2001. The first public attacks on Rumsfeldís efforts by the services came in a widely disseminated e-mail from former Army chief of staff Gordon Sullivan, head of the Association of the U.S. Army, on 5 May and from active-duty and retired naval officers defending aircraft carriers (Captain William Toti in the Washington Times, 23 April 2001; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, quoted in Inside the Navy, 4 June 2001; retired admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., in National Defense, June 2001). For an analysis of the institutional barriers to change, see Thomas Mahnken, ìTransforming the U.S. Armed Forces: Rhetoric or Reality?î Naval War College Review, Summer 2001, pp. 81­9. ìIf we could achieve a 15 percent transformation in 10 years, I would consider that reasonable,î Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz admitted in August 2001; ìI do not think there is going to be a single decision that will not be opposed by someone.î Tom Canahuate, ìTotal U.S. Military Transformation in 10 Years Not Realistic, Says Wolfowitz,î DefenseNews.com, 16 August 2001. For the current direction of ìtransformation,î see Wolfowitz, keynote address, Fletcher Conference on ìFocusing National Power,î Washington, D.C., 14 November 2001, on the World Wide Web at http:// www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20011114-depsecdef.html (1 December 2001). 

23. See, for example, Paul Quinn-Judge, ìDoubts of Top Brass on the Use of Power Carry Great Weight,î Boston Globe, 20 April 1994, p. 12; Donald H. Rumsfeld, ìTransforming the Military,î Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, 
pp. 20­32; Eliot A. Cohen, ìA Tale of Two Secretaries,î Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, pp. 33­46; and Elaine M. Grossman, ìReformers Unimpressed by Rumsfeld Plan to Overhaul Military Brass,î Inside the Pentagon, 18 April 2002, p. 1. 

24. My understanding of the Kosovo air campaign comes from Clark, Waging Modern War; Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen, eds., War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001); Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, pp. 364ff.; Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATOís Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001); Michael Mandelbaum, ìA Perfect Failure,î Foreign Affairs, October 1999, pp. 2­8; and Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ìKosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,î and Barry R. Posen, ìThe War for Kosovo,î both International Security, Spring 2000, pp. 5­84. 

25. In 1998­99, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies ìProject on the Gap between the Military and Civilian Societyî compared the attitudes, opinions, values, and perspectives of elite officers on active duty and in the reserves with a sample of elite civilians in the United States, and with the mass public. The officer sample came from senior-year cadets and midshipmen at the service academies and in the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and from officers selected for in-residence attendance at staff and war colleges and for the Capstone Course (for new flag officers) at National Defense University, in Washington, D.C. Comparable samples of reserve and National Guard officers were also surveyed. The elite civilian sample was a random selection from Whoís Who in America and similar biographical compilations. The general-public sample came from a telephone poll, using a portion of the surveyís questions, conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates. Information on the project and its methods can be found at http://www.poli.duke.civmil and in the introduction and conclusion in Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). The figures for military officers cited in this essay do not include students in precommissioning programs. In the survey, 49 percent of the active-duty military officers said they would leave military service ìif the senior uniformed leadership does not stand up for what is right in military policy.î This was the second most-listed choice of nine offered, exceeded only by ìif the challenge and sense of fulfillment I derive from my service were lessî (68 percent). (All percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.) For a sense of the bitterness in the officer corps, particularly toward the senior uniformed leadership, see ìChief of Staff of the Armyís Leadership Survey: Command and General Staff College Survey of 760 Mid-Career Students (Majors with a Few LTCs),î n.d. [Spring 2000], on the World Wide Web at http://www.d-n-i.net/FCS_Folder/leadership_ comments.htm (30 November 2001); Ed Offley, ìYoung Officersí Anger, Frustration Stun Navyís Top Brass,î Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 29 January 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://seattlep-i.nwsource.com/local/navy29.shtml (30 November 2001); Rowan Scarborough, ìArmy Colonels Reject Choice Assignments,î Washington Times, 1 November 2000, p. A1; Paul Richter, ìGlamour of Americaís Military Schools Fading for Youth,î Los Angeles Times, 15 August 2000, p. 16; Justin P. D. Wilcox [Cpt., USA], ìMilitary Experience Exposes ëReadiness Lie,íî USA Today, 5 September 2000, p. 26. Wilcox, a West Pointer, was leaving the service after five years because of underfunding, ìmore attention placed on landscaping and details . . . than on training,î because ìpursuit of mediocrity has become the norm,î and for other reasons. ìWhen,î he asked, ìwill a general officer finally lay his stars on the table and stand up to the current administration for his soldiers?î One of the earlier attacks on the senior leadership was David H. Hackworth, ìToo Much Brass, Too Little Brash,î Atlanta Constitution, 2 March 1994, p. 11. For survey data and analysis, see American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century: A Report of the CSIS International Security Program (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), pp. xxii, xxv, 17­8, 23­4, 45, 71­2. For an indication of a slippage in quality, see David S. C. Chu and John Brown, ìEnsuring Quality People in Defense,î in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, ed. Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 206. These events followed the downsizing of the armed services, which in the Army officer corps damaged morale, loosened organizational commitment, and undermined professionalism. See David McCormick, The Downsized Warrior: Americaís Army in Transition (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1998), chap. 4, esp. pp. 127­9. 

26. I am indebted to Alfred Goldberg, historian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense since 1973, for the insight about civilian control being situational. I used this definition first in ìOut of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,î National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 16­7. A similar definition, emphasizing the relative weight of military and civilian in decisions and decision making, is found in Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999), esp. chaps. 1­3 and appendix. See also the discussion in Yehuda Ben Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1995), chap. 2 (ìCivilian Controlî). In an important forthcomingwork on civil-military relations, Peter Feaver distinguishes between trying to overthrow civilian authority (as in a coup) and simply shirking in carrying out the orders or wishes of the civilians. He explores the latter in depth, interpreting military subordination to civil authority as a variable rather than a given. See his Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civilian Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, in press). 

27. See James R. Locher III, ìHas It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,î Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001, pp. 108­9. 

28. Pentagon reporter David Martin, in his ìLanding the Eagle,î Vanity Fair, November 1993, p. 153, described the Joint Staff this way: ìMade up of 1,400 men and women, mostly in uniform, the Joint Staff analyzes the military consequences of the various options proposed by the administration. The answers they come up with can stop a fledgling policy dead in its tracks. You want to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia? Sure, we can do it. But it will take 500,000 troops and the second you pull them out the fighting will resume.î For an indication of the Joint Staffís analytical (and political) advantages over the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the 2001 QDR, see Elaine Grossman, ìShelton Mulls Holding Key Civilian-Led Review to Exacting Standards,î Inside the Pentagon, 2 August 2001,
p. 1. See also James Kitfield, ìPentagon Power Shift,î Government Executive, April 1994, p. 72. 

29. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War, pp. 172­4; John M. Shalikashvili et al., ìKeeping the Edge in Joint Operations,î in Keeping the Edge, ed. Carter and White, pp. 39­42, 44­5; Robert Holzer and Stephen C. LeSueur, ìJCS Quietly Gathers Up Reins of Power,î Defense News, 13­19 June 1994. 

30. Conversation with an officer at a war college, June 1999. In late 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked Congressís permission to reduce the various legislative liaison staffs in the Pentagon by almost half, to 250, because, as he reportedly believed, ìsome congressional liaison officers may be working at cross purposes with the Bush administrationís plan by pushing their own agency or command instead of the Pentagonís top priorities.î Rick Maze, ìSenate Wants to Reduce Number of Military Liaisons,î ArmyTimes.com, 4 December 2001. 

31. Dana Priest, ìThe Proconsuls: Patrolling the World,î in three front-page installments: ìA Four-Star Foreign Policy?î ìAn Engagement in 10 Time Zones,î and ìCINCs Donít Swim with State,î Washington Post, 28, 29, and 30 September 2000, respectively. See also the remarks of Dana Priest and Robert B. Oakley in the State Department Open Forum, 23 March 2001, and U.S. Secretary of State, ìCivil Military Affairs and U.S. Diplomacy: The Changing Roles of the Regional Commanders-in-Chief,î cable message to all diplomatic and consular posts, 1 July 2001. Writing from Paris, the journalist William Pfaff had highlighted the change a year earlier. ìIt is not too much to say that there is a distinct foreign policy of military inspiration, conducted from the Pentagon,î he wrote, citing the conflicting messages sent by the American military to its Indonesian counterparts during the East Timor crisis. See ìBeware of a Military Penchant for a Parallel Foreign Policy,î International Herald Tribune, 22 September 1999, on the World Wide Web at http://www.iht.com/IHT/WP99/wp092299.html (5 December 2001). For an indication of how one regional commander actively sought to determine policy and influence diplomacy, in this case intervention to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, see Clark, Waging War, chaps. 5­6. Another regional commander, Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni of U.S. Central Command, described himself as a ìproconsul,î hinting an analogy with a post in the ancient Roman republic and empire that mixed enormous political, military, and judicial powers over the population of a province. This author may have been the first to suggest that label to General Zinni, in an exchange at U.S. Central Command headquarters, Tampa, Florida, April 1998. 

32. Andrew J. Bacevich, ìDiscord Still: Clinton and the Military,î Washington Post, 3 January 1999, p. C01. 

33. See the sources in note 22 above. An insightful summation is Michael Duffy, ìRumsfeld: Older but Wiser?î Time, 27 August 2001,
pp. 22­7. 

34. Wilson, This War Really Matters, takes a detailed, and particularly revealing, look at the ìdecision-making process for national defenseî (p. 3) for the 1997­99 period, especially the interactions between the civilians in the executive branch, the Congress, and the Joint Chiefs. To understand the extent to which the armed services are expected to press their own institutional interests with Congress, see Stephen K. Scroggs, Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000). 

35. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), pp. 361­4; Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 39, 56, 103, 305; and Eric Q. Winograd, ìOfficials: Homeland Defense Mission Will Mean Changes for the Guard,î Inside the Army, 19 November 2001, p. 1. James Schlesinger, the secretary of defense who must have approved this change in force structure, confirmed this interpretation in the very process of questioning it: ìThis would not really be like Abe [Abrams]. He had the view that the military must defer to the civilians, even to an extraordinary degree. I speculate that the military sought to fix the incentives so that the civilians would act appropriately.î Quoted in Duncan, Citizen Warriors, pp. 271­2. 

36. William J. Crowe, Jr. [Adm., USN], The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 41, 127, 152­9, 161, 177, 180­5, 189­90, 212­41, 304­5, 309, 312­9, 341­5; Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 40. 

37. See, for example, Barton Gellman, ìRumblings of Discord Heard in Pentagon,î Washington Post, 20 June 1993, p. A1. 

38. J. G. Prout III, memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, ìSubj: CNO Comments at Surface Warfare Flag Officer Conference (SWFOC),î 23 September 1994, copy in possession of the author. 

39. Directions for Defense; Robert Holzer, ìExperts: Streamlined Staff at OSD Could Save Billions,î Defense News, 2­8 December 1996, p. 28. 

40. For insight into the militaryís influence over the character of the intervention in Bosnia, see Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of Americaís Bosnia Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 140­53, 173­8; Dan Blumenthal, ìClinton, the Military, and Bosnia, 1993­1995: A Study in Dysfunctional Civil Military Relations,î Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Use of Force Seminar, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 7 June 1999; and Clark, Waging War, pp. 55­66, 73, 79­80. Clark, who was the senior U.S. military adviser at the Dayton negotiations, put it this way 
(p. 59): ìUnder our agreement, we were seeking to limit the obligations of the military . . . but to give the commander unlimited authority to accomplish these limited obligations.î A background analysis is Susan L. Woodward, ìUpside-Down Policy: The U.S. Debate on the Use of Force and the Case of Bosnia,î in Use of Force, ed. Brands, pp. 111­34. In an analysis of civil-military conflicts between 1938 and 1997, Michael C. Desch argues that civilian control weakened in the United States during the 1990s. He finds that civilians prevailed in fifty-nine of sixty-two instances of civil-military conflict before the 1990s but in only five of twelve in that decade. See his Civilian Control of the Military, chap. 3 and appendix. 

41. Charles G. Boyd, ìAmerica Prolongs the War in Bosnia,î New York Times, 9 August 1995, p. 19, and ìMaking Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia,î Foreign Affairs, October 1995, pp. 22­38. The op-ed began, ìHaving spent the last two years as deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, I have found that my views on the frustrating events in Bosnia differ from much of the conventional wisdom in Washington.î 

42. Bill Keller, ìThe World according to Powell,î New York Times Magazine, 25 November 2001, p. 65. 

43. For a fuller discussion of General Powellís efforts to circumvent civilian control, see Kohn, ìOut of Control,î pp. 8­13, and with Powellís reply, comments by John Lehman, William Odom, and Samuel P. Huntington, and my response in National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23­31. Other profiles and supporting material are in Jon Meacham, ìHow Colin Powell Plays the Game,î Washington Monthly, December 1994, pp. 33­42; Charles Lane, ìThe Legend of Colin Powell,î New Republic, 17 April 1995, pp. 20­32; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, ìBeltway Warrior,î New York Times Magazine, 27 August 1995, pp. 40­3; Keller, ìWorld according to Powell,î pp. 61ff.; Michael C. Desch and Sharon K. Weiner, eds., Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations, October 23, 1995, Project on U.S. Post­Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1995); Lawrence F. Kaplan, ìYesterdayís Man: Colin Powellís Out-of-Date Foreign Policy,î New Republic, 1 January 2001, pp. 17­21. 

44. Eric Schmitt and Elaine Sciolino, ìTo Run Pentagon, Bush Sought Proven Manager with Muscle,î New York Times, 1 January 2001, 
p. 1; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, ìInside the Ring,î Washington Times, 26 January 2001, p. A9. Significantly, Powellís close friend Richard Armitage, who had been mentioned frequently for the position of deputy secretary of defense, was not offered that position and instead became deputy secretary of state. 

45. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Random House, 1952), remains indispensable. See also Richard N. Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 169; David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 386­8; and Bruce Tap, Over Lincolnís Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 151­4. 

46. Timothy D. Johnson, Winfield Scott: The Quest for Military Glory (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 217­9; John E. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldierís Passion for Order (New York: Free Press, 1993), 
pp. 386­9. 

47. Mark Russell Shulman, Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882­1893 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 46­57, 152­3; Paul A. C. Koistinen, Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865­1919 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1997), pp. 48­57; Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of Americaís Military-Industrial Complex, 1881­1917 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1979), chaps. 3­4, postscript. See also Kurt Hackemer, The U.S. Navy and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1847­1883 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), and his ìBuilding the Military-Industrial Relationship: The U.S. Navy and American Business, 1854­1883,î Naval War College Review, Spring 1999, pp. 89­111. 

48. DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980); David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917­1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 66­9, 81­4, 86­90, 102­3, 158­60, 220­2, 227­8; Randall R. Rice, ìThe Politics of Air Power: From Confrontation to Cooperation in Army Aviation Civil-Military Relations, 1919­1940î (dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2002). 

49. Quoted in Marriner Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers: Public and Personal Recollections, ed. Sidney Hyman (New York: Knopf, 1951),
p. 336. For a sense of Theodore Rooseveltís troubles with the services, see his letters to Elihu Root, 7 March 1902; to Oswald Garrison Villard, 22 March 1902; to Leonard Wood, 4 June 1904; and to Truman H. Newberry, 28 August 1908, quoted in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951­54), vol. 3, pp. 241, 247; vol. 4, p. 820; vol. 6, p. 1199. See also the forthcoming study of Roosevelt as commander in chief by Matthew M. Oyos, who supplied excerpts from the above documents; and Oyos, ìTheodore Roosevelt, Congress, and the Military: U.S. Civil-Military Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,î Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, 2000, pp. 312­30. 

50. The civil-military battles of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s are covered in a number of works, among them: Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1966); Herman S. Wolk, The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943­1947 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997); Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945­1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994); Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947­1950, vol. 1 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); Robert L. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956­1960, vol. 4 of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997); Andrew J. Bacevich, ìGenerals versus the President: Eisenhower and the Army, 1953­1955,î in Security in a Changing World: Case Studies in U.S. National Security Management, ed. Volker C. Franke (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), pp. 83­99; and Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993). 

51. For a brief history of civilian control, see Richard H. Kohn, ìCivil-Military Relations: Civilian Control of the Military,î in The Oxford Companion to American Military History, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 122­5. Similar interpretations of the conflict inherent in the relationship are Russell F. Weigley, ìThe American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,î Journal of Military History, special issue, vol. 57, 1993, pp. 27­59; Russell F. Weigley, ìThe American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 5; Ronald H. Spector, ìOperation Who Says: Tension between Civilian and Military Leaders Is Inevitable,î Washington Post, 22 August 1999, p. B1; and Peter D. Feaver, ìDiscord and Divisions of Labor: The Evolution of Civil-Military Conflict in the United States,î paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1993. A particularly cogent analysis from a generation ago, by a scholar who both studied the issues and participated as a senior civilian official in the Pentagon, is Adam Yarmolinsky, ìCivilian Control: New Perspectives for New Problems,î Indiana Law Journal, vol. 49, 1974, 
pp. 654­71. 

52. See, for example, Dana Priest, ìMine Decision Boosts Clinton-Military Relations,î Washington Post, 21 September 1997, p. A22; Ernest Blazar, ìInside the Ring,î Washington Times, 8 June 1998, p. 11; Jonathan S. Landay, ìU.S. Losing Handle on Its Diplomacy in a Kosovo ëat War,íî Christian Science Monitor, 5 June 1998, p. 7; Daniel Rearick, ìAn Unfortunate Opposition: U.S. Policy toward the Establishment of the International Criminal Courtî (honors thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000). 

53. In The Clustered World: How We Live, What We Buy, and What It All Means about Who We Are (Boston: Little, Brown, 2000), a study of consumerism and lifestyles, Michael J. Weiss identifies the military as one of ìsixty-two distinct population groups each with its own set of values, culture and means of coping with todayís problemsî (p. 11). His thesis is that the country has become splintered and fragmented (see pp. 258­9 and chap. 1). For the militaryís ìpresenceî in American society, see the late Adam Yarmolinskyís comprehensive The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), and James Burk, ìThe Militaryís Presence in American Society,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 6. In 1985, ìa group of 31 military and veterans organizations that lobby for the uniformed services on personnel and pay issuesî representing some ì6 million veterans and their familiesî banded together to form the ìMilitary Coalition,î a force that in the opinion of one thoughtful retired general is ìpotentially far more numerous and powerful than the NRA!!!î Stephen Barr, ìMilitary Pay Expert Retires,î Washington Post, 12 March 2001,
p. B2; Ted Metaxis e-mail to the author, 24 October 1999. 

54. Donald Rumsfeld, ìRumsfeldís Rules,î rev. ed., January 17, 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/jan2001/ rumsfeldsrules.pdf (29 January 2001). 

55. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/qdr2001.pdf (6 October 2001); Anne Plummer, ìPentagon Launches Some 50 Reviews in Major Defense Planning Effort,î Inside the Pentagon, 15 November 2001, p. 1; John Liang, ìRumsfeld Supports Switching Future QDRs to Administrationís Second Year,î InsideDefense.com, 6 December 2001. 

56. Thomas E. Ricks, ìTarget Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits,î Washington Post, 18 November 2001, p. 1, and ìRumsfeldís Hands-On War: Afghan Campaign Shaped by Secretaryís Views, Personality,î Washington Post, 19 December 2001, p. 1; Esther Schrader, ìAction Role a Better Fit for Rumsfeld,î Los Angeles Times, 11 November 2001, p. 22; Lawrence F. Kaplan, ìOurs to Lose: Why Is Bush Repeating Clintonís Mistakes?î New Republic, 12 November 2001, 
pp. 25­6; Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ìGetting Serious,î Weekly Standard, 19 November 2001, pp. 7­8; J. Michael Waller, ìRumsfeld: Plagues of Biblical Job,î Insight Magazine, 10 December 2001; Damian Whitworth and Roland Watson, ìRumsfeld at Odds with His Generals,î London Times, 16 October 2001, p. 5; Toby Harnden, ìRumsfeld Calls for End to Old Tactics of War,î London Daily Telegraph, 16 October 2001, p. 8. 

57. Quoted in Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York: Scribnerís, 1973), p. 278. 

58. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldierís Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. 147. For an outline of the four factors underlying civilian control in the United States historically, see my ìCivilian Control of the Military,î 
pp. 122­5. 

59. The Gallup polling organization has surveyed Americans annually on their confidence in major institutions since the early 1970s, and the military has topped the list since 1987, with over 60 percent expressing a ìgreat dealî or ìquite a lotî of confidence. See Frank Newport, ìMilitary Retains Top Position in Americansí Confidence Ratings,î 25 June 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ pr010625.asp (2 December 2001) and ìSmall Business and Military Generate Most Confidence in Americans,î 15 August 1997, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/releases/ pr970815.asp (2 December 2001); ìGallup Poll Topics: A-Z: Confidence in Institutions,î 8­10 June 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/indicators/indconfidence.asp (2 December 2001). For excellent analyses of the change in public attitudes toward the military since the late 1960s, see David C. King and Zachary Karabell, ìThe Generation of Trust: Public Confidence in the U.S. Military since Vietnam,î revision of a paper presented to the Duke University political science department, 29 January 1999, to be published in 2002 by the American Enterprise Institute; and Richard Sobel, ìThe Authoritarian Reflex and Public Support for the U.S. Military: An Anomaly?î paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 16 April 1999. Respect for lawyers is low and has been declining in recent years. See Darren K. Carlson, ìNurses Remain at Top of Honest and Ethics Poll,î 27 November 2000, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ Pr001127.asp (2 December 2001). 

60. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, eds., Why People Donít Trust Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1997); Albert H. Cantril and Susan Davis Cantril, Reading Mixed Signals: Ambivalence in American Public Opinion about Government (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999). The decline in trust of government and confidence in public institutions has not been limited to the United States. See Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies: Whatís Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000). Trust in government in the United States after the 11 September attacks jumped dramatically to the highest level since 1968. Frank Newport, ìTrust in Government Increases Sharply in Wake of Terrorist Attacks,î 12 October 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ pr011012.asp (2 December 2001); Alexander Stille, ìSuddenly, Americans Trust Uncle Sam,î New York Times, 3 November, p. A11; and John D. Donahue, ìIs Government the Good Guy?î New York Times, 13 December 2001, p. A31. Whether the attacks will reverse the long-term trend remains to be seen. 

61. For critiques of journalism in general and coverage of the military in particular, see Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, Warp Speed: America in the Age of Mixed Media (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999); Scott Shuger, ìFirst, the Bad News: The Big Daily Newspapers Get Some Things Right. National Defense Isnít One of Them,î Mother Jones, September/October 1998, pp. 72­6. My views come from a decade of close reading of reporting on national security issues. An example of lack of interest in civil-military relations is the absence in the media of reaction to and interpretation of the detailed and persuasive reports of Dana Priest (see note 31 above) about the growth in power of the regional commanders, discussed previously. Typical of press misunderstanding is the editorial ìUnifying Armed Forces Requires Radical Changeî in the 18 June 2001 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, calling for abolition of the separate military departments, replacement of the JCS by a ìsingle Chief of Military Staff who would command the armed forces,î and further empowerment of the regional commanders. The editorial purports to ìmake the Secretary of Defense a genuine master of the Pentagon rather than a referee among warring factions,î but the recommendations would destroy a secretaryís ability to monitor and supervise one of the worldís largest, and most complex, bureaucratic structures. 

62. See William J. Bennett, The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators: American Society at the End of the Twentieth Century, updated and expanded ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 1999); Marc Miringoff and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, The Social Health of the Nation: How America Is Really Doing (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); James H. Billington, ìThe Human Consequences of the Information Revolution,î Ditchley Foundation Lecture 37 (Chipping Norton, U.K.: Ditchley Foundation, 2000); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Everett Carl Ladd, The Ladd Report (New York: Free Press, 1999); Weiss, The Clustered World, pp. 10­1, 14­5, 19­25, 43­4; Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), essays 1, 12, 13; Derek Bok, The Trouble with Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 386­98; William Chaloupka, Everybody Knows: Cynicism in America (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1999); Robert D. Kaplan, An Empire Wilderness: Travels into Americaís Future (New York: Random House, 1998); and Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997). More hopeful though still cautious pictures are Robert William Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening & the Future of Egalitarianism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000); and Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999). 

63. In the TISS survey, a number of the 250-some questions examined attitudes about the proper role of the military in society. For example, 49 percent of elite civilians and 68 percent of the mass public agreed (ìstronglyî or ìsomewhatî) that ìin wartime, civilian government leaders should let the military take over running the war,î a position echoed by even as distinguished a scholar as Amitai Etzioni (ìHow Not to Win the War,î USA Today, 7 November 2001,
p. 15). To the question, ìMembers of the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen,î 59 percent of the civilian elite and 84 percent of the general public agreed. Civilians were much more likely than the military to condone leaking documents to the press in various situations. The distinguished sociologist James A. Davis felt the results ìmake oneís hair stand on endî but suggested as a ìsimple explanationî that they are accounted for by ìcynicism about civilian politics,î Americansí high regard for ìtheir military,î and by the ideas that civilian control is ìa fairly sophisticated doctrine, while common sense suggests that important decisions should be made by people who are best informed.î See his ìAttitudes and Opinions among Senior Military Officers and a U.S. Cross-Section, 1998­1999,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, p. 120 and esp. table 2.10. My point is that whatever the explanation, the very positive image of the military held by Americans in the last dozen or so years diverges considerably from what seems to have been the historical norm. See C. Robert Kemble, The Image of the Army Officer in America: Background for Current Views (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), particularly part 2. At the same time, 47 percent of the general public did not think ìcivilian control of the military is absolutely safe and secure in the United States,î and 68 percent thought that ìif civilian leaders order the military to do something that it opposes, military leaders will seek ways to avoid carrying out the orderî at least ìsome of the timeî (30 percent thought ìallî or ìmost of the timeî). For the decline in civics education and understanding, see Chris Hedges, ì35% of High School Seniors Fail National Civics Test,î New York Times, 21 November 1999, p. 17; Bok, Trouble with Government, pp. 403­6. 

64. For the caricatures in popular literature and films, see Howard Harper, ìThe Military and Society: Reaching and Reflecting Audiences in Fiction and Film,î Armed Forces & Society, vol. 27, 2001, pp. 231­48. Charles C. Moskos, ìToward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,î in The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), p. 20; Moskos, ìWhat Ails the All-Volunteer Force: An Institutional Perspective,î Parameters, Summer 2001, pp. 34­5; and ìInterview: James Webb,î U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2000, pp. 78­9, all argue that the military is pictured negatively in film. But King and Karabell, ìGeneration of Trust,î pp. 6­7, judge that current portrayals are the most ìpositive . . . since World War II.î 

65. Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of the People (New York: Free Press, 1998), particularly chaps. 1, 3. 

66. In the TISS survey of ìeliteî officers, some 40 percent of the National Guard and 25 percent of the reserve respondents listed their occupation as ìmilitary,î which suggests that they are in uniform full-time or work somewhere in national defense, either for government or industry. See David Paul Filer, ìMilitary Reserves: Bridging the Culture Gap between Civilian Society and the United States Militaryî (M.A. thesis, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 2001), pp. 46­7. In the fiscal year 2001 defense authorization act, 6.6 percent of the Army National Guard and 20.6 percent of the Air National Guard were authorized to be ìdual statusî civilian technicians and uniformed members. Charlie Price (National Guard Bureau of Public Affairs) e-mail to author, 12 February 2001. 

67. The similarity ìattitudinallyî between active-duty officers and the National Guard and reserves on some of the questions in the TISS survey is addressed in Filer, ìMilitary Reserves.î Other congruence is evident in the data. 

68. See, for example, Jack Kelly, ìU.S. Reliance on Guards, Reservists Escalating,î Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 28 October 2000, p. 9; Steven Lee Myers, ìArmy Will Give National Guard the Entire U.S. Role in Bosnia,î New York Times, 5 December 2000, p. A8; Winograd, ìOfficials: Homeland Defense Mission Will Mean Changes for the Guard,î p. 1; David T. Fautua, ìArmy Citizen-Soldiers: Active, Guard, and Reserve Leaders Remain Silent about Overuse of Reserve Components,î Armed Forces Journal International, September 2000, pp. 72­4; John J. Miller, ìUnreserved: The Misuse of Americaís Reserve Forces,î National Review, 23 July 2001, 
pp. 26ff.; and Duncan, Citizen Warriors, 
pp. 214­7 and n. 25. Duncan calls the 1995 deployment of Guardsmen and reserves to the Sinai for six months of peacekeeping duty ìunprecedented.î See also Peter Bacqué, ìGuard Troops Will Head for Sinai in í95,î Richmond Times-Dispatch, 28 January 1994, p. B6. The reserve-component contribution to active-duty missions has risen from about one million man-days in 1986 to approximately thirteen million in each of the years 1996, 1997, and 1998. CSIS, American Military Culture, p. 19. See also Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies during the 1990s (Carlisle, Penna.: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), pp. 29­30. 

69. Personal exchange, panel discussion on civil-military relations, Marine Corps Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, September 1998; personal exchange, lecture/discussion with twenty-six state adjutant generals, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, October 1998. 

70. The decline in citizen-soldiering and some of its implications are addressed in Andrew J. Bacevich, ìLosing Private Ryan: Why the Citizen-Soldier Is MIA,î National Review, 9 August 1999, pp. 32­4. Also Elliott Abrams and Andrew J. Bacevich, ìA Symposium on Citizenship and Military Serviceî; Eliot A. Cohen, ìTwilight of the Citizen-Soldierî; and James Burk, ìThe Military Obligation of Citizens since Vietnamî; all Parameters, Summer 2001, pp. 18­20, 23­8, 48­60, respectively. Also Hart, Minuteman, esp. 
pp. 16­7, 21­5. For a recent review of the end of conscription, see David R. Sands, ìMilitary Draft Now Part of Past: Spain and Italy are the Latest European Nations to Abandon Compulsory Service,î and ìU.S. Talk of a Draft Probably Hot Air,î Washington Times, 31 December 2000, pp. 1, 4, respectively. 

71. In the TISS survey, well over 90 percent of the civilian elite said that the people they came into contact with ìin the social or community groups to which [they] belongî were either ìall civiliansî or ìmostly civilians with some military.î The same was true (over 90 percent of respondents) in the workplace. Americans (both elite and general public) who have not served in the military also have fewer close friends who now serve or are veterans. The prospects for diminished civilian contact with, understanding of, and support for the military are analyzed in Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, ìUncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 3. Congressman Ike Skelton, ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, had already discerned the trend and its implications for support of the military; see Rasheeda Crayton, ìSkelton Calls for More Military Support,î Kansas City Star, 12 November 1997, p. 15. A more general comment comes from Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush: ìWith the lessened contact between the American people and the military, .Ý.Ý.Ý the results will not be healthy.î Scowcroft, ìJudgment and Experience: George Bushís Foreign Policy,î in Presidential Judgment: Foreign Policy Decision Making in the White House, ed. Aaron Lobel (Hollis, N.H.: Hollis, 2001), 115. The declining propensity of youth to serve is noted in Thomas W. Lippman, ìWith a Draft Cut Off, Nationís Society Climate Changed Sharply,î Washington Post, 8 September 1998, p. 13. Lippman cites Pentagon ìYouth Attitude Tracking Surveyî figures indicating that some 32 percent of youth ìexpressed some desire to join the militaryî in 1973, the last year of the Cold War draft, but that by 1993 the figure had dropped to 25 percent and by 1997 to 12 percent. See also Moskos, ìWhat Ails the All-Volunteer Force,î pp. 39­41. 

72. William T. Bianco and Jamie Markham, ìVanishing Veterans: The Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 7. 

73. Norman Ornstein, ìThe Legacy of Campaign 2000,î Washington Quarterly, Spring 2001, p. 102; William M. Welch, ìMost U.S. Lawmakers Lack Combat Experience,î USA Today, 12 November 2001, p. 12. Writing before 11 September, Ornstein calls the present ìCongress . . . clearly and irrevocably a post­Cold War Congress. Eighty-three percent, or 363 members, of the House were first elected in the 1990s, since the Berlin Wall fell, along with 57 members of the Senate. Few of these lawmakers, in either party, have an abiding interest in the U.S. role in the world. International issues are simply not high on their priority list.î He notes also that in a typical post­World War II Congress, some three-quarters of the senators and more than half the representatives were veterans. Importantly, the newer veterans in Congress are quite likely to be Republicans, whereas in the past veterans were more or less evenly split. Donald N. Zillman, ìMaintaining the Political Neutrality of the Military,î IUS [Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society] Newsletter, Spring 2001, p. 17. In 2000, a retired rear admiral ìstarted a ëNational Defense P[olitical]A[ction]C[ommittee]í to support congressional candidates who have served in the armed forces.î ìInside Washington, D.C.: G.I. Joes and G.I. Janes Ready Their PAC,î National Journal, 9 September 2000, p. 2759. 

74. According to the newsletter of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, the military began voting in greater percentages than the public in 1984, and in 1996 ìat an overall rate of 64%, compared to the 49% rate generated by the general public. The Uniformed Servicesí high participation rate can be directly attributed to the active voter assistance programs conducted by Service Commanders and to assistance from the state and local election officials in simplifying the absentee voting process and accommodating the special needs of the Uniformed Services.î See ìMilitary Retains High Participation Rates,î Voting Information News, July 1997, p. 1. In the 1980 election, military voting was below civilian (49.7 to 52.6 percent). In the 1992 election, the Defense Department expanded the program, according to a reporter, ìto register and turn out military voters,î changing the ìemphasis . . . from ensuring availability of voting forms to mustering ballots at the polls.î Setting ìfor the first time . . . a target rate for participation,î this ìnew focus on voter turnout . . . has led some Democratic and some independent analysts to suspect the Bush administration is trying to energize a predictably sympathetic voter base.î Barton Gellman, ìPentagon Intensifies Effort to Muster Military Voters,î Washington Post, 17 September 1992, p. A1. See also Daniel A. Gibran, Absentee Voting: A Brief History of Suffrage Expansion in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Federal Voting Assistance Program, August 2001). 

75. Ole R. Holsti, ìA Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976­1996,î International Security, Winter 1998/1999, p. 11; TISS survey data. Some observers think the actual Republican figure is much higher, many officers being reluctant to reveal a preference, ìknowing full and well what the reaction would be if the percentage of Republicans in the elite military ranks was seen to approach 85 to 90 per cent, which I am told is a reasonable figure.î This well-connected West Point graduate continued, ìWeíre in danger of developing our own in-house Soviet-style military, one in which if youíre not in ëthe party,í you donít get ahead. I have spoken with several . . . who were run out of the Army near the beginning of their careers when commanders became aware that they had voted for Clinton in 1992. I have no doubt they are telling me the truth, and . . . Iíve spoken with some . . . who confirm their stories.î Enclosure in Tom Ricks to the author, 20 November 2000. Generals and admiralsówho, as older, more senior, and more experienced officers could be expected to be imbued with the more traditional ethic of nonaffiliationóhave a slightly higher independent or nonpartisan self-identification. In 1984, Newsweek (9 July, p. 37) surveyed 257 flag officers, about a quarter of those on active duty; the results were Republican 52 percent, Democrat 4 percent, independent 43 percent, ìdonít knowî 1 percent. Holstiís 1984 officer sample contained 29 percent independents. The TISS survey included seventy-four one and two-star officers: Republican 57 percent; Democrat 9 percent; independent, no preference, and other 34 percent. The TISS active-duty sample was 28 percent independent/no preference/other. 

76. Pat Towell, ìGOP Advertises Differences with Commander in Chief in Military-Oriented Papers,î Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 11 December 1999, p. 2984; Republican National Committee advertisement, ìKeeping the Commitment: Republicans Reverse Years of Military Neglect,î Air Force Times, 13 December 1999, p. 57; Republican National Committee postcard to University of North Carolina Army ROTC cadre members, n.d. [fall 2000], in possession of author; Frank Abbott to author, 11 October 2000; David Wood, ìMilitary Breaks Ranks with Non-Partisan Tradition,î Cleveland Plain Dealer, 22 October 2000, p. 16. Just prior to the election, the Republican National Committee paid for e-mail messages from Colin Powell urging recipients to vote for ìour Republican teamî; Powell to Alvin Bernstein, subject ìA Message from Colin L. Powell,î 6 November 2000, in possession of author. In the 2000 election, about 72 percent of overseas military personnel, targeted particularly by Republicans, voted. The overall voting rate for the civilian population was 50 percent. Robert Suro, ìPentagon Will Revise Military Voting Procedures,î Washington Post, 23 June 2001, p. 2. The Bush campaign pushed to count overseas military ballots, even questionable ones, in counties where Bush was strong and to disqualify those in counties where Gore was strong, nearly resulting in a large enough net gain to swing the outcome by itself. David Barstow and Don Van Natta, Jr., ìHow Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote,î New York Times, 15 July 2001, p. 1. 

77. Christopher McKee, A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794­1815 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 107­8; William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784­1861 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992), chap. 15; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784­1898 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 87­96, 242­3, 266­9; Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 203­13. 

78. General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., in The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917­1942 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989), remembers that ìthere was never much partisan political feeling on military posts, even during years of presidential elections. . . . [T]he military were isolated from the political rivalries. . . . Then too, Regular Army officers were sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution . . . and . . . carried out orders regardless of the political party in power. . . . Further, few officers maintained voting residence, and absentee voting was relatively rare at this timeî (p. 130). Edward M. Coffman, who has spent over two decades studying the peacetime Army (his volume covering the social history of the Army, 1898­1941, to follow his The Old Army, is near completion), found that regular officers in the nineteenth century ìgenerally stayed out of politics with rare exceptionsî and during ìthe 20th centuryî had ìvirtually no participation in voting. For one thing, the absentee ballot was not in vogueóand then there was the problem of establishing residency but, as I picked up in interviews [Coffman has done several hundred with veterans of the 1900­40 era], they didnít think it was their place to vote. Again and again, both officers and their wives told me that they didnít vote until after retirement.î Coffman e-mail to the author, 23 July 1999. Nonpartisanship and lack of voting in the 1930s is confirmed by Daniel Blumenthal in ìLegal Prescriptions, Customary Restrictions, Institutional Traditions: The Political Attitudes of American Officers Leading Up to World War II,î seminar paper, National Security Law Course, Duke University Law School, 4 April 1998. 

79. I agree with Lance Betros, ìPolitical Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America,î Armed Forces & Society, vol. 27, 2001, 
pp. 501­23, that the mere act of voting is not partisan, but I think that continual voting over time for the same party can lead to partisanship that does harm military professionalism. In a March 1999 discussion at the Naval War College, Admiral Stanley Arthur felt that officers who are sincere about their votes ìtake ownershipî of them, a commitment that could undermine their ability to be neutral, apolitical instruments of the state. I do not find that promoting oneís armed service, writing about national defense issues to affect policy, and making alliances with politicians to advance oneís own personal and service interests are the same as the partisanship of identifying personally with the ideology and political and cultural agendas of a political party, which is the kind of partisanship that has emerged in the last two decades. For a different view, see Betros, ìOfficer Professionalism in the Late Progressive Era,î in The Future of Army Professionalism, ed. Don Snider and Gayle Watkins (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002). 

80. Mackubin Thomas Owens, ìThe Democratic Partyís War on the Military,î Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2000, p. 22. See also Tom Donnelly, ìWhy Soldiers Dislike Democrats,î Weekly Standard, 4 December 2000, p. 14. 

81. Ed Offley, ìRejected Military Votes Spark New Furor in Florida Election Count,î Stars and Stripes Omnimedia, 20 November 2000; Thomas E. Ricks, ìDemocratic Ballot Challenges Anger Military,î Washington Post, 21 November 2000, p. A18; Kenneth Allard, ìMilitary Ballot Mischief,î Washington Times, 27 November 2000; Elaine M. Grossman, ìRift over Florida Military Ballots Might Affect a Gore Administration,î Inside the Pentagon, 30 November 2000, p. 1. 

82. Triangle Institute for Security Studies, ìSurvey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era,î 1999. The question read: ìIf civilian leaders order the military to do something that it opposes, military leaders will seek ways to avoid carrying out the order: all of the time [9 percent chose this answer]; most of the time [21 percent]; some of the time [38 percent]; rarely [20 percent]; never [8 percent]; no opinion [4 percent].î The telephone survey of over a thousand people was administered by Princeton Survey Research Associates in September 1998. 

83. I made this argument more fully in ìThe Political Trap for the Military,î Raleigh (North Carolina) News & Observer, 22 September 2000, p. A19, orig. pub. Washington Post, 19 September 2000, p. A23. See also Charles A. Stevenson, ìBridging the Gap between Warriors and Politicians,î paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 2­5 September 1999. 

84. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 144­6, 361­2. An indication of the bitterness that developed between Holbrooke and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, who carried out the bombing on behalf of Natoís governing body, is in ìFrontline: Give War a Chance,î WGBH Educational Foundation, 2000, aired 11 May 1999, Public Broadcasting System. For a dispassionate view of the misunderstanding between political and military officials, see ìSummary,î in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Bombing, ed. Robert C. Owen [Col., USAF] (Maxwell Air Force Base [hereafter AFB], Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 500­5. 

85. Huntington, Soldier and the State, chaps. 2, 8­11, pp. 361­7; James L. Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power (New York: Free Press, 1981), pp. 138­47; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 187­93. 

86. In the TISS survey, the answers ìagree stronglyî or ìagree somewhatî were given to the assertion, ìThe decline of traditional values is contributing to the breakdown of our society,î according to the following distribution (ìmilitaryî being defined as active-duty, reserve on active duty, and National Guard up-and-coming officers): military, 89 per

cent; civilian elite, 70 percent; mass public, 82 percent. For the statement ìThrough leading by example, the military could help American society become more moralî the figures were military 70 percent and civilian elite 42 percent (the mass public was not surveyed on this question). For ìCivilian society would be better off if it adopted more of the militaryís values and customs,î the distribution was: military, 75 percent; civilian elite, 29 percent; and mass public, 37 percent. See also Davis, ìAttitudes and Opinions,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, pp. 116­9. For more analysis of the military view of civilian society, see Gronke and Feaver, ìUncertain Confidence,î pp. 147ff. On p. 149 they write, ìElite military officers evaluate civilian society far more negatively than do elite civilians.î The use of the military as a role model for society has a long history in American thinking; in the 1980s, the Chief of Naval Operations, James D. Watkins, was a leading proponent of that view. Peter Grier, ìNavy as National Role Model?î Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 1986, p. 1. 

87. Sam C. Sarkesian, ìThe U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,î Orbis, Summer 1998, 
pp. 423­37; James H. Webb, Jr., ìThe Silence of the Admirals,î U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1999, pp. 29­34. Sarkesian expanded the argument in Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-first Century: War, Peace and Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1999), esp. chaps. 11, 12. Even as respected and experienced a defense reporter as George C. Wilson has implied that the senior military leadership should speak out publicly in disagreement with their civilian superiors. This sentiment became something of a mantra in the middle and late 1990s as senior officers were accused of caving in to political correctness. See Wilson, ìJoint Chiefs Need to Be More Gutsy,î National Journal, 20 November 1999, p. 3418. 

88. Webb, ìSilence of the Admirals,î p. 34. 

89. Crowe, Line of Fire, p. 214. The 1998­99 TISS survey asked under what circumstances ìit is acceptable for a military member to leak unclassified information or documents to the press.î The figures for active-duty officers were (rounded up): 
Opinion 
 
Agree
(%) 
 
Disagree
(%) 
 
No Opinion
(%) 

ìA crime has been committed and the chain of command is not acting on it.î 
 
26 
 
70 
 

ìDoing so may prevent a policy that will lead to unnecessary casualties.î 
 
30 
 
65 
 

ìDoing so discloses a course of action that is morally or ethically wrong.î 
 
28 
 
65 
 

ìHe or she is ordered to by a superior.î 
 
17 
 
76 
 

ìDoing so brings to light a military policy or course of action that may lead to a disaster for the country.î 
 
39 
 
55 
 

ìNeverî 
 
41 
 
49 
 
10 
 
Reserve and National Guard officers were slightly more willing to agree to leak, but a higher percentage of them (46 percent) answered ìnever.î 

90. Peter J. Skibitski, ìNew Commandant Intends to Push for More Resources for Pentagon,î Inside the Navy, 15 November 1999, 
p. 1; Hunter Keeter, ìMarine Commandant Calls for Defense Spending Increase,î Defense Daily, 16 August 2000, p. 6; John Robinson, ìOutgoing 6th Fleet Commander Warns Fleet Size Is Too Small,î Defense Daily, 22 September 2000, p. 1; Elaine M. Grossman, ìDefenseÝ Budget Boost to 4 Percent of GDP Would Pose Dramatic Shift,î Inside the Pentagon, 31 August 2000, p. 3; Steven Lee Myers, ìA Call to Put the Budget Surplus to Use for theÝ

Military,î New York Times, 28 September 2000, p. A24; Cindy Rupert, ìAdmiral: Navy Pales to Past One,î Tampa Tribune, 21 October 2000, p. 2; Linda de France, ìSenior Navy Officers: ëWe Need More Ships, Planes, Subs,íî Aerospace Daily, 30 October 2000, and ìIn Next QDR, ëBudgets Need to Support Our Tasking,í General Says,î Aerospace Daily, 4 December 2000; Vickii Howell, ìAdmiral Tells Civic Clubs Navy Needs More Ships, Subs,î Birmingham (Alabama) News, 16 November 2000, p. 6B; Robert I. Natter, ìHelp Keep This the Greatest Navy,î U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2000, p. 2; Rowan Scarborough, ìMilitary Expects Bush to Perform,î Washington Times, 26 December 2000, p. 1. 

91. Rowan Scarborough, ìCohen Tells Military Leaders ëNot to Beat Drum with Tin Cup,íî Washington Times, 8 September 2000, p. 4. Secretary Cohen told them, according to his spokesman, ìto be honest but. . . .î According to Thomas E. Ricks and Robert Suro, ìMilitary Budget Maneuvers Target Next President,î Washington Post, 5 June 2000, p. 1, the armed services began ignoring civilian orders on the budget as early as June 2000, in order to ìtargetî the next administration. ìëWeíre going for the big money,í an officer on the Joint Staff was quoted as saying. . . . Pentagon insiders say the Clinton administration, which long has felt vulnerable on military issues, doesnít believe it can afford a public feud with the chiefsóespecially in the midst of Goreís campaign. So, these officials say, aides to defense Secretary William S. Cohen are seeking only to avoid confrontation and to tamp down the controversy. . . . One career bureaucrat in the Office of the Secretary of Defense said privately that he was offended by the arrogant tone service officials have used in recent discussions. . . . By contrast, a senior military official said the chiefsí budget demands represent a ërepudiation of bankrupt thinkingí in both the White House and Congress, which have asked the military to conduct a growing number of missions around the world in recent years without paying the full bill.î 

92. Bradley Graham, ìJoint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy,î Washington Post, 5 April 1999,
p. A1. See also Kenneth R. Rizer [Maj., USAF], Military Resistance to Humanitarian War in Kosovo and Beyond: An Ideological Explanation, Air University Library, Fairchild Paper (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 1­2, 7, 41­2. 

93. The regular public promotion of service interests by officers began when the Navy and Army in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formed coherent understandings of their own roles in national defense and formal doctrines for war-fighting in their respective domains of sea and land (and later air). The institutionalization of service advice on military subjects and public pronouncements on national security affairs has circumscribed civilian control to a degree. Efforts to limit the militaryís public voice, beginning perhaps in the first Wilson administration (1913­17), have been episodic and often ineffective. See Allan R. Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, 1979), pp. 19, 27­30; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, pp. 301­13, 362­71; Abrahamson, America Arms for a New Century, pp. 147­50; Betros, ìOfficer Professionalism,î in press; Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, 
pp. 68­9. 

94. Published in New York by HarperCollins, 1997. The author was McMasterís adviser at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992­96, for the seminar papers, masterís thesis, and Ph.D. dissertation that resulted in the book. 

95. McMaster hints at such an interpretation only by implying that the Army chief of staff, Harold K. Johnson, might have been justified in resigning (p. 318); by implying that the chiefs should have ìconfront[ed] the president with their objections to McNamaraís approach to the warî (p. 328); by stating that ìthe president . . . expected the Chiefs to lieî and ìthe flag officers should not have tolerated itî (p. 331); and by blaming the chiefs for going along with a strategy they believed would fail, and thus sharing the culpability with their deceitful civilian superiors for losing the war ìin Washington, D.C., even before Americans assumed sole responsibility for the fighting in 1965 and before they realized the country was at war; indeed, even before the first American units were deployedî (pp. 333­4). The interpretation of long standing in military thinking since the Vietnam War is that the war lacked clear objectives; that it was lost because a fallacious strategy was imposed by deceitful politicians who limited American power and micromanaged military operations; and because the American people, with no stake in the war (in part because elites avoided service), were biased against the American effort by a hostile press. Rosemary Mariner, a retired naval captain and pioneer naval aviator, remembers ìa certain litany to the Vietnam War storyî in ìevery ready roomî and at every ìhappy hourî from ìflight training and throughout subsequent tactical aviation assignmentsî (she was commissioned in 1973), a ìtribal lore that Robert S. McNamara was the devil incarnate whom the Joint Chiefs obviously didnít have the balls to stand up to. . . . Had the generals and admirals resigned in protest or conducted some kind of a second ëadmiralís revolt,í the war would have either been won or stopped.î Thus Marinerís ìinitial reaction to McMasterís book was that it simply affirmed what had been viewed as common wisdom.î Conversation with the author, 13 April 2000, Durham, N.C.; e-mail to the author, 14 May 2001. Indications of the impact of Vietnam on officer thinking are in George C. Herring, ìPreparing Not to Fight the Last War: The Impact of the Vietnam War on the U.S. Military,î in After Vietnam: Legacies of a Lost War, ed. Charles Neu (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 73­7; David Howell Petraeus, ìThe American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Eraî (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987); and Frank Hoffman, Decisive Force: The New American Way of War (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996). 

96. Fogleman explained his motives in a 1997 interview and specifically rejected the notion that he resigned in protest. Kohn, ed., ìEarly Retirement of Fogleman,î pp. 6­23, esp. p. 20. 

97. While there is no tradition of resignation in the American armed forces, it has happened, and occasionally senior officers have considered or threatened it. In 1907, ìAdmiral Willard H. Brownson resigned as chief of the Bureau of Navigation after the president [Theodore Roosevelt], over Brownsonís protests, appointed a surgeon rather than a line officer to command a hospital ship.î Oyos, ìRoosevelt, Congress, and the Military,î 
p. 325. George C. Marshall offered or intimated resignation, or was reported to have done so, at least a half-dozen times when chief of staff, but he claimed later to have actually threatened it only onceóand in retrospect characterized his action as ìreprehensible.î Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 461 n. 33, 97­103, 285­7, and George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943­1945 (New York: Viking, 1973), 
pp. 246­7, 492­3, 510­1. General Harold K. Johnson considered resigning several times, and in August 1967 the Joint Chiefs (absent one member) considered resigning as a group over the Vietnam War. See Lewis Sorley, Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 181­2, 223­4, 263, 268­70, 285­7, 303­4. In 1977, on a flight to Omaha from Washington, General F. Michael Rogers suggested to four of his colleagues that all of the Air Forceís four-stars should resign over President Jimmy Carterís cancelation of the B-1 bomber, but nothing came of the discussion. See Erik Riker-Coleman, ìPolitical Pressures on the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Case of General David C. Jones,î paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Military History, Calgary, Alberta, 27 May 2001. The source for the discussion of mass resignation is Bruce Holloway [Gen., USAF], oral history interview by Vaughn H. Gallacher [Lt. Col., USAF], 16­18 August 1977, pp. 424­6, U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. In a discussion about pressure to resign over the cancelation of the B-1, General David C. Jones (oral history interview by Lt. Col. Maurice N. Marynow, USAF, and Richard H. Kohn, August­October 1985 and January­March 1986, pp. 178­9, 181) commented, ìI think there are cases where people should perhaps resign: first, if they are ever pressured to do something immoral, illegal, or unethical; second, if you possibly felt you hadnít had your day in courtóif you hadnít been able to express your views; or if we had been inhibited in the conversation to the Congress. . . . It seems to me that it is very presumptuous that somebody in the military can set themselves up on a pedestal, that they have the answer to the country, that the President who has just been elected on a platform of cutting the defense budget, is somehow so wrong that we are in this pedestal position, that we know the answers in this country. . . . It is up to the military to make its case, and then salute smartly once that case is made. . . . The only thing I have seen while I was in the military that really would be . . . a condition of resignation would be somehow during the Vietnam War. But probably . . . it would have been for the wrong reasons[ó] . . . the White House . . . determining the targets . . . or whatever. The more fundamental reason is how in the world did we get ourselves involved in a land war in Southeast Asia[?]. . . [W]e are really servants of the people. The people make their decisions on the President. We are not elected; the President is elected. Itís only in that regard if number one, they are trying to corrupt you by ignoring you and by muzzling you and all that sort of stuff. . . . Or if something is of such national importance, and Iím not sure anybody can predict it.î In 1980, General Edward N. Meyer, chief of staff of the Army, was asked by the secretary of the Army to rescind a statement he had made to Congress about ìa hollow army.î Meyer refused and offered his resignation, but it was not accepted. Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, pp. 201­3. Retired Marine Corps commandant Charles C. Krulak (question and answer session, Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Springfield, Virginia, 27­28 January 2000, enclosed in an e-mail from a colleague to the author, 1 February 2000) claimed that ìit had become known within the Pentagon that 56 Marine General Officers would ëturn in their suitsí if mixed gender training were imposed on the Marine Corps. . . . The Marines drew a line in the sand, and the opposition folded.î 

98. Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 167. 

99. Ibid., p. 149. In May 1983, then Lieutenant Colonel Wesley Clark ìsuggested a line of argumentî to then Brigadier General Powell for introducing a transition plan to the incoming Army chief of staff: ìIsnít the most important thing never to commit U.S. troops again unless weíre going in to win? No more gradualism and holding back like in Vietnam, but go in with overwhelming force?î According to Clark, ìPowell agreed. . . . This argument captured what so many of us felt after Vietnam.î Clark, Waging Modern War, p. 7. Clark remembered that ìin the Army, it had long been an article of resolve that there would be ëno more Vietnams,í wars in which soldiers carried the weight of the nationís war despite the lack of public support at homeî (p. 17). 

100. Ole R. Holsti, ìOf Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, pp. 84, 489, and tables 1.27, 1.28. 

101. Ronald T. Kadish [Lt. Gen., USAF], Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, ìRemarks,î 6 December 2000, Space and Missile Defense Symposium and Exhibition, Association of the United States Army, El Paso, Texas, on the World Wide Web at http://www.ausa.org/kadish.html (5 January 2000). 

102. Frank Hoffman e-mail to the author, 14 March 2000. Hoffman, a member of the national security study group assisting the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, reported his conversation with a ìJoint Staff Officer that the Joint Staff and the military officers in the NSC were coordinating a rapid schedule to preclude the president from announcing a Clinton Doctrine on the use of force in late October. It was expressed in the conversation that it was hoped that publishing a strategy with narrow use of force criteria would cut out the president from contradicting himself late in the month in a speech that would contravene the militaryís idea of how to use military force.î 

103. Kohn, ed., ìEarly Retirement of Fogleman,î p. 12. 

104. ìWhy is it . . . that whatever the question isóenforcing a peace agreement in Bosnia, evacuating the U.N. from Bosnia, or invading Haiti, the answer is always 25,000 Army troops?î asked one Marine officer of a reporter. By mid-1995, the uniformed leadership was more divided on opposing interventions. See Thomas E. Ricks, ìColin Powellís Doctrine on Use of Military Force Is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers,î Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1995, p. A12; Quinn-Judge, ìDoubts of Top Brass,î p. 12. 

105. Kohn, ed., ìEarly Retirement of Fogleman,î p. 18. Another possible resignation was voiced privately in 2000. Conversation with a senior military officer, January 2001. 

106. In ìThe Pentagon, Not Congress or the President, Calls the Shots,î International Herald Tribune, 6 August 2001, on the World Wide Web at http://www.iht.com/articles/ 28442.htm (5 December 2001), journalist William Pfaff calls the military ìthe most powerful institution in American government, in practice largely unaccountable to the executive branch.î He considers the Pentagonís ìpower in Congressî to be 
ìunassailable.î In ìThe Praetorian Guard,î National Interest, Winter 2000/2001, 
pp. 57­64, Pfaff asserts (p. 63) that American ìmilitary forces play a larger role in national life than their counterparts in any state outside the Third World.î See also Desch, Civilian Control, chap. 3 and appendix; Charles Lane, ìTRB from Washington,î New Republic, 15 November 1999, p. 8; Melvin Goodman, ìShotgun Diplomacy: The Dangers of Letting the Military Control Foreign Policy,î Washington Monthly, December 2000, pp. 46­51; Gore Vidal, ìWashington, We Have a Problem,î Vanity Fair, December 2000, pp. 136ff. 

107. For the long-term congressional forfeiture of authority in national security, see Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication on War & Spending (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000), chaps. 1­4. 

108. The oath every American military officer takes upon commissioning reads: ìI, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.î The requirement and wording is in 5 U.S.C. §3331 (1966). An oath to support the Constitution is required of ìall executive and judicial officersî as well as senators and representatives, of the national and state governments, by Article VI, para. 3. 

109. For civilian control in the Constitution, see Richard H. Kohn, ìThe Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers,î in The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 61­94. 

110. This is George Bushís characterization, in ìA Nation Blessed,î Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001, p. 138. The actual civil-military relationship and the extent of civilian oversight are revealed in the works cited in endnote 111, below. 

111. A good bibliography of the literature on the Vietnam War is George C. Herring, Americaís Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950­1975, 3d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996). The most convincing explanations of the American defeat explore the inability of the United States and South Vietnam to prevent communist forces from contesting the countryside and thereby continuing combat, and the failure to establish an indigenous government that could command the loyalty or obedience of the population, in the crucial period 1965­68, before the American people lost patience with the cost and inconclusiveness of the struggle and forced American disengagement. The best discussion to date of civil-military relations in the Persian Gulf War is Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generalsí War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). The memoirs of Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf confirm the very strong oversight and occasional intervention by the Bush administration in strategy and operations during the fighting. The senior British commander in the Gulf, General Sir Peter de la Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Account (London: HarperCollins, 1992), remembers (p. 103) that ìSchwarzkopf was under intense pressure from Washington . . . to consider other plans being dreamt up by amateur strategists in the Pentagon,î but (pp. 139­40) that as late as early December 1990 he ìhad no written directive as to how he should proceed[,] . . . no precise instructions as to whether he was to attack Iraq as a whole, march on Baghdad, capture Saddam, or what.î See also George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 302ff. 

112. That civilian control includes the right of the civilians to be ìwrongî is the insight of Peter D. Feaver. See his ìThe Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control,î Armed Forces & Society, vol. 23, 1996, p. 154. 

113. The importance of firm civilian control, even to the point of interference in technical military matters, in order to assure a strong connection between ends and means, is the argument of Eliot A. Cohen, ìThe Unequal Dialogue,î in Soldiers and Civilians, ed. Feaver and Kohn, chap. 12. 

114. S. L. A. Marshall, the famous journalist and reserve officer who from the 1930s through the 1970s studied and wrote so influentially about soldiers, soldiering, battle, and war, was not contrasting the military from other professions but people in uniform from all others when he wrote: ìThe placing of the line of duty above the line of self interest . . . is all that distinguishes the soldier from the civilian. And if that aspect of military education is slighted for any reason, the nation has lost its main hold on security.î The Soldierís Load and the Mobility of a Nation (1947; repr. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1980), p. 104. 

115. I am indebted to University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill emeritus professor of political science Raymond Dawson for this distinction. 

116. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense has created at least three new institutes for security studies to teach democratic defense practices, particularly civilian control of the military, to other nations. Presently there are at least four, meant to serve uniformed officers, defense officials, and political leaders from formerly communist countries in Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. 

117. Larry Rohter, ìFear of Loss of Democracy Led Neighbors to Aid Return,î New York Times, 15 April 2002, p. A6; Christopher Marquis, ìBush Officials Met with Venezuelans Who Ousted Leader,î New York Times, 16 April 2002, pp. A1, A8; and Peter Hakim, ìDemocracy and U.S. Credibility,î New York Times, 21 April 2002, p. 4 wk. 

118. Speech to the House of Commons, 11 November 1947, quoted in Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 8 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), vol. 7, p. 7566. 
 

La borrachera del déficit 

Por Paul Krugman 
The New York Times

NUEVA YORK 
Imaginen un alcohólico en recuperación que recae en la bebida. Primero dice que unos traguitos no le harán nada. Luego, cuando ya no puede negar que está borracho, insiste en que es una recaída pasajera. Finalmente, rezonga mientras estira la mano hacia otra botella: "¿Qué tiene de extraordinario estar sobrio?" Lo mismo hace el gobierno de George W. Bush respecto a los déficit presupuestarios. 

Durante la campaña de 2000, Bush solía prometer que mantendría la responsabilidad fiscal. Hasta el momento mismo en que se aprobó el recorte tributario de 2001, sus partidarios decían que podrían rebajar los impuestos, costear nuevos programas (por ejemplo, la cobertura de la provisión de medicamentos de venta bajo receta) y, aun así, saldar el grueso de la deuda del gobierno federal. 

Esas proyecciones presupuestarias color de rosa se desintegraron no bien se aprobó la ley. Después vino el 11 de septiembre. "¡Qué suertudo soy! Acerté en la trifecta", declaró Bush. Y afirmó falsamente haber dicho en la campaña que sus promesas presupuestarias no se aplicarían en caso de recesión, guerra o emergencia nacional. Sin embargo, hasta esta semana, sus funcionarios insistieron en que el déficit era temporario. 

Ahora, el director de presupuestos, Mitch Daniels, ha admitido lo evidente. El gobierno federal enfrenta una perspectiva de grandes déficit que se pierde en el infinito. Y, por supuesto, el alcohólico está borracho perdido. Mientras el gobierno estira la mano hacia otra botella (léase otra rebaja impositiva a largo plazo para los ricos), sus funcionarios denuncian, malhumorados, la "fijación" en los déficit presupuestarios y la desechan tildándola de "rubinomía" (por el secretario del Tesoro de Bill Clinton, Robert Rubin) sin sentido. (De paso, lo mismo cabría decir de la guerra contra el terrorismo como excusa para los déficit. "¿Qué hiciste en la guerra, papito?", pregunta Ronald Bronwstein en The Los Angeles Times . "Conseguí una suculenta rebaja impositiva y te pasé la cuenta.") 

Dejando a un lado la economía, los argumentos, siempre cambiantes, que esgrime el gobierno para justificar los recortes dicen mucho acerca de su carácter. Si su equipo nunca se preocupó por los déficit, las promesas de Bush sobre responsabilidad fiscal fueron deshonestas. Por otro lado, si los funcionarios del gobierno sólo decidieron que los déficit eran buenos cuando les convino expresar esa convicción, quedan como vulgares charlatanes que se excusan al verse confrontados con problemas reales. 

Por cierto que el máximo economista del gobierno cambió de parecer respecto a los déficit ya muy avanzada la partida. Hace poco, Glenn Hubbard, presidente del Consejo de Asesores Económicos, negó que los déficit elevaran las tasas de interés y deprimieran las inversiones privadas. Pero Hubbard es también el autor de un libro de texto sobre economía. Como bien lo señala J. Bradford DeLong, profesor de Berkeley, en su influyente sitio en Internet, la edición 2002 de ese libro explica cómo los déficit elevan las tasas de interés y deprimen las inversiones privadas. 

Menos impuestos para los ricos 

Hay una explicación para eso. Cuando el gobierno vende bonos, compite con los prestatarios privados. Según las reglas habituales de la economía, en igualdad de condiciones esta competencia debería provocar un alza de las tasas de interés y una baja en las inversiones. Hay excepciones, pero quien descubra súbitamente una en el momento preciso en que sus amos políticos necesitan una noticia de tapa no es persona creíble. 

Este alcohólico, ¿alguna vez volverá a ser abstemio? No, por un tiempo. Tiene a su alrededor demasiada gente que lo incita a beber. La Oficina de Presupuesto del Congreso (CBO) pronto empezará a usar un "puntaje dinámico" al evaluar las propuestas de recortes tributarios. En otras palabras, partirá de la premisa ofertista de que tales rebajas aceleran el crecimiento económico y, por ende, generan ganancias fiscales indirectas que contrarrestan las pérdidas directas. Antes, sus funcionarios se oponían a esta práctica porque es muy fácil deslizarse del análisis objetivo a la racionalización de los deseos. Con una Casa Blanca y un Congreso dominados por los republicanos, ¿alguien duda de que los futuros análisis de la CBO se mostrarán muy favorables a los grandes recortes impositivos para los ricos? 

Está bien tener un déficit durante una recesión, con tal de que sea temporario. Pero tanto las cifras como la búsqueda de excusas por parte del gobierno nos dicen que éste nada tiene de pasajero. Por el contrario, es probable que nuestra borrachera deficitaria dure hasta que se jubile la gran generación de la posguerra. Y entonces la mona será mucho peor. 

Extrañaremos la "rubinomía". Tal vez no hoy ni mañana, pero sí dentro de poco y por el resto de nuestra vida. 

(Traducción de Zoraida J. Valcárcel) 
 

La escritora presentó en Madrid su nueva obra, En América, publicada por Alfaguara 

Es grave que en EU, el país más poderoso, no haya debate: Sontag 

 Estados Unidos representa muchas fantasías, pues no hay un solo sueño americano, dice
 Aborda en su libro las migraciones europeas, uno de los hechos fundacionales de su patria 

ARMANDO G. TEJEDA CORRESPONSAL 

Madrid, 26 de noviembre. La escritora Susan Sontag presentó hoy en Madrid su nueva novela, En América (Alfaguara), obra ''indestructible" en la que la polifacética intelectual dice haber desplegado toda su creatividad para ''expresar todo cuanto he necesitado por medio de la literatura". 

La novelista, ensayista, fotógrafa y dramaturga confesó sentirse ''incómoda" como estadunidense y todavía más, si cabe, a raíz de los atentados del 11 de septiembre, ya que después de escribir un artículo de ''puro sentido común" recibió todo tipo de críticas e incluso amenazas de muerte. 

Nacida en 1933 y afincada en Nueva York desde hace décadas, Sontag representa el pensamiento crítico e hiperculto de Estados Unidos, nación que convierte en objeto literario en su más reciente novela, en la que aborda uno de los hechos fundacionales, esenciales de ese país: las masivas y permanentes migraciones europeas que, huyendo de la opresión zarista, de los conflictos bélicos o de la depresión económica, se hacían a la mar en pos del sueño americano. 

Escribir sobre los derrotados 

En América es una novela histórica que tiene como punto de partida la biografía de Helena Modrzejewska, la actriz polaca más célebre de finales del siglo XIX que decide hacer las maletas y buscar fortuna en Estados Unidos. Para contar esta historia, que llega hasta los conflictos que abrumaron a Bosnia y Sarajevo hace un lustro, Sontag empleó ocho años, que representan probablemente uno de los periodos más difíciles de su vida. 

Por eso -dice la novelista- ''esta es una novela indestructible, pues en esos ocho años sólo he tenido que interrumpir la escritura en tres ocasiones'': la primera por el viaje que hizo a Sarajevo, cuando las tropas serbias perpetraban una auténtica limpieza étnica en la zona; la segunda, a raíz de un accidente automovilístico que la dejó postrada en cama seis meses, y la última, la más prolongada -año y medio- por el tratamiento al que tuvo que someterse una vez que se le detectó cáncer. 

Sontag considera que En América es la prolongación de su ''otra gran novela", El amante del volcán. Durante la presentación de su libro en la Casa de América de Madrid, explicó que a diferencia de los ''grandes escritores", cree que ha escrito sus mejores libros en los últimos años de su vida. 

La también autora de la recopilación de ensayos Contra la interpretación y La enfermedad y sus metáforas, se refirió a la hegemonía de Estados Unidos: ''Es un país que representa muchas fantasías, no hay un gran sueño americano sino muchos sueños. En tanto no estoy de acuerdo con quienes dicen que no hay cultura en mi país, sin embargo, mi historia no es de ninguna de estas cosas, ya que siempre me ha interesado más, como a Charles Baudelaire, escribir historias de derrotados." 

Amenazas por artículo inocuo 

Sontag, una de las voces más críticas frente al gobierno de Estados Unidos, reconoció que a raíz de un artículo ''inocuo" que publicó por el 11 de septiembre, que a diferencia de otros no era ''radical ni mucho menos", pero que le valió recibir infinidad de amenazas y críticas; incluso ''una vez me amenazaron de muerte por teléfono". Sin embargo, mantiene incólume sus apreciaciones sobre la política de George W. Bush. ''Desprecio y temo a este gobierno, es algo de sobra conocido, pero insisto en que el problema para nosotros es que en estos momentos hay únicamente un gran partido político, el Republicano, mientras el Demócrata está muy débil. Además, los dos coinciden en lo básico y muchos que discrepan de estas opciones no tienen forma de ser representados políticamente. Resulta grave que en el país más poderoso del planeta no haya ningún tipo de debate. Esta es una administración terrible y sí, coincido en que Bush podría ser una persona completamente estúpida, pero no por esto hay que sentir cierta superioridad hacia él, pues está rodeado de personas muy brillantes y peligrosas que, encabezadas por Donald Rumsfeld, pretenden llevar a cabo una política reaccionaria y bélica." 

''Resulta paradójico", explicó, que siendo Estados Unidos un país de migraciones, ahora se desarrolle una política xenófoba contra los países árabes, cuando ''el gran reto de esta era son las grandes migraciones", de las que dice sentirse cercana, pues siempre ha preferido sentirse extranjera. 

''Siempre me ha dado vergüenza ser americana, de un país tan poderoso del que no me gusta ni el culto a la vanidad ni su sistema de comunicación de masas, ni las armas de fuego ni las películas de Hollywood, ni la violencia ni la cultura popular que arrasa la cultura de otros países. No lo había pensado ni dicho nunca, pero preferiría ser española o italiana. No estoy cómoda allí, pero desde antes del 11 de septiembre, desde toda mi vida. También es importante sentirse incómodo, como decía Baudelaire, cuando brindaba: me interesan más los derrotados que los ganadores." 

Sontag señaló por último que conservar el espíritu crítico es esencial para ''mantener viva la utopía", pues lo fundamental es mantener vivo el sentimiento utópico. 

"Renuncia funcionaria canadiense que tildó a Bush de "tarado"
________
Francoise Ducros  Ý
27 de noviembre, 2002
Actualizado: 9:20 AM hora de Nueva York (1420 GMT)

OTTAWA (Reuters) -- Una alta consejera del primer ministro canadiense Jean Chretien, que generó una controversia al calificar como un "tarado" al presidente estadounidense, George W. Bush, renunció el martes a su cargo. 

Francoise Ducros, directora de comunicaciones de Chretien, había estado bajo fuerte presión de la oposición y de la prensa desde que hizo el comentario la semana pasada durante una conversación con periodistas que cubrían la cumbre de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte en Praga. 

La funcionaria presentó su renuncia el viernes pero Chretien la rechazó, al afirmar que sus comentarios habían sido privados. Sin embargo, Ducros envió el martes una nueva carta a Chretien diciéndole que dejaba el cargo. 

"Está muy claro para mí que la controversia hará imposible que pueda cumplir con mi trabajo. Quisiera, por lo tanto, dejar inmediatamente mi posición como directora de comunicaciones", escribió Ducros, quien ocupaba el cargo desde mediados de 1999. 

Ducros, una abogada de 40 años conocida por su actitud combativa, mostró siempre su lealtad a Chretien y era considerada como una de las figuras más influyentes en Ottawa. 

"Lo siento mucho. Ella era muy buena, una persona muy competente que me sirvió a mí y sirvió al gobierno extremadamente bien, y le deseo buena suerte", dijo Chretien a los reporteros. 

El incidente amenazó con deteriorar aún más la maltrecha relación entre Bush y Chretien, quien claramente está incómodo con las posiciones del mandatario estadounidense en distintos asuntos, como sus amenazas de una guerra contra Iraq. 

El diario The National Post y otros periódicos de la cadena nacional Sun informaron que la funcionaria del gobierno de Chretien había expresado durante la cumbre de Praga su frustración de que Bush parecía más preocupado por conseguir respaldo para una posible acción militar en Iraq que en la expansión de la OTAN. 

"Es un tarado", habría dicho Ducros, que fue citada por los diarios canadienses.
________________

Renuncia la ministra alemana que habría comparado a Bush con Hitler
23 de septiembre, 2002
Actualizado: 9:55 AM hora de Nueva York (1355 GMT)

BERLIN (CNN) -- El canciller alemán Gerhard Schroeder, quien se acaba de apuntar una victoria con una reducida mayoría en las recientes elecciones, anunció el lunes que su ministra de Justicia renunciará al cargo luego que se difundieran sus supuestos comentarios en los que comparaba las tácticas del presidente George W. Bush a las utilizadas por Hitler. 

Schroeder dijo en una conferencia de prensa, tras ganar las elecciones el domingo, que la ministra de Justicia Herta Daeubler-Gmelin informó el lunes a los dirigentes del Partido Social Demócrata que no aceptaría un segundo mandato como ministra. 

"Creo que merece respeto el hecho de que ella no quiera afectar el nuevo comienzo (del gobierno) con todo lo que sucedió", dijo el canciller. 

Su supuesto comentario de que Bush utilizaba el tema de Iraq como táctica para desviar la atención de los problemas domésticos, una modalidad que también utilizaba Hitler, molestó a Washington y avergonzó a Schroeder en el último tramo de las elecciones. 

"Bush quiere desviar la atención de sus problemas domésticos. Es una táctica clásica. Es la que Hitler también usó", dijo la ministra la semana pasada, según el periódico regional Schwaebisches Tagblatt. 

La ministra negó haber hecho ese comentario comparando a Bush con Hitler, pero el portavoz del presidente estadounidense describió el episodio como "indignante", mientras que la asesora nacional de seguridad de Bush, Condoleezza Rice, dijo que las relaciones bilaterales habían sido "envenenadas".
_________________

L'économie américaine fait irruption dans la campagne électorale
A moins d'une semaine du scrutin de mi-mandat du président Bush, l'effondrement du moral des consommateurs jette une ombre sur la reprise. L'inquiétude des ménages se nourrit des mauvais chiffres du chômage, de la faiblesse continue de Wall Street et de la crainte d'une guerre en Irak.

New York de notre correspondant

Eclipsées par la perspective d'un conflit armé avec l'Irak et la sanglante équipée du "sniper" de Washington, les difficultés de l'économie américaine sont passées presque inaperçues lors de la campagne pour les élections législatives.

A moins d'une semaine du scrutin, elles viennent se rappeler au bon souvenir des électeurs. Mardi, le baromètre de la confiance des ménages, calculé par le Conference Board pour le mois d'octobre, est tombé à son plus bas niveau depuis neuf ans. "La faiblesse du marché du travail, les éventuelles conséquences d'une guerre contre l'Irak et la crainte d'une nouvelle baisse de la Bourse ont laminé la confiance", explique Lynn Franco, directrice du bureau d'études. L'indice est tombé à 79.4 contre 93.7 en septembre.

"Cette fois, il semble bien que les Américains aient fini par perdre le moral", souligne Drew Matus, économiste de la banque Lehman Brothers.

Après trois trimestres de récession l'an dernier, l'activité a connu un sursaut lors des derniers mois de 2001 et des premiers de 2002. Une reprise d'autant plus spectaculaire qu'elle intervenait à la suite d'une relance monétaire et budgétaire massive. Après onze baisses consécutives, la Réserve fédérale a ramené en 2001 le loyer de l'argent au jour le jour à 1,75Ý%, son plus bas niveau depuis quarante ans. Le budget des Etats-Unis, en excédent de 150Ýmilliards de dollars, est passé dans le même temps à un déficit d'une ampleur comparable. Mais, faute de relais pris par l'investissement et la consommation, la reprise s'est rapidement essoufflée. Au point de faire craindre aujourd'hui une rechute et une nouvelle récession. La croissance est retombée à 1,1Ý% en rythme annuel au deuxième trimestre.

Les ménages ont tenu l'activité à bout de bras depuis deux ans et demi, continuant à dépenser et à s'endetter en dépit de l'augmentation du chômage et de la diminution de leur patrimoine après la dégringolade de Wall Street. Ils ne pourront plus le faire longtemps. Depuis le milieu de l'année 2000, la consommation et le logement, qui représentent 73Ý% de l'activité économique, ont augmenté à un rythme annuel de 2,7Ý%. Mais la situation financière des Américains n'a cessé de se dégrader. Leur taux d'endettement atteint le niveau record de 96,5Ý% du revenu disponible. Pour réduire leurs dettes, les ménages n'ont d'autre alternative qu'épargner plus et consommer moins... Ils y sont d'autant plus contraints que les hausses de salaires se font rares maintenant. Non seulement les entreprises ont des problèmes de rentabilité, mais elles n'ont plus de difficultés pour recruter. Enfin, les consommateurs ne pourront plus compter sur un nouveau coup de pouce au pouvoir d'achat sous la forme de baisses d'impôts.

"Les économistes feraient mieux de regarder ce que font les consommateurs plutôt que ce qu'ils disent, s'emporte Glenn Hubbard, le président du conseil des conseillers économiques de George Bush. La confiance baisse depuis mai, mais le marché du logement reste solide. Avec l'augmentation des revenus, la progression des dépenses de consommations sera substantielle durant la prochaine année de reprise." Reste à savoir comment les salaires pourront augmenter.

Les 8Ý000Ýmilliards de dollars partis en fumée à Wall Street depuis marsÝ2000 ont laissé des traces profondes dans les bilans des entreprises sous la forme de participations surévaluées, d'investissements hasardeux et de surcapacités. Le taux d'utilisation des équipements industriels était de seulement 76,1Ý% en août, tous secteurs confondus. Contraintes aujourd'hui de publier de "vrais résultats", sans artifices comptables, les entreprises désinvestissent, réduisent l'emploi, se désendettent et effacent les moins-values héritées de la bulle. Elles n'augmentent surtout pas les rémunérations.

Quant à l'immobilier, il s'agit sans doute aujourd'hui de la principale menace pour l'économie américaine. Le prix des maisons a encore continué à augmenter de 6,5Ý% en rythme annuel au deuxième trimestre. Le transfert de l'épargne de la Bourse vers le logement et le niveau très faible des taux d'intérêt ont créé une bulle. Si cette bulle éclate, la situation financière des ménages deviendra encore plus précaire et la consommation encore plus faible. Un scénario catastrophe que redoute Stephen Roach, économiste en chef de la banque Morgan Stanley. "L'histoire nous apprend que la déflation se produit souvent après l'éclatement de bulles financières majeures", écrit-il. "Beaucoup se sont empressés de clamer que l'Amérique n'est pas le Japon des années 1990, ajoute-t-il. Mais si la bulle de l'immobilier et celle de la consommation éclataient à leur tour..."

Le mot même de déflation fait peur à Wall Street et à la Maison Blanche. Dans l'inconscient collectif, il est synonyme de calamité et renvoie aux images de la grande dépression des années 1930. Les prix des actifs et des biens ne cessent de baisser, les profits s'effondrent, les entreprises réduisent les salaires et licencient, entraînant un nouveau recul de la consommation. Les ménages et les entreprises trop endettés ne peuvent plus faire face à leurs engagements.

L'économie américaine n'en est pas là, mais elle est particulièrement fragile. "Cela faisait très longtemps que la déflation ne faisait plus partie du paysage. Aujourd'hui, il s'agit d'un risque à la fois possible et plausible", reconnaît J.ÝAlfred Boaddus, le président de la banque de Réserve fédérale de Richmond. En dépit de la faiblesse du dollar, l'inflation est tombée aux Etats-Unis à 1,1Ý%, son plus bas niveau depuis 48Ýans.

Eric Leser
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L'économie canadienne résiste encore
 

Le Canada a réussi jusqu'à maintenant à résister au ralentissement des Etats-Unis, son plus important partenaire commercial, évitant même la récession en 2001 grâce à la consommation des ménages.

Les économistes estiment cependant que l'économie canadienne, fortement dépendante des exportations, ne pourra pas tenir le coup indéfiniment. Ils tablent sur une croissance de 3,4Ý% en 2002 et de 3,35Ý% en 2003. La Banque du Canada a réduit ses propres prévisions, la semaine dernière, et mis en garde contre le risque d'une reprise de l'inflation.ÝElle s'attend maintenant à une croissance légèrement au-dessus du potentiel de 3Ý% de l'économie, ces trois prochains trimestres.

La banque centrale canadienne est la seule du G7 à avoir relevé son taux directeur à trois reprises cette année. Selon les économistes, le chômage devrait continuer à baisser l'an prochain, passant de 7,45Ý% au premier trimestre 2003 à 7Ý% début 2004.
 

ï ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 01.11.02
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ÝJANVIER 2002 ÝÝÝÝÝPages 20 et 21
Ý

DES IDÉES DÉSORMAIS JUGÉESÝ«ÝNATURELLESÝ»
Quand la droite américaine pensait l'impensable
 

  

L'idéologie néolibérale et impériale défendue par les Etats-Unis semble triompher partoutÝ: domination diplomatique et militaire américaine, dilution de plus en plus voyante de l'Europe en une zone de libre-échange, octroi par la Chambre des représentants, le 6 décembre 2001, de pouvoirs accrus au président George W. Bush en matière de négociations commerciales (pouvoirs qui avaient été refusés au président William Clinton en 1997). Le mouvement antimondialisation paraît sur la défensive. Comme les néolibéraux il y a trente ans...  

Ý 
Par SERGE HALIMI 
 

 
En 1998, ébranlé par les crises financières en Russie, en Asie du Sud-Est et en Amérique latine, un zélateur du «Ýcapitalisme globalÝ» le jugeait «Ýen retraite totale, peut-être pour des annéesÝ». Et l'hebdomadaire Business Week envisageait «Ýune retraite du capitalisme de libre-échange, idéologie de fait de l'après-guerre froideÝ; un monde dans lequel les pays se retirent du système de marché que chacun croyait aller de soi (1)ÝÝ». Même le ministre des finances japonais se voulait alors «Ýun keynésien de la vieille école (2)ÝÝ». 

L'illusion n'a pas duré, les choses - et les affaires - ont repris leur cours ordinaire. Mais, à d'autres périodes, le renversement du système dominant de croyances économiques et de politiques publiques légitimées par ces croyances avait eu lieu. Il ne fut pas le produit du hasard ou de la fatalité, pas davantage le résultat mécanique de réalignements sociaux ou historiques. Dans le cas des Etats-Unis, le livre que Rick Perlstein vient de consacrer à Barry Goldwater, candidat républicain à l'élection présidentielle américaine de 1964, nous rappelle, opportunément, le pouvoir du politique, l'existence d'un moment où contre toute attente ce sont les «ÝperdantsÝ» qui écrivent l'histoire parce qu'ils ont mobilisé, semé les idées et créé les mouvements qui demain l'emporteront (3). 

Bien prévoir pour bien agir, ce n'est donc pas forcément, comme le croient la plupart des sondeurs et des journalistes, prolonger les courbes existantes, se dissoudre dans l'air du temps, se plier à l'agenda des médias et à leurs exigences. C'est parfois préparer l'infléchissement des courbes puis leur retournement - patiemment, avec ténacité, le cas échéant en n'hésitant pas à combattre tous les jaboteurs d'idées à la mode. Parfois, le travail idéologique, le volontarisme politique et le militantisme font naître une nouvelle «ÝdemandeÝ». 

En 1964, Barry Goldwater est écrasé par le démocrate Lyndon JohnsonÝ: il n'obtient que 38Ý% des voix. Commentateurs et experts rédigent promptement son épitaphe et proclament le triomphe de l'idéologie démocrate, centriste et keynésienne. Le radicalisme conservateur est décrété «ÝfiniÝ». «ÝL'extrémisme dans la défense de la liberté n'est pas un vice, la modération dans la poursuite de la justice n'est pas une vertuÝ», avait claironné Barry Goldwater. Avec ce candidat-là, le Parti républicain a ainsi pris le risque de proposer à l'électorat des couleurs vives et un discours de rupture, de contre-révolution. Il aura, pense-t-on, compris la leçon. En novembre 1964, les élections se gagnent toujours au centre, le radicalisme effarouche, le progrès est garanti, le New Deal paraît éternel, les idéologies convergent, les techniques l'emportent, la pensée est unique Ý: il-n'y-a-pas-de-solution-alternative (4). 

Le président républicain Dwight Eisenhower admettait en 1958 que «Ýl'expansion graduelle de l'Etat fédéralÝ» était «Ýle prix à payer pour une augmentation rapide de la croissanceÝ». En 1960, la plate-forme du Parti démocrate annonce que «Ýl'éradication définitiveÝ» de la pauvreté est «Ýen vueÝ». Lyndon Johnson s'y emploie, assuré que «Ýnous pouvons tout faireÝ: nous en avons les moyens (5)ÝÝ». Il lance - à partir de la capitale fédérale, avec l'argent de l'impôt et le concours de milliers de fonctionnaires supplémentaires - une «Ýguerre contre la pauvretéÝ». Socialement, elle atteindra certains de ses objectifs (6). Politiquement, elle sonnait déjà le chant du cygne d'une ère de volontarisme keynésienÝ: «ÝUne guerre contre vos portefeuillesÝ», avait tranché Barry Goldwater. 

Car déjà des réalignements se dessinent. Le New Deal n'est pas éternel, le patronat prépare sa revanche, la coalition démocrate implose des deux côtésÝ: les «Ýpetits BlancsÝ», surtout ceux du Sud, l'abandonnent sur la question des droits civiques accordés aux Noirs, les radicaux combattent Lyndon Johnson à cause de la conscription et du Vietnam. La pensée va cesser d'être unique. Et l'«ÝextrémismeÝ» changer de camp. 

Un peu comme change de camp un certain Ronald Reagan. En 1964, il est républicain et il fait campagne pour Barry Goldwater (7). Lui aussi réclame «Ýun choix, pas un échoÝ». Il aboutira à ses fins. Pour «ÝsauverÝ» le Parti républicain exclu de la Maison Blanche depuis 1933, Dwight Eisenhower l'avait rallié aux thèmes et aux politiques du Parti démocrate. Quatre décennies plus tard, on créditera M. William Clinton d'un exploit comparable. Mais en sens inverse. Quand, cette fois, le Parti démocrate se range aux thèmes et aux politiques du Parti républicain, ce dernier a adopté une orientation néolibérale radicale. Président de la Heritage Foundation, le think tank («Ýboîte à idéesÝ») de la droite américaine qui a formé nombre des cadres de l'actuelle administration Bush, M.ÝEdwin Feulner expliquait en 1993Ý: «ÝLorsque nous avons démarré (en 1973), on nous qualifiait d'"ultra-droite" ou d'"extrême droite". Aujourd'hui, nos idées appartiennent au courant dominant (8).Ý» 

Ce serait cependant pécher par idéalisme que d'attribuer un tel retournement au seul travail idéologique des think tanks, des institutions économiques internationales, des intellectuels et des journalistes qui firent rimer «ÝmodernitéÝ» avec alignement sur les thèses du patronat. Le volontarisme intellectuel d'une droite n'hésitant pas à invoquer les thèses du communiste italien Antonio Gramsci sur la nécessaire conquête de l'hégémonie culturelle n'a en effet atteint ses fins qu'en raison d'une modification du rapport de forces social et politique en sa faveur. 
 

Une panique identitaire
 
 
 

La question des «ÝminoritésÝ» aida à disloquer la coalition démocrate. On oublia ce que l'Etat social avait apporté (New Deal) pour ne retenir que ce qu'il coûtait (impôts)Ý; les prélèvements fiscaux et l'inflation furent progressivement perçus par certaines catégories populaires comme le prix de politiques qui ne les favorisaient plus. Dès 1964, la campagne de Goldwater démontre qu'on peut, en jouant la carte raciale et celle des «ÝvaleursÝ», faire basculer à droite un électorat populaire devenu rétif à l'action redistributive de l'Etat quand il ne voit en elle qu'une intervention coercitive au profit des «ÝminoritésÝ» et des pauvres. En évoquant le cas d'un allocataire-type, présumé noir, de coupons alimentaires «Ýqui devant vous à la caisse achète un T-bone steak pendant que vous attendez avec votre paquet de viande hachéeÝ», Ronald Reagan savait ce qu'il faisait. 

Le politologue Benjamin Barber relate qu'en janvier 1995, deux mois après la déroute électorale du Parti démocrate aux élections législatives, le président Clinton lui expliquait Ý: «ÝNous avons perdu notre base dans le Sud. Nos gars ont voté pour Gingrich (le dirigeant républicain de l'époque). Je les connais bien, j'ai grandi avec eux. Ils pensent qu'ils paient sans arrêt pour nos réformes. Depuis la guerre civile, toutes les réformes progressistes se sont faites sur leur dos. C'est eux qui ont payé le prix du progrès. Nous ne cessons de leur imputer le coût de la liberté des autres (9).Ý» 

Mais le ressentiment «ÝracialÝ» a cassé les solidarités de classe d'autant plus facilement qu'à partir du virage à droite de la fin des années 1970, le chômage, la précarité, la mise en concurrence de tous avec chacun amenuisent la disposition des milieux populaires à «ÝpayerÝ». Fût-ce «Ýle prix du progrèsÝ» au profit de groupes encore plus défavorisés qu'eux. Paradoxalement, l'échec social du néolibéralisme va favoriser son succès électoral et politiqueÝ: un capitalisme sauvage libère un populisme réactionnaire. De droite ou de gauche, les gouvernants mènent une politique favorable aux riches. Puis, avec le concours des médias détenus par les possédants, ils convertissent une possible colère ouvrière née de revendications économiques en une panique identitaire. Et en une demande de «Ýloi et d'ordreÝ» (10). 

En 1976, concluant son discours de réception du prix Nobel d'économie, Milton Friedman observeÝ: «ÝLe changement radical qui a eu lieu en matière de théorie économique n'est pas le produit d'une guerre idéologique. Il s'agit presque entièrement de la force des événements. L'expérience a eu beaucoup plus d'effet que la plus puissante des volontés idéologiques ou politiques (11).Ý» C'est se montrer bien trop modeste. Sans le travail patient des «ÝextrémistesÝ», comme Barry Goldwater et des think tanks conservateurs animés par Friedman et par Friedrich von Hayek, rien ne garantissait que l'«ÝexpérienceÝ» de la stagflation des années 1970 serait interprétée comme elle le fut. Une crise favorise la remise en cause du statu quo. Mais dans quel sensÝ? 

Société du Mont Pèlerin, Heritage Foundation, Cato InstituteÝ: ces boîtes à idées n'hésitèrent pas à «Ýpenser l'impensableÝ». Au fond, le nom du parti au pouvoir leur importait peuÝ: il fallait qu'à terme tous les partis se voient contraints de conduire une politique économique au service de l'«ÝentrepriseÝ», que les joueurs s'affrontent, mais sur le même terrain. A droite, tous keynésiens en 1960 Ý: conservateurs britanniques, républicains américains et gaullistes français. A gauche, tous néolibéraux en 2000Ý: travaillistes blairistes, démocrates clintoniens et socialistes français. 
 

Léninistes de marché
 
 
 

Préparant, dès février 1947, la grande alternative au «ÝsocialismeÝ», Hayek annonceÝ: «ÝNotre effort diffère d'une tâche politiqueÝ: il doit essentiellement viser le long terme et non pas ce qui pourrait être immédiatement praticable (12)ÝÝ». Cela revient à dire que l'idéal néolibéral ne sera pas affadi pour courtiser le marais et obtenir ainsi des victoires sans lendemain. Il ne s'agit pas pour ces hommes de rupture, de séduire l'électorat centriste, les parlementaires, les médias, qui tous flottent au gré des courants, mais d'inverser le sens des vagues. Léninistes de marché, les néolibéraux croyaient au rôle des avant-gardes. Ce n'était pas les ministères qui les intéressaient, mais le pouvoir. 

Goldwater, Reagan, Thatcher, Hayek, FriedmanÝ: notre monde ressemble chaque jour un peu plus à leurs rêves. Eux disposaient d'armes sur lesquelles les adversaires de la mondialisation néolibérale ne doivent pas compterÝ: les grandes entreprises ne vont pas financer les recherches de ceux qui entendent détruire leur pouvoirÝ; la presse, désormais entre les mains des multinationales, les discréditera dès que nécessaire. Les contestataires disposent néanmoins d'un atout. L'idée de transformer le monde en marchandise est folle. Quand les idées folles des dominants deviennent le «Ýcercle de la raisonÝ», quelques espoirs sont permis pour ceux qui, défendant les intérêts d'une majorité de la population de la planète, entendent remettre le monde à l'endroit. Ne pourraient-ils pas à leur tour s'imposer la détermination et la patience des croisés du marché qui, à l'écart des jeux politiciens et des séductions médiatiques, ont su autrefois penser l'impensableÝ?

SERGE HALIMI.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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